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AMTRACT 
The problems used in the study involve two colloctions of elements 
of two oolours& Tho proportions of elements of each colour in each of 
the collections is varied, and the way children reason when asked which 
collection they would prefer in order to Gamble for a specified outcome 
is investigated in three situations: 
(a) The elements are beads to be drawn from boxes. (72 subjects 
aged 5-10 years, 48 subjects aged 11-14 years). 
(b) The elements are single segments marked on circles of different 
sizesy with pointers to be spun. (72 subjects aged 6-11 years). 
(c) The elements are similar to (b)ý but marked into separate 
pieces to allow comparison by counting. (60 subjects, aged 
6-10 years). 
Pour possible ways of solvine such problems are outlined: 
Method 1: Guessing, alternating choices and other irrelevant methods. 
Method 2: Comparing the amounts of the target elements in each collectionp 
and choosing the collection with the greater amount. 
Method 3: Comparing the differences between the amount of target and non- 
target elements in each collection, and choosing the collection 
with the most favourable difference. 
Method 4: Comparing the proportions of target and non-target elements 
in each collection, and choosing the collection with the most 
favourable proportion. 
Within the main age range investiCated. (6-10 years)p methods 1-3 
are found to form a developmental sequence, in situation (a), whereas in 
situations. (b) and (c) the predominant developmental sequence is from 
Method 1 to Method 2 only. It is argued that this can be explained by 
considering the methods of quantification used by subjects in each 
situation. 
(A summary of the way in which the main themes are developed in the 
thesis is given at the end of the thesis. ) 
1. 
CHAPTEM 1. 
Introduction 
One of the recurrent themes of cognitive psychology is that people 
are constantly trying to gain control of their environment by predicting 
what will happen and testing these predictions against outcomes. For 
example, Kelly (1963) says: 
'Thus far we have said that the person is bent on 
anticipating events. His Psychological processes are channelized 
with this in mind. Each person attunes his car to the replicative 
themes he hears and each attunes his ear in a somewhat different 
way. But it i, s not mere certainty that man seeks3 if that were so, 
he might take great delight in the repetitive ticking of the clock. 
More and more he seeks to anticipate all impending events of 
14-mtooever nature. This means that he must develop a system in 
which the most unusual future can be anticipated in terms of a 
replicated aspect of the familiar past. ' (Op-cit-tP-58) 
Unfortunately many of the events we have to deal with are of a 
complexity which would make (mizz-a2 prediction impracticable for everyday 
use) and this has led to much research on 'subjective' or 'psychological' 
probability judgements in the last two decades. (Cohen and Christensen 
1970; Peterson and Beach, 1967)- The term 'subjective probability' is 
used to describe the probability of occurrence a person ascribes to an 
event rather than its mathematical or objective probability of occurrencel 
and the two need not be related. For examplev the mathematical probability 
of winning by backing a particular number when playing roulette may be 
quite small, but the gambler may consider his chances of winning as much 
better than'they are mathematically. He may even have reasons for doing 
so. The most celebrated example of such a reason is ýhe Monte Carlo fallacy, 
which in fact depends upon a miscalculation of the mathematical probability 
Of success, rather than a purely subjective estimate. 
The easiest way of understanding the Monte Carlo fallacy is by means 
Of an illustration. Suppose we toss a coin four times and each time it 
lands on heads. How likely is it that the next throw we make will give 
another head' (accepting that no trickery of any kind is involved)? 
The chances of throwing five heads in a row are slimp in fact JT21mix-jr2if 
so surely the next throw is almost bound to be a tail? 
To many people this is a very compelling line of reasoningý as is 
testified by many 'systems' for winning gambles. The reason it is fallacious 
is that every throw of the coin in independent of the throws which preceded 
it2 so that the probability of heads coming up on any throw is always-; 1g, * 
Admittedly the probability of throwing five heads in a row is -21r2li 
2. 
but the probability of throwing four heads and then a tail on the fifth 
throw is also The point is that these probabilities only 
apply in the case when one is embarking on one's first throw; they are 
the probabilities of future events. In the example given the four heads 
have already been thrown and are therefore irrelevant to any future 
probability considerations. 
Many other examples of factorslahich influence peoples judgements 
of probabilities have been collected by Cohen (1960,1964) and Cohen and 
Christensen (1970)- The flavour of this research is well illustrated by 
an experiment reported by Cohen (1957)- In this experiment adult subjects 
were given a choice between different possible gambles in the form of 
lotteries. The choice was arranged to be between a single large probability 
or a number of smaller probabilities e. g. drawing either one ticket from 
a box of teny or ten tickets from a box of one hundred, in the latter case 
putting back the ticket drawn*each time before making the next draw. 
This makes the mathematical probability of success exactly the same in 
both cases, but the experimental subjects appear to have been more influenced 
by psychological than by mathematical considerations. About four-fifths 
of the subjects preferred to make the single draw from the box of ten, and 
even when as many as fifty draws from the box of one hundred were allowedy 
many subjects still preferred the single draw. Clearly, they were afraid 
that they would keep drawing the ticket they had just put back. This is 
confirmed by the fact that when the subjects were allowed to draw the ten 
tickets (or even fewer) from ten separate boxesq a majority of subjects 
changed to preference for the plural chance to the single draw from the 
box of ten tickets. In other words they changed from underestimating 
the plural chance to overestimating it. A similar experiment is reported 
by Cbhen and Chesnick (1970)- 
The'general conclusion that one can draw from Cohen's work is that 
peoplestestimates of the probabilities of events do not necessarily obey 
rules of mathematical probability, but are subject to differento 
Psychological rules. However, this conclusion needs qualifying because 
it is only supported by empirical evidence in cases where calculation 
of the mathematical probability of a given event would be quite complex, 
so that it may be the case that estimates only obey psychological rules when 
people are unable to apply the mathematical rules. 
If one accepts Cohen's thesisq with the qualification stated aboveg 
then it becomes pertinent to ask where these 'psychological rules' of 
probability come from, and how they are developed during childhood, 
&dolescence, or whenever. 
3. 
Some answers to these questions are provided in Cohen (1957), where 
studies are reported both of the ways in which children make judgements 
about the likelihood of chance events and the ways in which their under- 
standing of probability terminoloey changes with age. In one experiment 
children were shown a display of two vertical columns of lights which 
were lit in successiong the childs' task being to guess whether the next 
light to be lit would be in the left or the right hand column. The 
children involved in the experiment were between six and eleven years old 
and the younger children seem to have followed a win-stay-lose-shift 
strategy. Older hhildren paid more attention to what was happening to the 
display and predicted that if more lights were lit on the left-hand sidel 
the next light would appear on the right, and vice-versa. 
Cohen considers that 'language of uncertainty' can be usefully thovight 
of as having three main categories: 
1. Words such as 'probability', Isurdlylt 'possiblylp which denote 
a subjective probability and are potentially quantifiable. 
2. Words like 'many', 1often1v 1soon19 which are also quantifiablep but 
denote not so much a condition of uncertainty as a quantity imprecisely 
known. 
3. Words-like 'fat', Irichlp 'drunk', which are not reducible to any 
accepted number because they are given various values by different 
people. 
In his studies of the development of the meanings of such terms2 Cohen 
has found that they are very context specific. For exampleg a childis askcd 
to take 'some$ sweets from a bowl and the experimenter notes how mapy he 
has taken. This number varies in different situations, such as if the 
child is alone or if there are other children with him who are also to 
take sweetsp if there are a large or a small number of sweets availablep 
and so on. It also depends on the items involvedv 'some friends' and 
, some trees' suggesting different numbers to most people. As well as 
this the meanings of such terms-show a marked change with age. Children 
aged between six and fourteen years were told to take 'a few' or 'a lot' 
of beads from a tray and it was found that the older the childy the 
fewer beads he will take, and also that the difference between 'a lot' 
and 'a few' widens with increasing age. The expressions 'nearly always' 
and 'very rarely' show a similar development, increasing from about 
2 to 1 for a child to 20 to 1 for a person twenty-five years old. 
The General impression created by Cohen's work is one of considerable 
ingenuity in the design of individual experiments but a lack of any 
systematic approach to the areap andý above all, any coherent theoretical 
Position. Cohen and Christensen (1970) excuse this on the following grounds: 
4. 
'The danger of premature and excessive formalisation in psychology 
has been indicated with respect to the resulting impoverishment 
and distortion of the psychological actualities which the formal 
models are designed to represent. The get-rich-quick vogue) in the 
guise, for examplej of over-hasty computerisation of psychological 
pro6essesthe complexities of which are unrecognisedt is not 
likely to identifyt let alone resolveý basic psychological issues'. 
(OP-cit-yp-142). 
Although pleas forlopen-mindedness' of this kind may well be useful 
in the opening stages of any research, once an opening has been made they 
are likely to prove malfunctional. Kuhn (1970) has put forw4rd a con- 
vincing case for the priority of paradigms in the establishment of 
scientific traditionsg and the way in which accepted paradigms determine 
both the kind of problems the practitioners of a science will attempt 
to resolve and their mode of resolution. The observation of any phenomenon 
and collection of data will always be guided by some sort of modelg and 
it is desirable that this model should be made as explicit and open to 
inspection as possible. The 'distortion of reality' caused by our models 
of reality is something that must ultimately be Livedwithp not decried. 
This point is well mdde in the fundamental postulate of Kelly's person- 
ality theoryg (Kelly, 1955) which is that a person's processes are 
psychologically channelized by the ways in whibh he anticipates events. 
Thus the best that we can do is to be continually modtfying our models 
of the world in order to extend their scope and remove incompatibilites 
between our predictions and the observed outcomes. 
A similar view of the nature of knowledge is taken by Piaget (1967)- 
A clear exposition of Piaget's views is given by Furth (1969)p who 
points out that knowing in Piaget's use is taken in a very general sense 
and does not imply any conscious or reflective knowing. Piaget holds 
that behaviour at all levels demonstrates aspects of structuringg and he 
identifies structuring with knowing. When something has been assimilated 
to the organism's structurep it is knownp so that knowledge is not seen 
as a property of the independent objectý nor is it in the subjectq instead 
it is constructed by the subject as a relation between himself and the 
object. This is perhaps more easily understood if a clear example of 
assimilation functioning in this way is given: 
'To illustrate briefly the concept of assimilationp take a 
baby who has acquired the ability to grasp things in his environment. 
Piaget conceptualizes this state of affairs by saying that the 
baby has a sensory-motor scheme of grasping. This grasping scheme 
functions by assimilating a great variety of external things to 
5. 
itself; in other words, the baby is observed to gTasp and 
handle many different objects. These things have in common 
that they are amenable to grasping even though their specific 
figural outlines may differ one from the other. The grasping 
scheme corresponds to this common property of the objects orl 
even better according to Piaget's theory, confora this common 
property on them. (Purth 1969, P-14). 
The following quotation is also very useful, as a concise summary of 
Piaget's position concerning knowledge: 
knowledge is in Piaget's theory never a stateý 
whether subjective, representativeg or objective. It is 
an activity. It can be viewed as a structuring of the 
environment according to underlying subjective structures or 
as a structuring of the subject in living interaqtionwith the 
environment. In any case, the laws of structuring are seen 
as intrinsically related to the self-regulations which are 
found at all levels of a developing biological Organisation., 
(Furth, 1969 p. 20,21. ) 
Such consideration of the nature of knowledgi and scientific 
discovery makes Cohen and Christensen's concern to avoid impoverishing 
and distorting psychological lactualities' by 'premature and excessive 
formalisationi,! appear somewhat simplistic. Az has already been pointed 
Out, such concerns may have a place in the opening stages of a field of 
researchv but significant advances will only be possible when theoretical 
models and assumptions have been made explicit. 
In this thesis an attempt will be made to take a more systematic 
look at a narrowed down area in this fieldp namely the way in which 
children make judgements about chance events in which all the mathemat- 
ically relevant information is available to inspection, though not 
necessarily explicit. Before doing thisy howevert it is necessary to 
draw attention to certain distinctions being made here which are not 
always made. 
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish events which we normally 
see as chance eventag such as the throwing of dice) coinsý and so ony 
from events to which we can ascribe probabilities, but do not normaily 
see as 'due to' chancey such as whether it will rain tomorrow. In the 
literature all events to which probabilities can be given are often, 
lumped togetherg particularly when subjective probability is usdd, ýas 
part of a theory of decision making. This may be a valid step in 
certain contexts but for present purposes it will be better to maintain 
this distinction until evidence that it is unnecessary is produced. 
6. 
The other distinction to be made is between chance events where 
all the information needed to doduce the mathematical probability of 
success is readily availabley and those where it isn't. In the former 
category would be throwing dice, coins and so onp in the latter would be 
lotteries where one doesn't know how many people have bought tickets, and 
the kind of situations, usually involved in probability-learning experiments. 
The same distinctions are drawn by Goffman (1967)- 
To reiteratet this thesis will concentrate on the way children 
make judgements about events which are commonly regarded as 'pure 
chance' but in which all the mathematically relevant information is 
available in some form. 
Within this narrowed down field the main contribution has undoubtedly 
been made by Piaget and Inhelder (1951). The point of departure of 
PiaCet's work on the development of childrens' conceptions of probability 
is well stated by Flavell (1963): 
'Iri order to identify a set of phenomena as 'chance events' one 
has first to identify a set of phenomena'uhich are not chance 
events, a non-chance ground against which chance can emerge as a 
figure. Only if cogmitive processes are developed enough to order 
and organize the intrinsically certaing lawfulq and predictable by 
means of rational operationsp can things which are intrisically 
uncertainy unlawful p and unpredictable boýý. prcýý, 3-sjjd-e'a as such' 
(Op. cit 
Pp. 341-342). 
In order to investigate what he calls the childvalconception of 
probability' Piaget devised several experiments. These will not all be 
reported here as they are susceptible to the usual critirismsc-levelled 
A-t Piaget's experiments, ladle, of exprrimental controls, detailin r(eportihg. dnd adec 'Howevery juý: te__tests of the signifidtrhoe of thb results, 
in cases where other researchers have followed Piaget's lead his originall 
experiment will be considered. 
One example of this is the work of Ybstj Siegel and Andrews (1962). 
They argue, as does Braine (1959Y1962), that Piaget may be underestimating 
his subjects' intellectual capacities by relying on verbal responses, and 
repeated one of his experiments in a form which required non-verbal 
responses and gave concrete rewards for correct responses. As carried 
out by Piaget and Inhelder (1951) the experiment involved two c6lJobtions 
of counters. There were two kinds of counter in each collection and 
the child knew how many counters of each kind were in each collection. 
His task was then to judge whether he had a better chance of drawing a 
counter of a certain kind from one collection or the other when the 
counters were face down. The modifications made to this experiment by 
7. 
Tost et al (1962) involved using a different kind of displayp demanding 
less understanding of. -probabilistic terminology, controlling 
for 
irrelevant colour preferenceslaccepting non-verbal responses (i. e. 
choices without reasons)and reinforcing 'correct' responses. Their 
criterion of success was correct choice (i. e. choice of the gamble 
which is not likely to lead to success on mathematical grounds) rather 
than thelcorrect choice and correct reason' favoured by Piaget. 
According to Yost et al (1962) a higher number of cdrrect responses in 
24 trials was produced by four-year olds with the non-verbal than the 
Piagetian experimental technique. They deduce from this that four-year 
olds do have some understanding of probability. Unfortunately this 
conclusion is invalid because their experiment confounds true under- 
standing with the kind of learning involved in probability-learning 
experiments. 
The work has been followed up by Carlson (1970). He compared the 
performance of children rather older than those in the Yost study on a 
task similar to Yost's and a Piaget derived task. His Piaget task 
involved a red ball being propelled by a spring. The distances it 
travelled in ten trials were marked and the child was asked how far it 
would go the next time. The child had to give the right answery a right 
reason, and resist a counter-suggestion by the experimenter. From the 
results of this experiment Carlson concludes: 
(a) The development of probability reasoning increases monotonically 
with age. 
N Verbal and non-verbal assessment techniques do not measure the 
same aspects of this development. 
(c) The general age brackets suggested by Piaget for the ontogenesis 
of probabilistic thinking are supported. 
(d) Sex and intelligence are not significant variables in the 
development of probabilistic thought. 
Of these conclusions perhaps (c) is most interestingg that is the 
experiment confirms Piaget's reported findings. (Carleon (1969), reports 
other experiments whibh also confirm Piaget's findings. ) 
Conclusion (a)j that the development of probability reasoning increases 
monotonically with age, can only be tentatively drawn from evidence 
gathered from two problems. Conclusion (d) that sex and intelligence 
are not bignificant variables in the development of probabilistic thought 
is supported by Carlson (1969)2 but is strictly not supported by Carlson 
and McMillan (1970), which shows that mental retardation does affect 
children's probability abilities. Conclusion (b) that verbal and 
a. 
non-verbal techniques do not measure the same aspects of the development 
of probabilistic thinking is not surprising in view of the difference 
between the stringent criterion of success employed in the Piagetian 
experiment and the lax criterion of the non-verbal experiment (in which 
a subject has 0., 5 probability of guessing correctly). A difference 
between non-verbal and Piagetian measures of children's probability 
concepts was also found by Davies (1965) using children between three 
and nine years of aCet and by Goldberg (1966) with pre-school children. 
The experiments mentioned so far support the view that the 
Piagetian and non-verbal techniques for investigating children's 
probability concepts may not be tapping the same abilities. They also 
lead to greater confidence in Piaget's results as they appear to be 
easily replicable. But replication of results does not reveal anything 
more about what the children are actually doing in these experimentoland 
what kind of knowledge their probability knowledge is. The only 
coherent theoretical perspective on this appears to belong to. 
Piaget. Having stated that chance events can only be understood in 
contrast to non-chance events, he claims that this is a characteristic 
development during the concrete operational period. According to Piaget 
the pre-operational child is unable to differentiate chance and non- 
chance events2 but when he begins to apply operations to different 
phenomena he can discover areas where they fail to Sive definite 
knowledge. This allows the differentiation of chance and non-chance 
eventsp and with further development in opzrationa2thinking it im possible 
for the child to establish that certain events are more likely to occur 
than others. 
There are two achievements whibh Piaget sees as pre-requisites 
for a full understanding of probability. These are: 
(a) The ability to work out all possible outcomes of events* 
(b) The ability to handle proportions. 
Both of these achievements are characteristic of the formal 
operational period and presuppose. the development of what PiMLget calls 
a combinatorial system. (See Piaget and Inheldery 1966, for a useful 
summary of this). The child in the concrete operational period can 
only reason about things he can see to be truep and cannot deal with 
hypotheses. The essence of formal operational thought is that 
hypotheses can be systematically generated and assessedp and this 
permits the attainment of full understanding of probability. In fact 
Piaget believes that the notion of probability arises from assimilation 
of the concept of chance to the formal operations. 
9. 
The trouble with this kind of theory, au Bruner (1966) has pointed 
out, is that it is more like a logical description of what a psychological 
theory must account for than a psychological theory. Howeverp it 
provides a useful starting pointp and makes Cohen6 position seem ad-hoc 
by comparison. 
Preliminary Mcperiment 
In order to ascertain which lines of inquiry in this field might 
prove most fruitful, a small pilot experiment was run. This involved 
among others a problem devised by simpltfying some of Cohen's experiments 
to a level suitable for children and a problem designed to throw some 
light on Piaget's claim for the necessity of a 'combinatorial system' 
which develops during the formal operational period. 
Method: 17 subjects aCed between 5 and 17 years were tested and one 
aged over 21 years. Five problems were involved in the experimentp and 
a complete list can be found in Appendix A. The two problems which are 
particularly relevant to the present discussion are as follows: 
Problem 1: This is a simple form of the kind of problem used by Cohen. 
The problem involves a forced choice situtation in which the subject 
can choose to throw a die to get a six or toss a coin to get a head. 
t He is asked the reason for his choice and given a ýsmartiel as reward 
if his gamble has a successful outcome. The problem is extended by adding 
extra throws with the dieli. e. 
l(b) two throws of the die to get a six or one toss of the coin to get 
a head, 
l(c) three throws of the die to get a six or one toss of the coin to Set 
a head. 
l(d) four throws of the die to Cot a six or one toss of the coin to get 
a head. 
l(e) five throws of the die to get a six or one toss of the coin to get 
a head. 
Problem 4: It was hoped that this might elucidate Piaget's claims 
concerning the loombinat6rial system'. 
4(a) The subject has to say whether the outcome of one toss of a 
coin will be a head or a tail, giving a reason for his answer. 
The coin is then tossed, and success reWarded with a Ismartiel. 
4(b)ý This is the same as 4(a) except that the subject has to predict 
whether the outcome of two tOO00a of one Coin'will be two heads, 
t1lo tails, ý: p one-head and-, one tailý, _, 
(The alterA4tiVes are no-br 
necessarily offered in this order). 
4(c) This is the same as 4(b), except th-tt the subject is asked to predict 
whb 
' 
ther-t'he out. pome of-three tosses will be three heads, throe tails, 
two heads and a ýa'lilpý"ýor two tails _-ýnd a head. 
The order in which the five ex-ocrimental T)roblemc were presented to each 
subject was varied, but the subparts of c, -, ch problem, were 
10. 
always given in the same order. All subjects were rewarded with a 
Ismartiet whenever a choice led to a successful outcome. 
Results: The criterion of success used was the choice of the mathematically 
most likely outcomet or an assertion to the effect that one could choose 
either way where both choices had the same mathematical probability of 
success, together with what the experimenter regarded as an adequate 
justification. Full results of the experiment and sample responses, can 
be found in Appendix A. 
The rcoults of the experiment showed a steady improvement in 
performance with increasing age. A productýrmoment correlation. showed 
the correlation of performance with age to be nearly 0.8., which is 
significant at the 0.001 level. (See Appendix A). More interestingly 
the results-ohowed some of the 'psychological rules' to which Cohen refers. 
All subjects of over 13 years thought that three throws of the die to 
get a six had the same chance of success as one toss of a coin to get a 
head. The reasoning behind this appears to be: 
Each throw of the die has one-sixth probability of success. 
There are three throws. 
Hence the probability of success on three throws is one-sixth 
X3 
2* But the probability of success with one toss of the coin is also - 
So it doesn't matter which we choose. 
This is ihtuit_'ivc], 7 convincing but mathematicallyfalse. It is f alse 
because there is an implicit assumption that one cannot throw the same 
number more than one time in the three throws, whereas in fact this 
might happen. 
Ihithis situation subjects clearly did not use a combinatorial 
system to deduce all the possible outcomes and then compare the number 
of favourable with the number of possible instances in order to calculate 
the probability. Arguably, the initial estimates of one-sixth and a half 
for the one-trial probabilities of success with die and coin might have been 
arrived at t4ltýt§ WAY, but onceýthis was (lone a simple mathematical 
formula was employed. In fact, use of a combinatorial system would 
have been extremely arduous. The results ofppob1e&, 4 showed a high 
proportion of correct responses at all ages tested. (The younger 
children were not tested on part (c))* However, the answers given for 
parts (b) (predicting the outcome Of two t6i§'966Lýof a coin) and (c) 
(predicting the outcome of three tosses of a coin) seemed to be mainly 
1: intuitivb1p in that subjects were unable to formulate clear reasons 
for their choices. 
ii. 
Part (a) (predicting the outcome of one toss of a coin) was 
successfully performed (correct choice and correct reason) by nearly 
all subjects over age 9. This is an age at which children do not possess 
the combinatorial systemp according to Piaget. This means that either 
the knowledge that heads or tails is equally likely to 'come up' when 
one throws a coin cannot be dependent on such a system, or the system 
develops at an earlier age than Piaget believes. There was also little 
evidence of the use of a combinatorial system in the results of parts 
(b) and (c). The few successful answers could be ascribed to use of 
such a system, but it appears to be linked more closely to the subject's 
mathematical sophistication than anything else. Pire (1958) reached 
a similar conclusion after analysing a large number of results to 
similar problems. 
This experiment was intended as a guideline for further work and is 
clearly inconclusive because of its modest scale. Howeverp there are 
some possible criticisms of this kind of experiment which are worth 
considering now. The first of these criticisms is that the effect of 
reinforcement in the form of experimenter's approval or material reward 
iq not allowed for. The consistency of the children who have reasons 
for their choices in sticking to themt even when disappointedp rules 
this out. Of course the children who are 'just guessing' may well 
be influenced-by pay-off considerationsp but this doesn't affect the 
results when reasons as well as choices are analysed. Other possible 
criticisms are that the criterion of success employed of correct choice 
and correct reason is too stringent, and that one shouldn't make so much 
use of verbal data anyway. 
These criticisms have been lumped together because they make a 
similar point, namely that this kind of experiment underestimates the 
abilities of any given age group of children. Such criticisms are 
misdirected because the experiment is not intended to generate normative 
data, and as long as one accepts this one might as well use the richest 
data source availablep namely verbal data. There will always be 
children who make correct choices consistently and yet can't explain 
why. Indeed it is commonly accepted that competence of this kind 
generally precedes linguistic performance, but this is only ýlikely 
to 
be the case when competence is newly acquired. 
The general conclusion to be derived from this little pilot study 
is that whilst Piaget's idea of a combinatorial system may provide an 
adequate logical description of the way probabilities are correctly 
calculated in this kind of situationt it is not a very plausible 
11 
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psychological theory of what"people actually do in such situations. 
Cohen*s claims about lpsycholooical rules' being employed to generate 
subjective probabilities offer more promise, but look somewhat empty 
in view of the ad hoc way in which these psychological rules must be 
inferred from situation to situation. 
Introduction to the type of problem to be investigated. 
What seems to be needed is a detailed study of what children 
actually do in order to make judgements of probabilities. This must 
involve either acceptance of verbal data or else an exceptionally high 
degreee of methodological rigour in testing alternative explanations of 
the childrens' performances. Many of the studies reported so far fail 
to do either of these things, serving merely as replications of Piaget's 
observations. Howevery in some cases Piagetla observations are detailed 
enough to be worthy of further consideration. 
One example of this is the problem, already discussedg which was 
criticised by Yost ef. al (1962). The experimenter makes up two collections 
of counters, some of which have a cross on one side and some of which 
don't. For example, one collection might contain two counters with 
crosses and two without crosses, whilst the other colledtion haa two 
counters with crosses and one without a cross. The collections are then 
turned face down and their members are scrambled up. The child is 
asked whether he has a greater chance of drawing a counter with a cross 
from one collection or the other. After investigating children's 
answers to a number of problems of this kind, using varying proportions 
of crosses and non-crossest Piaget reported the following developmental 
stages: 
(a) The child does not apply any systematic and relevant strategy. 
(b) The child predicts on the basis of the absolute number of 
counters with crosses in each collection, rather than the 
ratio of these to the total number of counters. 
(c) The child predicts by comparing the proportions of crosses 
and non-crosses in each collection. 
Stages (b) and (c) are confirmed by Lowe and Ranyard (1973) in a 
study involving children aged 8 to 11, who should be in the later part 
of Piagetts concrete operational period. Stage (b) is described by 
Lowe and Ranyard as involving use of magnitude cues2 and stage (c) 
involves use of proportion cues. Information about the cues used 
by the the subjects was obtained by'designinG the problems so that 
proportion and magnitude cues were in conflict and then carrying out 
individual regression analyses to determine which strategy (magnitude 
13. 
or proportion) matched the subject's judgements more closely. These 
analyocs revealed that most children quite distinctly utilized one 
cue rather than the other. However, the children who did use proportion 
as a cue were not in the formal operations staCep although Lowe and 
Ranyard think that they may have been 'helped! by certain details of 
the design of their experiments. One of their experiments involved 
collections of red and green beads in beakers, about which they comment: 
'The results in the Beaker test seem in direct conflict with 
Piaget and Inhelder's findings. This may be due to the way the 
information was arranged on our slidesq compared to the way 
Piaget and Inhelder set out the information (in the same task). 
On our slides2 the favourable and unfavourable cases were 
arranged in separate columns in each beaker emphasizing this 
comparisony whereas Piaget and Inhelder set out each collection 
randomly. When the information is organized appropriately many 
children will be capable of comparing serial ordersof. favourable 
and unfavourable cases and basing their judgements on a simple 
compensation between these. If the collections are arranged 
unsystematically such a strategy will not occur spontaneously 
and attempts to make the more difficult comparison between 
favourable and possible cases are more likely. ' (Op-cit-vP-7)- 
Later on they say: 
'In conclusion, we are suggesting that when information 
is organized appropriately, children at the concrete operations 
stage can use a successful proportion - like strategy in a 
probability task. ' (Op. cit. v P. 8). 
The fact that this particular type of problem has been so popular 
with investigators renders it suitable for more detailed analysisy 
which will be attempted in this thesis. 
Introduction to the theoretical approach to be adopted 
Having surveyed some of the researches in the field chosen, the 
problem arises of what to do next. The resolution of this problem 
depends very much on the individualb,; conception of what science is and 
should be like. The positivist point of view is that laws should be 
produced from the generalisation of experimental data and organised 
into a formal theoretical structure. Attempts to introduce, theoretical 
concepts with a standing of their own are frowned upon as metaphysical 
in cases where the entities they refer to are not susceptible of 
direct observation. 
Harrg (1971) has argued that this approach to science is empty and 
Iftatrizting. He believeSthat the way forward in any soience is an 
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adequate conception of the nature of the entity being studiedv so that 
chemistryp for examplet really Got under. icqy-with the idea that materials 
were made up of minute parts. He goes on to say: 
'Conceptions of the nature of human beings up to now have 
been either insufficiently specific, for example as with the 
Skinnerian conception of mang which does not allow, on the 
basis of that conception al0hey people to be distinguished 
from pigeons (Skinner, 1953)9 or insufficiently powerfuly ast 
for example, the early Millerian conception of ; a-manif6ldof 
information channels which makes the capacity to ignorep reflect 
upong and control output inexplicable (Miller, 19649 PP 171-184)'. 
(OP. Cit. 9 P. 115. 
) 
Harre suggests that the concept of a person should become the 
basis of the new post-positivist psychology. The traditional concept- 
ion of a person includes the idea of rational agency and the idea that 
people are capable not only of monitoring and controlling their 
performancesp but of monitoring the control they excerise in the 
first order performance* 
'To put this point in another useful way, not only do people 
follow rulesp but they know that they follow rules and they 
may, and often do, choose the rules they will follow in 
accordance with rules for choosing rules. ' (Harre'e, 197ltP-116) 
This conception of man as a person is undoubtedly powerfuly 
especially in accounting for peoples' social behaviourwith which 
Harreo' seems mainly concernedp but it may itself be lacking in 
specificity when applied to the more traditional topics of the 
psychology of cognition. Howeverg the quotation given above connects 
directly with another, more precise conception of man2 the conceptibn 
of man as not only a persony but a person who is continually processine 
information. Such a conceptionlof coursellies behind most modern 
cognitive psychology and an early form of it was rejected by Harr6/ 
in one of the passages quoted. However, the criticism given by 
Harref can only be fairly applied to Miller's early work stemming 
from-information theoryy and is much less applicable to later 
developments of the information processing approach. These 
developments have become particularly associated with the school 
of thought dominated by Newell and Simon. (Newell and-Simong 1961, 
1972). 
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Heitman (1965) provides an account of the information processing 
approach to psychological problems. He explains that if each person 
is considered as made up of receptorsp effectors and a control syetem 
joining them, the information processing approach involvoc concentrating 
on the control system and airoiding most of the questions concerned with 
sensory and motor activities. The type of control system usually 
postulated in order to explain the content and direction of thought 
comprises a number of memories containing symbolised information whi'Oh! 
are interconnected by various oiddering relations, a number of primitive 
information processes which operate on the information in the memories, 
and a well-defined set of rules for combining these primitive processes 
into whole program of processing. 
The aim of an information processing theory is to build up, from 
these basic partsp first a flow chart then a computer programb, which 
will produce the same behaviour as a person in a particular situation. 
Thim program is- then accorded the status of a theory of the persond 
psychological processes and is tested in the same ways as any other 
psyohologioal. theory. This in an extension of the famous insights of 
Turing (1950)- 
It im important to note that the essence of the information process- 
ing approach is the description of postulated internal mechanisms in 
an abstract '. but precise manner. Hence no direct correspondences 
between these internal mechanisms and physiological mechanisms need be 
specified or knownt since the theory stands or falls only by"how well 
it accounts for what people do when thinking. This means that any 
information processing theory might be implemented in a variety of ways, 
and much interest has centred on the possibility of computer simulation 
which this introduces. 
There are various advantages to be gained from producing information 
processing theories in the form of computer programs. The main a, dvantage 
is that this provides a very rigorous test of the theory concerned. 
With models of other kinds it is quite possible to overlook ambiguities 
and errorst and the more complex the theory is the more this is likely 
to happen. The conclusions reached by running a computer program 
follow with certainty from the processes built into the program2 and 
in addition the sequence of processes performed by the computer can be 
used as an additional source of data to be compared with human protocols 
obtained in the equivalent situation. 
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Despite the undoubted validity of these arguments2 there are 
certain practical considerations which must be taken into account 
before throwing in one's lot with the simulation school. One of the 
most important of these is that the level at which simulation is 
possible depends on the richness of the data available. The point 
is neatly put by Miller, Galanter and Pribraml (1960): 
'Another thing that Turing's theorem did - or should have 
done - was to focus attention on the adequacy of the description 
of behaviour. A machine cannot be expected to simulate something 
that has never been described - it can be held responsible only 
for those aspects of behavior that an observer has recorded. No 
simulation is complete and. no SiClul-It ion preservagn-611the charact- 
eristics o: ý behavior. ' (OP-cit-PP-47). 
In view of this the approach adopted here will be to utilise as 
rich a source of data as is practicable and to construct models of 
Psychological processesy without introducitg the amount of detail 
which would be needed to construct an equivalent computer program. 
Because of this the models will be not only less detailed than computer 
programs, but also capable of less complexity in practioeq as the 
symbolic manipulations involved iniinterpreting complex models seem 
to present people with great difficulties. In this respect the proposed 
models will initially be more like what are often referred to as 
strategies (e. g. Brunerg Goodnow and Austiny 1956), but the 
, 
aim is to 
refine them to a point where computer simulation might be possible. 
The initial test of any theoretical model must bepaa Newell and 
Simon (1972) maintaing whether it is sufficient to produce the data 
it.:. is meant to explain. However, 04ether the model is sufficient in 
this way depends very much on the level of detail at which the sufficiency 
test is carried out. Again the aim must be to begin with a model which 
is sufficient to generate the gross aspects of performance and then 
modify it so that increasinly detailed behaviours can be predicted. 
Gregg and Simon (1967) also dmphasize, universalityý precisiong simplicity 
and flexibility as criteria on which to assess the usefulness of different 
models when there are no clear-cut differences in empirical predictions. 
These criteria. are derived from Popper (1959)- 1 
So far the information-processing approach has been discuosed in a 
general context of human cognitionp and nothing has been said about how 
it can be applied to the type of questions associated with developmental 
psychology. One way in which this might be done is described by Klahr 
and Wallace (1970a); 
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'We believe that the major task facing the child who has 
just been presented with an experimental task is to assemble 
from his repertoire of fundamental information-handling processesp 
a routine that is sufficient to pass the-task at hand. We view 
the information processing demands of the task as being analogous 
to the compilation and execution of a computer program. *. e***e*# 
Incoming visual and verbal stimuli are first encoded into internal 
representations. Then the assembly system attempts to constructp 
from its repertoire of fundamental processes, a task-specific 
routine that is sufficient to meet the demands of the verbal 
instructions. Having assembled such a routine, the system then 
executes it. ' (Op. cit., p. 362. ) 
The different stages children seem to go through in their ways of 
solving various tasks can then be described by different information 
processine models. In order to evaluate such models Elahr and Wallace 
(1970b) propose the formal criterion of developmental tractability as 
an addition to the criteria. specified by Gregg and Simon (1967)- 
Developmental tractability is used to describe the ease with which a 
model can be interpreted as both a predecessor and successor of other 
models in a developmental sequence. By this criterion the best model 
is the one which is most amenable to transformation into a model of a 
later developmental stage, or which is itself most easily seen as a 
transformation of an earlier model. The purpose of using such a 
criterion is to permit assembly of a collection of stage models which 
will facilitate inferences regarding the nature of the transition 
mechanism responsible for the stage to stage development. 
Some Possible models. 
An attempt will now be made to apply the research strategy outlined 
above to the results of the other researches which have been reviewed. 
The first stage described by Piagety when the child does not seem to 
apply any systematic and relevant strategy to solve the problem, looks 
like it is a collection of different behaviours with little in common 
except their irrelevance by adult standards. Because of this it will 
be ignored at present. The best place to begin the analysis thus becomes 
Piaget's second stage. This is the stage where the child predicts on 
the basis of the absolute number of the target counters in each collection, 
rather than the ratio of these to the total number of counters. If the 
collections of counters are called Set A and Set B9 the counters the 
child is trying to get (the target counters) li, and the non-target 
counters Yq then one possible model corresponding to Piaget's second 
Stage is shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 1 is not intended an a conventional flow diagramf it is 
merely a convenient way of representing the stratoey so that people 
can understand what it involves. In other words, although it is not 
in the normal form of a flow diagram, it states all the necessary 
processing to achieve a solution, without specifying how such processing 
might be implemented. The advantage of doing thin is that it doesn't 
commit the modellor to any one implementation and yet is precise enough 
to lead to testable predictions. There is no commitment, for exampleg 
to a parallel or sequential processor since although the model in GOt 
out in a parallel form (when read from top to bottom)p it could 
equally well be considered sequentially by reading it from left to 
right and top to bottom. 
The model generates the same answers as Piaget's second stage 
child in most situations. Howeverg whenever the number of X counters 
in each collection is the same, it will be unable to produce an answer. 
Fortunately there are two simple modifications that can be made to the 
model in order to got an answer out of it, It could be instructed to 
choose at random whenever there is no unique outcome, or it could be 
made to take account of the number of Y-. countersý in each collection 
(by repeating the strategy on the Y counters and choosing the collection 
with less). 
These possible revisions wil, 1 be referred to as model 2(a) and 
model 2 (b)p respectively. Both model 2(a) and model 2(b) can be 
regarded as models of the second stage described by Piaect. It would 
be interesting to know whethor children always reason like model 2(a) 
or like model 2(b) in the special situation where there are the same 
number of X counters in each collection, or whether some children 
reason like model 2(a) and some like model 2(b)p or if neither model 
applies. Unfortunately the research reviewed so far cannot answer 
this questionj so that it will have to be resolved by experiment. 
The main limiting factor to model2ls ability to produce 
mathematically satisfactory solutions is clearly its almost total 
disregard of information concerning Y counters. in fact model 2(a) 
makes no use at all of such informationg and model 2(b) only uses it 
in the special case where Ax and Bx are equal. The simplest way in 
which information about Y could be utilised would be to make choices 
based on the difference between the number of X and Y counters in 
each collection. A diagram to represent this would be figure 2 
(which will be called model 3). 
The shaded portions of model 3 show how the original model 
(model 2) would have to be modified to take this form. This shows 
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clearly the relation between the previous model and this elaborated 
version, but it is somewhat oversimple. This is because the final 
comparison (made in the bottom box) may be quite complex. The 
differences to be compared may be positive or negative2 and there are 
various ways in which this problem might be handled. A model 3(i) 
might be proposed which would have a number system capable of dealing 
with negatives, or a model 3(ii) in which various transformation 
rules are applied to make sure that the final comparison is always 
between positive numbers. Howeverg there is a simple reason why 
little attention need be paid to such possibilities at the moment. 
The reason is that the difference between models 3(i) and 3(ii) is 
not as great as the difference between model 2(a) and model 2(b)y in 
the sense that one couldn't devise a simple test to distinguish which 
one is operating. The main empirical difference appears to be the 
kind of mistake each is likely to make. If operating correctly, 
however, both models 3(i) and 3(ii) will produce the same results so 
that for present purposes they will not be distinguished and will be 
referred to as model 3. In other words, model 3 is being used to 
describe the general strategy of comparing (Ax - Ay) with (Bx - By) 
and need not specify the precise manner in which this strategy is 
carried out. The strategy is surprisingly powerfulp and leads to 
mathematically correct answers to many problems of this type. 
At this point it would be pertinent to ask why so much space is 
being devoted to what is, after all, only a possible way of handling 
the problem and is not reported by Piaget as one of the developmental 
stages children go through. The answer to this question can perhaps 
be more easily understood by first considering what a 'true proportion' 
modelf which would correspond to Piaget's third stage and would generate 
mathematically correct answers, might entail. The general layout would 
have, to be something like figure 3. 
Npy-jijiis is almost the same as model 3, except that where model 3 
compares X and Y by substraction, this uses division. This means that 
the proposed model compares the ratio of favourable to unfavourable 
cases instead of the ratio of favourable to possible cases (which is 
the mathematical cohcept of probability). This is quite legitimateg 
as the research reported by Fischbein, Pampu and Manzat (1970) demon- 
strates that children generally prefer to make the favourable to 
unfavourable rather than the favourable to possible comparison. Of 
course this represents a very considerable increase over model 3 in 
the complexity of the processing'being done2 but the sequence of 
processing steps remains essentially the same. 
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Aims for the first main experiment. 
Model 3 thus serves as a theoretical link between model 2 and 
the 'true proportion' model 4. Both rpodel 2 and model 4 can be seen as 
models of the stages described by Piaget (his second and third stages 
respectively) but model 3 is not described by him. Howevert it is so 
much easier to convert model 2 into model 31 and then model 3 into 
model'4P instead of making the huge jump from model 2 to model 4 
directly, that to anyone considering the child as being in some ways 
analogous to a developing information processing system it is puzzling 
that model 3 doesn't occur. 
One possible explanation is that model 3 does in fact occur, but has 
been bverlooked by most previous researchers. Support for this 
explanation can be derived from the point already mentioned that model 3 
is a powerful vfay of handling problems of this type, and very often 
produces the same choice as model 4. This means that unless the 
researcher was specifically looking for model 3, or had generated by 
accident problems which would distinguish model 3 and model 4, answers 
reached by model 3 could easily'be mistaken for the results of'prop'Ort- 
ionall reasoning. This could be what Lowe and Ranyard (1973) mean by 
the following remarks: 
'When the infromation is organised appropriately many 
children will be capable of comparing serial orders of favour- 
able and unfavourable cases and basing their judgements =. a 
simple compensation between those. ' ( Op-cit-i P-7-) 
'Estimating the proportion, of red, using the non-verbal 
response mode, could be based on 'Llicomparison of the number of 
red with the number of green dots using a set of quite simple 
concrete operations. ' (Op. cit*9p98). 
The latter remark certainly indicates that a similar strategy 
to model 3 may be used by children when estimating proportions. 
If this is the case why shouldn't it also be used when comparing 
probabilities? To the writer's krfowledge the only study where the 
model 3 strategy is explicitly acknowledged as a possible way of 
comparing probabilities is that of Fischbein et al (1970)- They 
find that although the strategy is used by some subjects none of 
them used it in solving twelve or more out of the eighteen problems 
involved in their experiment. However2 their experiment involved 
children of rather disparate age groups: pre-schoolers (5-0 to 6-4), 
third-graders (aged 9.0 to 10.0)2 and sixth graders (aged 12.4 to 13-7)- 
This means that it is possible that the strategy may be more important 
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at some of the ages not sampled. Such considerations can only be 
satisfactorily resolved by empirical evidence. The experiment 
proposed has the following aims: 
A. To find out whether the models put forward provide satisfactory 
models of childrens' reasoning when faced with this type of 
problem. 
B. To find out whether model 2(a) or model 2(b) provides the more 
accurate description of Piaget's second developmental stagep 
or whether both apply. 
C. To find out whether model 3 is only a theoretical possibilityv 
or if it corresponds to an actual strategy employed by children 
to solve problems of this type. 
D. To find out whether there is a developmental sequence from the 
first stage described by Piaget to model 2 to model 3 to model 4, 
or even a sequence from Piaget's first stage to model 2(a) to 
model 2(b) to model 3 to model 4. 
These aims are nott of courseq mutually exclusive. The problems 
proposed will be similar to the kind already described. Howeverg 
instead of collections of face-down countersý collections of red and 
green beads in boxes will be used. The problem then becomes one of 
choosing one of two boxes to draw a red or green bead from. (These 
materials are similar to those used by Yost et alý 1962). Fuller details 
of this will be given later. 
Methodological considerations: data collection and analysis. 
There are two main kinds of data which can be obtained in an 
experiment of the proposed typeý namely the choice made by the subject 
and the reason he gives for his choice. The first source is not 
particularly convenient because the choice to be made is only between 
two alternatives, so that the subject can guess correctly on half the 
trials. This means that any experiment which uses correct choice as 
its success criterion will havecto involve a large number of trials 
and rely heavily on a statistical estimate of the 'significance' of 
the results. Of course one could always increase the number of 
alternatives the subject could choose from in order to reduce the 
required number of trialsq but this would involve an undesirable 
increase in the complexity of the problem. The danger here is that 
when the problem becomes too complex for the children to handle without 
excessive difficultyf they will revert to 'guessing'. In addition any 
experiment which is analined solely in terms of the choices made by 
the subjects will need to be exceptionally well designed because of 
the ease with which alternative explanations of these choices can be 
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adduced. The pitfalls inherent in this approach are well demonstrated 
by the study by Yostq Siegel and McMichael (1961)9 similar to one 
already described (Yost et all 1962)lwhich tries to remove the verbal 
element from the presentation as far as possible, as well as from the 
analysis. - Yost, Siegel and McMichael reach the conclusion that their 
experiment demonstrates that four-year olds do have some understanding 
of probability2 in contrast to Piaget's view that children under seven 
years are unable to respond consistently to the quantitative proportions 
of the elements involved. Howeverl as Flavell (1963) points outl 
'It is uncertain.., ...... whether this method succeeded in' 
'liberating' pre-existing concepts and strategies by virtue of its 
procedural differences from the other 
, 
method, or whether it was 
simply a more effective training procedure for inculcating 
response patterns (and perhaps concepts as well) which the child 
did not have in his repertoire when he walked into the experimental 
room'. (OP-cit., P-393. ) 
This criticism is not supported by Goldberg (1966). She compared 
results to an experiment of this kind elicited by a method similar to 
PiaCet's techniques with those elicited by a method similar to that of 
Yost. She argues that if Plavell's interpretation of Yost's resultq 
that the methodology used provides a better learning condition than 
Piaget's methodology and not a better technique for assessing available 
conceptag is correctv then subjects' performance should improve more 
during a number of Yost-type trials than during a number of Piaget-type 
trials. What she found was small but significant learning effects 
in both situations, which she claims does not support Flavell's 
interpretation. Howeverf performance on the Yost-type trials was 
better than that on the Piaget-type trialsq and it is arguable that 
the kind of learning which went on in the different types of trittl 
might be of a different nature. The point being made is not that this 
did or did not happenp but that it is remarkably easy to produce 
alternative explanations of this type, so that as long as only non- 
verbal data is being used our knowledge is not advancing very fast. 
Purthermorep the argument has become fixed on a point which is of 
little importance anywayp for all that Yost and his colleagues have 
done is to show that if one makes a certain kind of problem simple 
enough for pre-school children to graspp then they seem to show come 
ability in solving it. There is nothing very mysterious about thisy 
unless one holds that 'abilities' do not develop but appear suddenly 
at fixed chronological ages. How the pre-school children solve the 
protlemsg what they are actually doing, is not revealed by experiments 
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of this type. 
The second possible source of data is verbal datay i. e., the 
reason the child gives for his performance. Reliance on verbal data 
and on verbal methodology has been criticised by Braine (195911962). 
Braine points out that by using assessment techniques which do not 
distinguish intellectual capacities from associated verbal abilitiesq 
the intellectual capacities of children are likely to be underestimated. 
This criticismt howevery is only important in cases where normative 
claims are being madep so that it is not strictly relevant to the 
present project. 
Brainerd (1973a) claims that the judgement criterion is superior 
to explanation for establishing t, he presence of a cognitive structure 
because it allows safer inferences concerning correspondences and 
sequences between hypotheoised structures. Howeverg his argument is 
not completely convincing (see Reese and Schackq 1974';. '. Brainerdpl974) 
and he admits himself that there, is one case in particular where 
explanations are most useful: 
'Explanations can supplement judgements in such a way that 
one is provided with insights into the nature of the structure 
or structures under consideration-' (Brainerd, 1973a, P. 178)- 
This means that for present purposes explanations may be of great 
value. 
Another claim advanced by Braine (1959pl962) is that it must be 
impossible to study the development of a concept by using methods 
which employ verbaiccues to evoke the concept. Put simplyp the 
argument runs that if the child understands the verbal cueg he must 
have already developed the concept. Hence if he responds appropriately 
we know. for certain that he has the conceptq but if he doesn't respond 
appropriately we have learnt very little. In addition it is often 
maintained that childrens' comprehension of linguistic items precedes 
their production of those items (e. g. Frasert Bellugi and Browný1963) 
so that reasons given for decisions may well laa behind the 'real' 
reasonse 
Nelson (1973), on the other handp argues that pratItLction may 
be 'instrumental$ in advancing comprehension: 
'As strategies of language learningy comprehension and 
production are both complementary and contrastive. A child 
who produces little may be relying on internal processing 
of the language he hears to advance his linguistic competence. 
On the other handq production may be instrumental in advancing 
comprehension. The relation between these factors is not at 
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all well understood at the present time. ' (Op-cit-P P-40). 
The final resolution of these problems cannot be achieved until 
the function of language in cognitive development and the relation- 
ship between linguistic and cognitive development is properly understood. 
At present this is one of the most controversial areas of research 
and any adequate review would be beyond the possible scope of this 
study. Piaget and Inýelder (126QA aný, Sinuýaig7deýwaft SlMýý, seem to virw language dove opment af- g era y H, u or ind eoo ve 
developmentg although. -they do admit the facilitating 
effect. of a well-developed language system on cognitive development. 
Much greater stress is placed on language as an organising factor in 
cognitive development by Luria and Yudovich (1959)) whilst intermediate 
positions are taken by Vygotsky (1962)p and Bruner, Olver and Greenfield 
(1966). 
The confused state of this area means that no firm decision can 
be made as to the advisability or inadvisability of utilising verbal 
data. Howeverg it has already been asserted that the exclusive use 
of non-verbal data is a desperate measure because of the difficulty 
involved in designing a watertight experiment and the paucity of such 
data. This means that it will be worthwhile at least to consider 
ways in which verbalisations might be tentatively returned. to play. 
The importance of this task, from the standpoint of the 
philosophy of science, is strongly expressed by Harre" (1971)ý who 
argues that the accounts people give to themselves as well as to 
others in explanation and justification of their actions: 
1-o-se are not just pieces of 'verbal behaviour' produced by 
controlling variables; these are systems of statements in whose 
content and organisation lies the missing dimension of psychology. 
Par from inventing all sorts of ingenious ways of trying to find 
out about people by not asking them about their experiences, the 
Copernican revolution in psychology consists exactly in getting 
them to Give as much as possible of anticipatory, monitoring 
and retrospective commentary upon their actionsy i. e. 9 to give 
accounts. ' (Op. cit. y p. 1161 underlined passages italicised 
in original). 
One very obvious step to take is to make the instructions and 
procedures of any experiment as concrete as possible, so that 
illustrations are provided by the experimenter at every step of what 
he means by whatever he might be saying at that time. In addition 
the use of any but the simplest words should be aVoidedf so that 
hopefully the combination of simple instructions and concrete 
examples may obviate some of the possible criticisms advanced by 
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Braino concerning lack of understanding by the child of what is 
required of him, and such like. 
The probelm of how to analyse verbal results2 in the form of 
reasons given by the child to justify his choices, is more difficult. 
Such reasons are often very sketchy and make it tempting for the 
experimenter to interpret their 'real' meaning. The method adopted 
by Piaget, of picking out 'typical' verbalisations corresponding to 
the differeni stages postulatedt is unsatisfactory because of its 
subjective and preconceived nature. There is also the possibility 
that any reaqon given will be a post hoc. justification of a choice 
made because of come totally different considerations, answers like; 
'I like the colourly or 11-V Mummy told me toll can easily be regarded 
as of this typep while even answers like 'Itic the bigger one' are 
imprecise enough to be consistent with an alarming variety of inter- 
pretations. 
In terms of current psychological theory, as already mentioned, 
this problem appears intractable without an accepted model of the 
language - thought interrelationship and its development. In 
practice, a workable position may be reached if the following conditions 
are satisfied: 
(a) Design condition: The experimental design is arranged 
to ldid*arqbiguatol the reasons for their choices given 
. 
by the. subjects as much as possible. 
(b) Results condition: The choices made. by the subjects and 
their justifications of these choices do not conflict 
with each other. 
(c) Analysis condition: The analysis of the verbal data 
involves a minimal amount of interpretation by the 
experimenter. 
There are of course other necessary conditional ouch as that 
the experimenter does not suggest possible reasons to the subject, 
which apply to ail experiments and are commonly accepted. 
The results conditionf (b)9 is one whose fulfilment can only 
be observed empirically. If choices made-and reasons given are 
consistentý then it is worth pursuing the verbal analysis, if the 
choices and reasons frequently conflict only non-verbal data can 
be validly used. How far the design conditionp (a), can be met 
depends mainly on the individual experimenter's ingenuity, but it 
will obviously be helpful to have a clear idea of what kind of 
reasons the subjects are likely to produce in the experiment and 
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possible explanations of these reasons. 
The analysis conditiont (c), is perhaps the most important and 
the most equivocal. In some ways it is linked to (a), because if 
the results of an experigient areunambjeubU8 then less linterpretationk' 
will be needed than if they are not. Bryant (1971a) pointed out how 
easily alternative explanations of Piagetle research findings can be 
devised and has tried to produce more tiGhtly-controlled versions of 
some of the standard Genevau situations (Bryantg 1971by Bryant and 
Trabasso, 1971)- The dangers implicit in attempts to infer cognitive 
structures from childrens' verbalisations have long been recognised 
by Piaget (e. g. Piagetp 1932)9 but as Wallace (1972a) remarks: 
I There is little evidence in his practice that 
he has coped successfully with them. In particular, he 
appears to have failed to resist the supreme temptation of 
capitalizing on the ambiguity of verbal responses to derive 
support for his preconceptions... ,., there is a case for view- 
ing the childrens' verbalisations cited as simply illustrations 
of the appropriateness of a preconceived theory. ' (op. cit. p. 23) 
The broblem to be facedq thený is that of devising a rigorous 
way of encoding Verbal data for analytic purposes which will involve 
minimal interpretation of those data by the experimenter. Inter- 
experimenter consistency of interpretation, such as might be obtained 
by correlating the results of analyses by different experimentersq is 
not by itself sufficient if the experimenters have previously been 
trained in the use of the scoring systemg as this is equivalent to 
training them to make the same interpretations (Cooperg Costelloy 
Douglasq Ingleby and Tiirnerv 1974)- The need for such a technique 
has been stressed by Dienes (1959) and Smedslund (1964)- 
One technique for the clasnification of qualitative data which 
looks promisingly rigorous and objective has been devised by Brimer 
(1967,1973). The only interpretation made by the experimenter in 
the Brimer analysis is whether any pair of responses generated in 
the experiment are the same or different. In this way categories 
of indistinguishable responses to the same item can be built up 
and used as the basis of a cluster analysis which will show which 
subjects produce response categories that are statistically 
associated. The experimenter's personal interpretatiom of his 
own results can then be compared with this more objective analysis 
to see whether it is confirmed or falsified. The actual procedures 
involved in the Brimer analysis will be treated at greater length 
elsewhereq for present purposes it is sufficient to say that this 
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method of analysis satisfies the requirement (c) which was proposed 
as a condition for making use of verbal responsesq and so it will 
be used as -he principal method of analysis of experimental results. 
191 
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CHAPTER 2. 
The First Beads Experiment 
Having decided that verbal response data are acceptable 
providing certain conditions are metv it is now necessary to return 
to the detailed design of the experimental problems. These can 
be arranged to distinguish the various models of what children might 
do which have been advanced. For example, in order to distinguish 
use of a method of solution equivalent to model 2 (a) from use of a 
method equivalent to model 2(b)2 a problem is required which has the 
same number of target beads in each collection but a different number 
of non-target beads. 
e. g. Collection A Collection B 
xxx xxx X= Red bead 
yyyy yy y -Green bead 
When the target colour is red (X)-there are an equal number of 
red beads in each collection. 
Hence: model 2(a) -4 choose either collection 
model 2(b) -ýquantify green and choose the collection 
with less green, i. e. R. 
Thus, in situations of this type, model 2(b) will always lead to 
a bhoice of B, whereas model 2(a) can lead to a choice of either A, or 
B. In addition model 2(a) implies that it doesn't matter which choice 
is madej so that if a child says something to this effect it can be 
regarded as compelling evidence in favour of model 2(a), as he is 
contradicting the 'set' implicit in the experimental design, which 
suggests that there is a reason for favouring one collection over 
the other. Of-course if the child is intimidated by the experimental 
setting, or if model 2(a) is not a very 'strong tendency' then he may 
simply choose A or B without saying that he thinks it 'doesn't really 
matter'. In some cases there may even be a regression to a reason 
Of the type d9scribed by Piaget as the first developmental stage, 
such as 'It's pretty', or 'It's lucky'. It must also be admitted 
that model 2(a) and model 2(b) can only be distinguished inthis way 
if answers consistent with the model 2 type of reasoning rather than 
models 3 or 49 or Piagets first stage (for which no model has been 
advanced but which can conveniently be referred to as model 1) have 
been obtained consistently in response to other problems. Otherwise 
models 3 and 4 produce similar choices (although not necessarily 
similar reasons) to model 2 (b), and model 1 and model 2(a) also lead 
to similar patterns of choices. 
To distinguish model 2 and model 3 or 4a problem of the following 
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kind may be used: 
Collection A Collection B 
xxxx xx X= Red bead 
yyyyyy yy Y= Green bead 
When the target colour is red (X) 
Model 24 Choose A because there are more reds in A than B. 
Model 34 Choose B because A has more greens than reds. 
Model 44 Choose B because of the unfavourable ratio of greens 
to rode in A. 
Choices corresponding to model 1 in this type of problem will 
still be erratic, but model 2 will consistently select A, and models 
3 or 4 will consistently go for B. Model 3 and model 4 may then 
be distinguished by problems of this type: 
Collection A Collection B 
xxxx xx 
yyyyyy yyyy 
In this case, model 2 4choose A, whether the target colour is 
red or green, as there areemore reds and more greens in A than in B. 
I-Todel 3 -> choose either, whether the target is red or green, as there 
are two more greens than reds in each collection. Model 4 -;, choose 11, 
when the target is green, A when the target is red. 
Again, a child reasoning by a method equivalent to model 3 will 
contradict the experimental set by asserting it doesn't matter whether 
he chooses A or B. The possibility of regression to model 2 or even 
advancement to model 4. when forced to choose also exists. If a 
significant number of subjects do claim that choice of A or B is 
equally likely to lead to successt strong evidence that model 3 
represents one 6f the strategies children use to solve problems of 
this kind has beon provided. 
Another type of problem which will distinguich model 3 and 
model 4 is: 
Collection A Collection B 
xx 
yyyyyyyy yyyy 
Here model 2 ->choose A whether the target colour is red or greeng 
as there are more reds and more greens in A than in B. 
Model 3 ->choose A when the target is green2 as there are four 
more greens than reds compared with only two more in B. Choose B 
when the target is red2 as there are only two less reds than greens 
and there are four less in A. 
Model 4 -) choose either, whether the target is red or greeng as there 
*__________ 
________ 
____________________________________________ 
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are twice as many greens as reds in each collection. 
In this case, then, model 4 is the one which will result in 
contradiction of the experimental set. 
By using carefully designed problems of the types illustrated 
the applicability of the various models to the data could be assessed 
solely from a combination of choice-data and regression analyses. 
A similar method was used by Lowe and Ranyard (1973), and though 
there is much to recommend ity it suffers from the disadvantage of 
requiring each child to perform a large number of trials. This 
disadvantage would be very severe in this casep where several models 
are to be tested (Lowe and Ranyard were only testing between two 
models)y although the work could be broken down into a number of 
smaller experiments designed to test pairs of models. Howeverp a 
case has been made for the introduction of verbal responses (in the 
form of justifications made by the children for their choices) 
into the analysisy and if this is done a lot of information can be 
derived from less specific problems. For example: 
Collection A Collection B 
XXX XXXX 
MY YY 
If the target colour is red(X): 
A justification consistent with model 1 (Piaget's first 
developmental stage) would be: 'I'll have the one on the left/ 
right because its pretty'. 
A justification consistent with model 2 would be 'I'll have 
the one on the right because there's more reds than there are on 
the left'. 
A justification consistent with model 3 would be 'I'll have 
the one on the right because there's more reds than greens and 
the other has less reds than greens'. 
A justification consistent with model 4 would be 'I'll choose 
the one on the right because there's twice as many reds as greens 
and the other has four greens onto three reds', 
As long as the child's answers are as explicit as those 
outlinedt and there is no contradiction between the justifications 
given and the choices madeý they can be used with some confidence 
as indicators of the way he reasons. Unfortunately problems will 
arise when unclear or ambiguous answers are given; 
e. g. 'I'll choose the one on the right because there's more 
reds'. In this context $more reds' might mean 'more reds than on 
the leftl, '(model 2) or 'more reds than greens' (model 3). Some 
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kind of further questioning would then be required to disambiguate 
this response. The experimenter might ask 'What do you mean by 
that? 9I or 'Show me by pointing what you mean by that. ' Failing 
this he could even ask 'How many more are there? ' An answer to 
this question generated by model 2 would be that there is one more, 
because there are four reds in collection B and three reds in collection 
A. An answer generated by model 3 would be that there are two morep 
because there are four reds and only two greens in collection B. 
However2 such specific 'prodding' as this is UAddsiY; d-Uie-, - as it 
suggests to the child that quantification is relevant to the solution 
of the problem and it causes variations in the treatments each child 
receives. The question 'How many more are there? ' is also not as 
straightforward as it appears, a point which will be elaborated later. 
The choice to be made2 then, lies between the conciseness of the 
experiment and its discriminatory power. An experiment involving few 
trials will have to rely heavily on verbal response datag whilst one 
involving large numbers of trials will suffer from problems associated 
with inattentiveness of subjects and the like, which are most important 
when working with children. After some pilot work, which indicated 
that the approach being advocated here is feasible, an experiment was 
designed which it was hoped represented a satisfactory compromise. 
This will be referred to as the first beads experiment. 
The first beads experiment 
Procedure: The aims of the experiment have already been outlined and 
will not be repeated. The experitpent is in three parts, beginning 
with a pretest which is intended to allow the subjects to become 
familiar with the experimental situationp materials and instructions. 
This is followed by the main experimental problemsy which are presented 
in an order varied from child to child. After this there are some 
more specific problems which are only given to certain children in 
certain circumstances and are intended as a more rigorous substitute 
for the 'clinical' interviewing technique often employed at the end 
of Genevan experiments. Throughout the experiment data are collected 
by the experimenter in the form of a written record of the reasons given 
by the subject to justify his choicesq the choices he makestand their 
success or failure in producing the desired outcomes. 
The materials used comprise two boxes, each with a hole in the 
top large enough for one bead at a time to pass through. For each 
problem there are cards which have two collections of redand green 
spots marked on them; indicating how many beads of each colour are 
in each box. These arrays of spots are arranged in two ranks in one 
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to - one correspondence as far as Possiblet so that the card for 
Problem B1 would look like this: 
cu 
The subject places one red bead on each ofthe red spots and 
one green bead on each of the green spots. The left hand collection 
of beads is then transferred into the left hand box and shaken, and 
the right hand oollection is transferred to the right hand box and 
shaken. The card representing the two collections remains in front 
of the subjectq and he is asked which box he would choose to draw a 
bead out of if a red (or green as the case may be) bead is wantedt 
and the reason for his choice. If this reason is unclear he may be 
asked 'What do you mean by thatV The verbatim instructions are as 
follows for the case when red is the target colour: 
'We're going to try out some games, and I want you to tell 
me what you think of them. ', 
What we do is we put beads on these spots. (Show appropriate 
card. ) We put a redCbead on each red spot, like this (demonstrate), 
and a green bead on each green spot, like this (demonstrate)q Theng 
when we've done that these , eads go in this box (point) and these beads 
go in this box (point). Can you do that for me? 
(When this haabbBen done). Now shake up the boxes so that 
you don't know where they are inside. 
(When this has been done). You don't know where they are 
inside now, do you? 
But you do know that these beads (point to collection A on 
display) went in this box (point to box A) and these beads (point 
to collection B on display) went in this box (point to box B). 
Good. Now listen carefully and I'll tell you what we're going 
to do. We're going to tip just one of the boxes and let one bead outq 
and I want the bead that comes 6ut to be a red bead. So which box 
would you tip? ' 
Now why did you choose that box rather than the other one? 
(If the reply to this is not clear, ask IV . 1hat do you mean by that? ') 
When an answer has been given, 
'Well, we'll try tipping that box and if you're right you got a 
pointy if you're wrong you get nothing. If a red bead comes out you 
get a pointy if its a green one you get nothingy O. K.? I 
, You have to tip it very gently or t4e. y all come out at once- 
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These instructions seem very complicated but turned out to be 
quite eany. -for children to grasp, probably because of the very direct 
way they relate to the materials used. Any difficulties experienced 
were overcome by repetition of the appropriate part of the instructionsý 
but this was only rarely necessary. After the initial tril a simplified 
version of the instructions was used. Each problem is in two partsp 
namely the part where red is the target colour and the part where green 
is the target colourg so that bead drawn out on the previous trial 
would be returned to its box and the next instruction is: 
'Now this time detregoing to tip one of the boxes and let one bead 
outt and I want the bead that comes out to be a green bead. So which 
box yould you -tip? 
Now why did you choose that box rather than the other one? t (If 
the reply to this is not clear, ask 'What do you mean by that? ') 
When an answer has been given 'Wellt we'll try tipping that box and 
if you're right you get a pointq if you're wrong you get nothing. If 
a green bead comes out you get a pointý if its a red one you get nothing. 
O. K.?, 
With each new problem it was also necessary to empty the boxes, 
put the beads on the new problem card, and transfer them to the boxes. 
(All this was done by the subject. ) The instructia30could then be 
repeated in the shortened form indicated. The instructions were not 
read outy but were memorised by the experimenter. This must have led 
to come inaccuracies caused by slips of the tongue, lapses of memory 
and suchlikel but it'avoided the rather artifical nature of a 'read out' 
instruction. In general every effort was made to keep the experimental 
setting as relaxed and informal as possible. For this reason tape and 
vid6o recording equipment was not used since if the experimenter writes 
things down this is far less intimidating than if the child's performance 
is recorded. On the other hand effort was also made to avoid giving 
qny kind of specific encouragement or nonstandard instruction in order 
to minimise the effects of experimenter bias and non-identical treat- 
ments. The decision not to use video or tape means that the more 
sopisticated non-verbal measuresp such as latencies and hesitations, 
are riot available for analysis. 
Sample: The subjects who took part in the experiment were seventy-two 
children aged botween-fiveand ten years from a local primary schoolp 
and forty eight children aced between eleven and fourteen years from a 
local secondary school. These were divided into groups of twelve 
children aced five, six$ seveng eight, nine, ten, eleveng twelve, 
thirteen and fourteen years. As well as this four children failed 
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to finish the experiment and were replaced. These were two six year, 
, 
olds and a five year old, who seemed too intimidated by the experimental 
situation to want to finish, and an eiGht year old described by his 
teacher as having emotional problems. None of the subjects taking 
part in the experimentlor any of the subsequent experiments, was 
red-green colour blind. The catchment area of both schools was the 
sameg being a working-class suburb of Coventryt but apart from this 
no attempt was made to control for socio-eoonomic differences, 
intelligence differencesý or sex differences. The primary school was 
of modern 'open design' and children were selected either by approaching 
them and asking them to take part or because they approached the 
experimenter at a time when it was possible for them to be fitted in. 
In the se. condary school selection was done by class teachers who were 
asked to send lordinaryt children. The somewhat casual nature of 
this sampling procedure can be excused on the grounds that only the 
possible strategies used by the children are being studiedg and any 
relation these strategies may show to chronological age will be 
qualified by saying that it is only the case for the sample used. 
Conclusions about the possible relation of any strategies found to 
mental age, sexq or social class variables will not be drawn. 
Problems used: Two problems were used in the pretestp whose results 
were recorded but not analysedg and which was intended solely to 
counteract any artifacts which might otherwise be introduced into the 
experiment, through lack of familiarity with the situation and materials. 
The pretest. problems are: 
Pretest A. 3(; 2R V 2G 3R 
i. e. YYY YY 
XX XXX 
Protest B 3G 4R V 5G 4R 
i. e. YYY YYYYY 
XXXX XXXX 
After the pretest there were four problems which constitute the 
main part of the experiment. These were presented in a haphazard order 
determined by shuffling the four cards corresponding to the four problems. 
This is easier to put into effect than a 'systematic randomisation' 
involving some sort of Latin square and should provide sufficient control 
against order effects and suchlike. In addition the order of red 
and green being first target colour with each new problem was varied 
either by alternating this order between problems or by doing two 
problems with one colour as first target and then the remaining two 
---- -- 
_____- 
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problems with the other colour as first target. Position preferences 
wore controlled by presenting the cards either way upp so that the 
left-riCht order of the collections as shown below was often reversed. 
The experimental problems are listed below, with a short rationale 
for each one. 
Problem Bl: 4G 2R v 2G 4R 
yyyy yy Y- green bead 
xx xxxx X- red bead 
This is intended as a 'simple' problem which could allow children 
to perform slightly better than they might do with more complex 
problems. It is desirable for the experimental problems to vary in 
level of Idifficulty' in this wayt so that the flexibility of the 
strategies children use might be investigated. Mixtures of model 2 
and model 3 responses might be obtained from the same child, whereas 
if the problems were of even difficulty these might be all model 2 or 
model 3 responses. 
Problem B2: 4G 3R v 2G 3R 
i. e. yyyy yy 
xxx xxx 
For children who give answers predominantly of the model 2 type 
on the other problems, this will provide a, test between model 2(a) and 
model 2(b). It is also possible that such children miCht show regression 
to the model 1 type of answerv or improvement to model 3 or 4- 
Problem B3: 4G 4R 2G 2R 
i. e. yyyy yy 
xxxx xx 
This represents a case where model 2 and model 3 or 4 responses 
can be clearly distinguished. Model 2 will lead to choice of the 
left-hand box in the both parts of the problem, whereas model 3 and 
model 4 allow choice of either box in both cases. The problem also 
represents something of a paradox, because model 2 leads to the con- 
clusion that the left-hand box is better for drawing both green and red. 
It will be interesting to see if children notice this, and if it will 
affect their decisions. It is possible that some children will not 
be willing to choose the same box in both parts of the problemp and 
this could load to changes of reasons in the form of improvementsp 
regressionsp or outright guesses. 
Problem B4: 6G 4R 2G 2R 
i. e. yyyyyy yy 
xxxx xx 
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Againg model 2 can be distinguished from model 3 or 4. Model 2 
would lead to dioice of the left-hand boxg whether red or greeWistthe 
target colourp model 3 and model 4 will lead to choice of the left-hand 
box for green and the right-hand box for red. The main purpose of the 
problemg however, is to make some assessment of how much children's 
focus of attention is determined by the strategies they are using. 
Although model 2 implies that one should choose the left-hand box 
when the target colour is red, because there are more red beads in 
it than in the right hand box, it is also apparent that there are 
more'green beads in it than there are red beads. This additional 
information may be discounted, or it may lead to some attempt to modify 
the strategy to assimilate it. The paradox that model 2 predicts that 
the left-hand box is $better$ for red and green, which was pointed out 
in problemB3, is also present here and may also contributed to some 
sort of change in strategy. 
These four problems2 and the two pretests, constituted the 
standardised part of the experiment. They were followed by three 
additional problems which were given only if the ohjldýs performance 
in the main experiment had met certain conditions. 
The first additional problem is problem ; 35: 
Problem B5: 8G 4R v 2G 2R 
i. e. YYYYYYYY YY 
XXXX XX 
This is essentially the same as problem B4 but in an extreme 
form. It was given to children who had produced two model 2 type 
answers to problem B49 but had possibly ahown some signs of 'wavering', 
and also to any other children whose answers might have been interest- 
ing to the experimenter. 
Problems B6 and problem B7 are designed to distinguish answers 
produced by reasoning equivalent to model 3 from those of model 2 or 
model 4. These problems were both given to children who had shown 
any sign of the model 3 type of answer. 
Problem B6: 6G 4R v 4G 2R 
i. e. YYYYYY MY 
XXXX XX 
In this problem model 2 leads to a choice of the left-hand box 
for red or green, model 3 implies that either box will do for either 
colour (because there are two more greens than reds in each)9 and model 
4 leads to a choice of the right-hand box for green and the left-hand 
box for red. There are also possibilitites that subjects whose previous 
answers have been predominantly of a type attributable to model 3 may 
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'advance' to model 4 or 'regress' to model 2 when faced with the 
necessity of choosing one box or the othor. Regressions may be 
particularly common when red is the target colourf because there are 
'only' two reds in the right-hand box. 
Problem B7: 8G 4R v 4G 2R 
i. e. YYYYYYYY YYYY 
XXXX XX 
Model 2 leads to a left-hand box choice for red or green, but 
model 3 leads to choice of the left-hand box when green is the target 
colour (there are four more greens than reds and only two more in the 
other box) and the right-hand box when red is the target colour (there 
are only two less reds than greens and four less in the otherbbox). 
This time model 4 implies that either box may be chosen for either 
colour, as there are equal proportions of red and green in each box. 
The problem is also arranged to use quite simple proportions (1 :2 
in each case). In spite of this some regression from model 4 to 
model 3 answers is a possibility. 
The problemsused in the first beads experiment have been collected 
together in Table 1. 
Results of the first beads experiment. 
The data collected consisted of the choices made by the subjects 
and the reasons they gave for their choices. The reasons given were 
written down at the time, and consequently are not authentic to the 
degree a tape recording might be. Often words like 'the' and 'there's' 
were missed out in hasteybut any numbers and relational terms were 
specially noted. The order of presentation of the problems wasalso 
recordedp in case any investigation of 'order effects' proved necessary, 
but these data were not used in the main analysis. Any verbalisations 
other than choice reasons produced by the subjects were recorded at 
the experimenter's discretion, but were also ignored in the main 
analysis, as were the outcomes of the gambles. 
The analysis to be carried out involves three partsz 
1. An analysis of the type of reasoning shown by the children and the 
applicability of the theoretical models in terms of interpretations 
of the results made by the experimenter in accordance with a set 
of evaluative criteria. 
2. An analysis of the results by means of the Brimer cluster analysis. 
3. A comparison of the experimenter's analysis with the results of 
the cluster analysis. 
-- -- 
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Attempts to establish reliability between different markers in 
the first part of the analysis were not made because it was considered 
that training people to make the same interpretations is not a big 
step towards objectivity. Obviously such inter-ccorer reliability 
would be an essential pre-requisite of any adequate test of children's 
knowledgeoconcerning probability matterst but this is not the purpose 
of the experiment. It has been argued that for the present purposes 
the Brimer cluster analysis will lead to greater objecti-V*ty than the 
experimenter's interpretations of the childrens' performanceg so that if 
there is a close correspondence between the results of the cluster analytis 
and the experimenter's interpretations (which will 'be 'in-t-erm. 's bf, the 
proposed models) this can be regarded as confirmation of the validity 
of the interpretations (within certain limits which will be elaborated 
later)o The categorisation of subjects' responses used in the cluster 
analysis were also not subjected to any tests of inter-marker reliability, 
although evidence from other studies using the same technique (Satterly 
and Brimer, 1971; Wallace, 1972a) indicates that high consistency 
between markers may be expected. 
In order to carry out the first part of the proposed analysis 
it is necessary to devise a scheme for classifying the results in terms 
of the various proposed models. The results are to be scored as type ly 
27 3 or 41 corresponding to models lv 21 3 and 4 respectively. The criteria 
OUsed in! -*-_-ý- interpreting the results are as follows: 
Type 1: Any answer corresponding to model 19 Piaget's first devel- 
opmental stage. Such answers appear to the experimenter to involve 
spurious factors or guesswork. Choices are erratic and their justifications 
often seem post hoc. The following examplesý taken from the experimental 
resultsp serve to illustrate this. 
SB10 (Beads experiment subject number 10), problem B4 red 
(beads experiment problem 49tnrget colour red. ) 
Chooses 6G4R (the box with six green: andfour red beads 
inside). 'It's got more sharper corners'. 
SB79 problem B3 red. 
Chooseo 404A 'I like this box'. 
SB4P problem B2 red. 
Chooses 2G2R 'My best one. My Mummy told me'. 
SB39 problem B2 red. 
Chooses 2G3R 'To get the red out'. 
SB13oproblem Bl red. 
Chooses 4G2R. 'There's two reds and two greens but they're 
on different sides'. 
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SB16y problem B1 red. 
Chooses 2G4R 'I got a green one out before'. 
(This was 
the outcome of her previous choice. 
) 
Type_ Any answer corresponding to model 2. Such answers involve a 
comparison of the numbers of target beads in each boxg and choice 
of the 
box with more of them. Answers involving comparison of 
the numbers of 
non-target beads in each box 
(without reference to the target beads), 
and choice of the box with lessq may also be scored as 
type 2, although 
these are Iluite rare. The choice made and reason given must not conflict9 
hence the choices will be as shown in Table 1 (a). 
Examples of Type 2 responses are given below. (Ages of the subjects 
quoted are not 9ývenq because the examples are meant to be illustrative 
of the particular type2 rather than any given age). 
SB289 problem B4 green 
chooses 6G4R I Got six greens in. Other only has two 
SB301 problem B4 green 
chooses 6G4R 'More greens than the other box. * 
SB87Y problem B1 red. 
chooses 2G4R 'There's two more reds than there' (points 
to other box. ) 
SB649 problem B1 green 
chooses 4G2R 'Not so many red ones as the other box'. 
(Answers of this type are rare). 
BB639 problem B1 red. 
chooses 2G4R 'Twice as many reds as the other one. ' 
(Only one subject did thisq but it is worthy of comment 
in view of the fact that it involves . comparison 
by ratiosý 
-i-1it1L_J%he.. type Z, rjtrategy.., 
) 
In problem B2 there are an equal number of red beads in each 
box7 so that when red is the target colour an additional distinction 
between responses generated by model 2(a) and responses generated 
by model 2(b). is necessary. Model 2(a) leads to assertions that there 
are no grounds for choosing between the two boxes, whilst 2(b) leads to 
choice of the box with less beads of the non-target colourv often 
preceded by a long silence or an assertion of type 2(a). 
Examples of type 2(a) responses: 
SB12p problem B2 red. 
chooses 2G3R 'Don't know why. Both got three. Doesn't 
matter which you choose. ' 
SB41p problem B2 Red. 
chooses 4G4R 'Just a guess. Same reallyp I think. ' 
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(This can only be seen as 2(a) in the context of the subject's 
response to the other part of problem B2. ) 
Examples of type 2(b) responses: 
SB44t problem B2 red. 
chooses 2G3R "Cos I've just said the other one. Three 
in eachq but not the same. The greens, aren't the same. 
I'll choose the one with less greens. ' 
BB48P problem. B2 
chooses 2G3R 'Same redsj but. less greens. ' 
SB63y problem B2red. 
chooses 2G3R 'Only two greens. Same reds in each one. ' 
Type 3: Answers corresponding to model 3. This involves comparison 
of the numbers of target and non-target beads in each boxv and choice 
made and the reason given must be in agreement, so that the choices 
will be as shown in Table l(a). 
Examples of type 3 responses taken from the experimental results: 
SB71P problem B3 red. 
chooses 4G4,, R 'Doesn't matter - they've each got the same 
number of reds and greens. ' 
SB60, problem B7 green 
chooses '8G4R 'There's four more, only two more in there. ' 
BB67Y problem B4 red 
chooses 2G2R 'Equal ones. More chance of green with the 
other. ' 
SB661 problem B2 green. 
chooses 4G3R 'Got most greens and three reds. The other 
only has two greens and three reds. f 
Type 4: This categorisation is given to answers2 which appear to 
have been arrived at by the 'true proportion' model of Piaget's 
third developmental stage, one possible version of which is model 4- 
The choices made in problems B11 B2p B39 B4 and B5 will be identical 
with the choices made in accordance with model 3y but the reasons 
for the choices will be different. The choices in problems B6 and 
B7 will be different to those made by model 3 and are given in 
Table l(a). 
Examples of type 4 taken from the experimental results: 
SB 108, problem Bl green. 
chooses 4G2R 'There's four greens and two reds; a two 
to one chance. ' 
SB107 9 problem B6 green. 
chooses 4G2R 'There's more greens and reds in the otherg 
lesis here. Two to one Champ here, one and a half to one 
there. ' 
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SB1089 problem B4 red. 
chooses 2G2R. 'It's got the same chanceto green. Better 
chance than in the other one. Halves each. ' 
In addition to these types of responscog a certain number were 
found to be unclassifiable within the scheme, and these are grouped 
together as type 1? 1 These include answers which supply too little 
information to be classed as typeg 2,3 or 49 but too much to be 
called type 19 and answers where the model 2 or model 3 strategy is 
used but the box with less instead of more of whatever is required is 
chosen. 
Examples of unclassifiable responses: 
SB51, problem B4 red. 
chooses 2G2R, 'Only two red ones thereq but four in the 
other. ' 
Experimenter: 'What do you mean by thatV 
SB51: 'Mon't know. I'm sure its better. ' 
BB359 problem B3 red. 
choosas2G2R. 'Got less. Got two red and two green-' 
The results of applying this categorisation scheme t6 the data 
can be found in Appendix Bý and a graphical illustration is provided 
in Figure 4- In order to categorise the results each problem was 
treated separately, but information was exchanged between problem 
subparts to resolve some ambijtities. For exampleg if a child gave 
an answer to one part of problem B1 which was clearly of type 2, 
and an answer to the other part which coula beespennas either type 2 
or type 3, this was considered to be of type 2. Information was only 
exchanged in this way between subparts of the same problems, i. e. 9 
within problems. If this is not done the number of ambiguities in 
the results rises. In order to avoid any temptation to treat the 
subparts of separate problems in this way the results were scored 
by scoring all the answers to a particular problem at a time, rather 
than scoring all the answers a particular child gave to different 
problems at one time. In this way 'halo' effects are eliminated 
in all but the within-problem case. In the Brimer analysis every 
subpart of every problem is treated separately. 
Discussion: The ease with which the classification scheme derived 
from the theoretical models can be applied to the datag and the small 
number of unclassifiable responses, provides subjectively convincing 
evidence for the validity of the models as representations of the 
way children are handling the problems. The graph (figure 4) shows 
that models 1,2 and 3 represent typical ways of dealing with problems 
42. 
of this type, but model 4 does notp (all the type 4 responses to problems 
Bl - B4 were provided by one subject), and may be more closely related 
to the subjects' mathematical sophistication. 
The results from the secondary shool children show something of a 
fall-off in comparison with the primary school results. There are 
various reasons why this might havellbeen expected. Although the catch- 
ment area of the primary and secondary schools involved is the same, 
some children will have been $creamed off' and sent to other schools 
in the area. The attitude of the secondary school children to the 
experiment is one of polite condescension as compared with the enthus- 
iastic involvement of the primary school children, and they gave the 
impression of being unwilling to take it seriously. Because of thin the 
analysis will concentrate on the results of the primary school group 
and any conclusions drawn from the secondary school results can only 
be tentative. 
The overall result does not accord with Piaget and Inhelder (1951) 
who do not postulate anything corresponding to model 31 and consider 
model 4 as the final stage of conceptual development in this area. 
However, their experimental design would not have allowed models 3 and 
4 to be distinguishedp so that they may well have mistaken answers 
generated by model 3 for answers involving a true appreciation of proportion. 
Their conclusion that model 4, which corresponds to their third develop- 
mental stagetts the natural outcome of formal operational reasoningp 
may not be invalidated by the results of the present study because of 
the reasons cited for believing that the performance of the secondary 
school children involved was not all it might have been. 
The research reported by Lowe and Ranyard (1973) also fails to 
distinguish models 3 and 4. In fact their idea of a proportion strategy 
seems to bear some similarity to model 3t as isýshown by some of the 
statements already singled out from theirreport. 
The graph of the overall result (figure 4) gives preliminary 
evidence of a developmental sequence from model 1 to model 2 toi, m6del 
3 (if all6wance is made for the drop in performance between the primary 
and secondary school children) with the different types of solution 
showing maxima at different ages. This raises the possibility that the 
models are in fact models of 'developmental stages' in the solution of 
this type of problem. Before this can be decided the nature and meaning 
of the term stage must be clarified-. 
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Considerations concerning the detection of stages in cross-sectional, 
data. 
Stage has had a long history as a psychological concept. Much of 
this history is one of spurious usuage for, as Wallace (1972a) remarksý 
an expression such as 'He's at the teething stage' can be reduced to, 
'He's teething' without any loss of meaning. The most interesting use 
of the term has been made by Piaget, who sees stages in terms of 
qualitative differences in intellectual organisation and, consequentlyý 
behaviour. In addition to the stress on qualitative changes, each stage 
is seen in a wider framework as part of a sequence of increasingly 
structured and integrated adaptations to the environment. Authoritative 
expositions of Piaget's views are provided by Piaget (1960) and Inhelder 
(1962)v I 
"Whereas somatic and perceptual development seem to be 
continuousy intellectual development seems to take place in 
stages, 
ihe 
criteria of which can be defined as follows: 
1. Each stage involves a period of formation (genesis) and a 
period of attainment.. Attainment is characterized by the 
progressive organisation of a composite structure of mental 
operations. 
2. Each structure constitutes at the same time the att; Unment 
of one stage and the starting point of the next stagep of 
a new evolutionary process. 
3. The. order of succession of the stages in constant. Ages of 
attainment can vary within certain limits as a function of 
factors of motivationg excercisey cultural milieug and so 
forth. 
4. The transition from an earlier stage to a later stage 
follows a law of implication analogous to the process of 
integrationg preceding structures becoming a part of later 
structures. ' (Inhblder, 1962, p. 24-) 
This approach to stages in conceptual development has been 
elaborated by Pinard and Laurendeau (1969), who also provide a 
discussion of the value of Piaget's equilibration model as a model 
of the fadtors responsible for the transitions between stages. The 
problem of the nature of such a transition mechanism is of fundamental 
importance in developmental psychology and will be approached later. 
At the moment it is necessary to establish some sort of practical 
prescription for the detection of stages in-n-,. -a set of data. 
The theoretical side of this problem has been considered very 
thoroughly by Plavell (1971). Plavell t akes the various criteria of 
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a stage development in turn and analyses the way in which these might 
influence performance in a way which would allow them to show up in 
experimental data. His starting point is that any meaningful use 
of the term stage must involve qualitative rather than quantitative 
changes in thinking. One would noty for example, want to say 
something like 'This child had previously been in the stage where 
his short-term recall was poorv but is now in the stage where it is 
better. ' (Op-cit-9p. 425-) Unfortunatelyq this does not mean 
that qualitative and quantitative changes cannot co-exist in the 
developmental process. There is abundant evidence of quantitative- 
looking improvements in the development of perception and memory 
(see Gibson, 19699 Flavellt 1970b)and Pascual-Leone (Pascual-Leone 
and Smith, 1969; Pascual-Leone, 1970) has claimed that such quantit- 
ative developments may account for the transition from one Piagetian 
stage to the next. It is the apparent mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative changes in conceptual developmenty, of improved skills and 
novel strategies, which makes the firm detection of stages so 
difficult. 
Suppose, for example, we have an 'ideal' stage development 
sequence in which each stage can be detected by the presence or 
absence, of a single item. Possible ways in which this sequence might 
develop are indicated in Flavell's figure 1 (Flavell, 1971s P. 426), 
which is presented here as figure 5- (The abscioaae in figure 5 show 
the defined age periods for three developmental stages. The linear 
development is an arbitrary convention. ) 
A purely qualitative change model would be represented by la. in 
figure 5. This implies that there are no periods of transition 
between stagesy (or, more prec, isely, that the transition periods 
are of null duration)y leading to the paradoxical conclusion that 
the child spends all his time 'being' rather than 'becoming'. To 
most people such a view would be unacceptableg and some notion 
corresponding to 'functional maturity@, which isaa measure of how 
readily available the item is in the child's repertoireq would have 
to be introduced. If the full functlonal maturity of a given item 
is taken to mark the end of one stage and the beginning of the next*, 
model lb is produced. It is this model which appears to be implicit 
in the efforts of many Piagetian researchers. However, a more 
extreme version of the gradual development model, 1c, is possible in 
which the final level of functional maturity of a stage-specific item 
is not reached until after development of the next stage item has 
begun. Flavell. maintains that for most items so far investigated this 
model gives the most realistic Picture. 
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When attention is shifted from ideal stages defined by single 
items to more realistic stages (from the Genevan point of view at any 
rate) involving various items, the situation becomes even more confused 
and confusing. The various items defining a stage may show varying 
degrees of concurrency in their development. Taking the case of a 
single stage defined by two items, X1 and X29 Plavell draws attention 
to the possibilities illustrated in hit figure 2p (Op-cit-PP-437)t 
presented here as figure 6. 
Once again the linear development is purely conventional. The 
important thing, it is argued, is whether the items X1 and X2 are 
initiated or terminated concurrently. In this case 2a would seem to be 
most like the Genevan conception of stage development, although 2b and 
2c are not wholly incongruent with it. 
As soon as the possibilities outlined in figure 5 are combined 
with those of figure 6 the situation becomes very confusing indeed. 
The result is brilliantly summarised by Flavell, 
'It is clear that "developmental concurrence" can be an ambiguous 
expression once the acquisition of an item is regarded as an 
extended process (figures lb and 1c) rather than an instantaneousf 
quantum-like jump (figure la). In particulart to say that "there 
is (exists) developmental concurrence" between two acquisition 
processes does not differentiate among Models 2a - 2c. Nor does 
it distinguish these from 2dq nor, in factl 2a - 2d from the 
different-stage developments represented by the dottedt solid and 
dashed lines in Figure le (the stage I item is after allt still 
developing during a time interval in which the stage III item is 
developingt and hence the two are for a time "developing concurrently"). 
What specific type or degree of concurrence do people have in 
diindq then, when they talk about items of the same stage developing 
"simultaneously" or "together"? The answer is, not surprisingly, 
that they generally do not have anything very specific in mindq 
because the distinctions represented in Figures 1 and 2 have not 
entered into their thinking on that matter. ' (Op-cit-pp-438). 
The difficulty of deriving evidence concerning what is actually 
happening fiL. _dývclopment in order to resolve the kind of issue raised 
above is highlighted by Plavell. The usual method of testing for the 
presence of developmental concurrences has been to administer tests 
designed to detect the presence or absence of items Xl and X2 to a 
group Of- chilclren(Plavellg 1970a2 Wohlwill, 1963). The 
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pattern of results obtained can then be interpreted as indicating 
the concurrence or non-concurrence of Xl and X2. The difficulty 
with this method is that if the criterion of success on each test 
(in terms of the level of functional maturity of the item required 
to pass) is not identical almost any interpretation can be made. 
Figure 7 (figure 3 in Flavelly 1971) shows two examples of this, 
in 3a the result is an-apparent developmental asynchroniam (a 
falsely liegative finding)y in 3b it is the converse (a falsely 
positive finding). (Flavell, 19719 P. 440). 
The obvious solution to this particular problem is to equate 
the level of difficulty of the tests employed, but it is not clear 
how far this could be realised in practice. Flavell's own solution? 
which is also a solution to the more general problems he has posedg is 
to Iliberalisel the concept of stage and argue, contrary to Pinard 
and Laurendeau. (1969)ythat it can be used meaningfully without really 
requiring concurrences. His conclusions are: 
'The items that define a stage develop gradually rather 
than abruptly. Moreoverp the typical item probably does not 
achieve its "final level of functional maturity" (defined 
in terms of the item's evocability and utilizability as 
a solution proced&e) until after the conventional termination 
age of the stage in which it is supposed to begin its develop- 
ment. ' (Flavell, 1971, p 450. ) 
With respect to inter-item concurrence: 
'Firs, ýqitems from the same stage may often emerge in an 
invariant or near-invariant sequence rather than concurrently, 
although important methodological problems cloud the research 
evidence on this point. Second, a stage theory such as 
Piaget's does not in any event logically require anything but 
a very loose sort of item concurrence at most, and research 
attempts at establishing strict concurrences have been 
accordingly misguided in rationale'. (Op-cit-pp-451-) 
Flavell's discussion of the stage concept has been accorded 
an extended treatment because it seems well-balanced between theoretical 
and practical perpectives. There are two points which should perhaps 
be added. The first'is that Piagetts own use of the term is itself 
inconsistent. He is very definite about how it is to be defined 
(e. e* PiaCet, 1960)9 but a careful reading of his own definition 
shows that only the 'major' developmental stages (the sensorimotor, 
concrete operational and formal operational periods) conform to it. 
The other stages Piaget identifies depart from the ideal in varying 
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degrees. In Piaget (1951)y six stages in the development of 
imitation are outlined. In Piaget (1952) there are three stages in 
the development of conservation of discontinuous quantitiest three 
stages in the development of conservation of continuous quantitieop 
and three stages in the development of additive composition of 
classes. In Piaget, Inhelder and Szeminska (1960) are three stages 
in the child's understanding of 'changes in ponitionIq three stages 
in the development of spontaneous measurement, three stages in the 
ý! construction of relations of distance'j" three stages in the 
development of conservation of lengthq three stages in the development 
of measurement of lengthp three stages in subdividing a straight 
line, three stages in locating a point, three stages in angular 
measurement, three stages in measuring the angles of a triangle, 
four stages in summing the angles of a trianglep three stages in the 
development of solutions to problems of geometrical locig four 
stages in the representation of curves of movementq three stages in 
the conservation of area, three stages in the measurement of area, 
three stages in the subdivision of areas, four stages in doubling 
an area or volume, and four stages in the conservation of volume, 
to say nothing of 'substages'. 
Frequently the three-stage developments are little more than 
statements that there is initial absence of somethingy followed by 
a period of transitiony followed by its attainment. In other casesq 
such as the three-stage development from Piaget and Inhelder (1951) 
which has been quoted many times in this thesis2 the stages are 
just different answers children give to the same question. This 
is not to deny that they are 'genuine, stages, or to invalidate 
Piaget's claims, but such stages can hardly pass the complex set 
of criteria put forward by Inhelder (1962). The gap between' 
this cavalier empiricism and the highly systematised Piagetian 
theory is most strikingg and supports Plavell's contention that 
not all of Piaget's theoretical definition is essential to his 
concept of stage. Of course Piaget's own concept of stage has 
'developed' in the yearsq and recent discussions (Inhelder9l972; 
Cellerier, 1972) indicate that it may well be moving in the same 
direction. 
The second point is that it seems to the writer that much 
of the confusion in this field can be airoided if a simple but 
radical step is taken. This in to admit that the inferences 
concerning stages which can be derived from experimental data 
and the inferences to be derived from theoretical models are 
48. 
of a different order. Inferences from experimental data can only 
be of an 'as if' varietyp the use of the term stage in the description 
of empirical rebults is an analytic convenience. The problem of 
distinguishing qualitative and quantitative phenomena solely on the 
basis of empirical data is intraotablep as the sophisticated 
consideration Flavell has given it reveals. On the other hand any 
model. of children's performance which passer. the criteria of sufficiency 
(Gregg and Simony 1967) and developmental tractability (Klahr and 
Viallaceg, 1970) will allow definte conclusions regarding stages and 
the role of quantitative and qualitative factors to be drawn. 
Acceptance of this position does not mean that 'stage' is to 
be abandoned as a theoretical concept$ but that the support for 
its use must come from theoretical and not just empirical considerations. 
When adequate theoretical models are available it is possible U 
compare experimental results generated in different situations with 
predictions derived from the models. There cannot be a purely object- 
ive way of deriving stages from experimental results, but certain 
patterns of experimental data are consistent with certain stage modelsy 
whilst other patterns are not. Of course, our models need not involve 
stages at allf but those being discussed here are of the stage type, 
so that the kind of data which would be consistent with the stage 
model under consideration'mVLst be elucidated. 
The models of problem solving strategies presented in this thesis 
can be viewed as a sequence of developmental stages in the looser 
sense ueed by Piaget, of developmental stages in the solution of a 
particular type of problem. They do not meet the criteria of stages 
proposed by Piaget (1960) or Inhelder (1962), which define more general 
stages in cognitive development. Now obviously stages in problem 
solving strategies are not unrelated to more general stages of cognitive 
developmentp but they are different in certain crucial ways. The 
main difference is with respect to what Flavell calls inter-item 
concurrence. Any developmental stage of the order of complexity 
described by Piaget (1960)p or Inhelder (1962)9 will have to be 
detected by the presence or absence of several items, and the different 
ways in which these stage-related items might develop presents a major 
difficulty in stage detection. However, developmental stages in 
problem-solving strategies will often only involve the presence or 
absence of a single itemq namely the stpategy under consideration, 
and this greatly simplifies the problem of comparing theoretical 
predictions and results. If this arguement is valid we arrive at 
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the paradoxical position that one typo of developmental stage is 
defined by several features but is difficult to detect with any 
degree of certainty, whereas the other type is defined by less 
features and yet can be comparatively easily detected. 
The problem of defining stages is thus sidestepped by the claim 
that stages are the result of a particular way of modelling the 
developmental processy and that if the proposed models meet the 
criteria of sufficiency and developmental tractability then the 
type of stages they will lead to can be easily deduced. The models 
11 2,3 and 4P of possible strategies in the solutioruýof probability- 
comparison problems meet these criteria and would predict a stage- 
development in childrens' solutions of these problems. This stage- 
development will be in the direction I-2-3-4 but whether each 
stage must be passed through, or some may be by-passed, is not clear 
without a model of the transition mechanism responsible for the 
development. For the present purposes this is unimportant as the 
data to be considered is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. 
In a longitudinal study it would be most important to decide whether 
the stage development is to be considered as an invariant or only 
semi-invariant sequencet but a cross-sectional study is by its 
nature insensitive in this respect. The presence or absence of a 
given stage can be detected in each problem by a single itemt namely 
the presence or absence of a verbal report of the solution-strategy 
characteristic of that stage. This means that the stage-development, 
if it is fo%indp will be like one of the possibilities illustrated in 
figure 5 (Plavell's figure 1). 
A practical means must now be found for distinguishing these 
possibilities empiricallyq and finding out which one the data of 
the first beads experiment supports. One solution to this would 
appear to be to use the concept of 'stage mixture' outlined by 
Turiel (1969). In a discussion of the developmental processes which 
might be involved in childrens' moral thinking, Turiel points out 
that Piaget's view of stages as 'structural wholes can give the 
impression thaty at any given timet a child functions on one stage 
and that change involves movement from one such discrete stage to 
another. (This is model la in figure 5) In practioef howevert Turiel 
found that normally a child's profile of scores in different situations 
contains a dominant stage having the largest scores, with the more 
distant stages from the dominant stage having smaller scores. Turiel 
proposes that this kind of stage mixture is an essential part of 
development and may be directly related to the structuring process. 
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That isp periods of change might be characterised by extensive stage 
variationp while periods of fixity would be oharacterised by consistency. 
These ideas arev of course, very similar to those illustrated by 
Flavell in the figure given here as figure 5. Turiel'a contribution 
is to point to the possible use of stage mixture as a criterion for 
distinguishing the different stage development models which were later 
clarified by Flavell (1971)- Consideration of Flavell'a figure and 
the patterns of stage-mixture which would be exhibited by each of its 
three:;: models shows that they can indeed be separated by this method. 
To illustrate this figure 5 must be considered again. Notice that when 
any item attains its full functional maturity its development line 
continues parallel to the horizontal axis. Howeverg one of the main 
features of Piaget's idea of stage development is that preceding stages 
are integrated into subsequent stages. This means that when item II 
attains its full functional maturityp item III will be incorporated 
into it. With the developmental stages for the strategies proposed 
here a similar effect will occur, since when any stage is fully 
developed there 4rill be no call to use the solution strategy of the 
preceding stage and this will effectively disappear. Hence a more 
appropriate version of the figure would be that shown im figure 8. 
It can bf course be pointed out that such an 'integrative' notion 
of stage-development need not be usedp (see e. g. Wernerp 1948, who 
maintains that each stage passed through is retained and accessiblep 
although lower stages are subordinated to the higher stageop or Flavell, 
1972p where further distinctions for possible developments of stage- 
related items are drawn). However, the models of problem-solving 
strategies being considered here are of this type, and it has been 
argued that the tiotion of stage is only useful in conjunction with 
some sort of explicit model. In cases where each stage becomes integrated 
ihto the subsequent stage in this way it can be seen that the degree 
of stage-mixture obtained empirically does indeed distinguish the 
different possible kinds of development. For example: 
Flavell's model la involves no stage mixture. 
Flavell's model lb involves stage mixture only between one stage 
and the stage either preceding or following it. In other wordst a 
child is in a stage and can either regress or improve on certain 
problemsy but no child will show both regression and improvement on 
different problems. Put more clearlyp no child will exhibit more 
than two different stages in the whole range of problems used* 
Flavell's model le involves stage mixture between one stage 
and the stages both preceding and following it. A child may exhibit 
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three (or more if there are more than three stages) different stages 
in a ranee of problems. 
This, at lastq provides a workable way of interpreting the 
empirical data which has boon classified in terms of the four models 
of strategies for solving the experimental problems presented earlier. 
In addition to the degree of stage mixturog there is one other criterion 
of a stage-developmentg which is that there should be a broad ago-otage 
relation in the results) so that the older children belong in the more 
'advanced' stages. 
Developmental stages in the results of the first beadsexperiment. 
Returning to the results of the first beads experimentg it can 
be seen that when each result is categorised as an example of one of 
the four problem-solving strategies derived from the theoretical models, 
the age-stage relation shows up very clearly. Figure 4 shows that 
type 1 responses are predominant at age fivev type 2 are maximal between 
ages 6 and 82 and type 3 are predominant after ago ten or eleven. 
Type 4 responses do not appear until age 129 and then are very infrequent. 
In order to pursue this stage-development possibility further a 
table of the results has been drawn up in which the subjects are arranged 
in what would be increasing order of development if the stage-hypothesis 
were correct* This is table 2. Only subjects from the primary school 
group have been included in this table because there are reasons for 
supposing that the primary and secondary school group are not equivalent 
in certain respects. These reasons have already been discussedý and 
require that the two groups be kept apart as much as possible in the 
analysis. Inspection of the secondary sbhool results (in Appendix B) 
shows that a similar table to table 2 could be made from them if 
required. 
The groupings in table 2 are derived from the primary school 
childrens' responses to the experimental problems B1 - B4. Results 
of the additiona! l problems, B5, B6 and B7 are not included in the 
table. The outcome of this grouping of the results is a three-stage 
developmentg with two transitionsp which can be summarised as follows: 
Stage 1: Fourteen subjects who gave only type 1 responsesq mainly 
aged 5 years. 
Transition 1-2: Twelve subjects who gave a mixturo oft%ype lp type 29 
and unclassifiable (? ) resp6nses, mainly aged 6 years. 
Stage 2: Twenty-one subjects who b; ave only type 2 responsesq mainly 
aged 7 and 8 years. 
Transition 2-3: Nineteen subjects who gave a mixture of type 2f 
type 3 and unclassifiable responses. Mainly age 8t 
9 and 10 years. 
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Stage 3: Six subjects who gave only type 3 responsesp mainly aged 
10 years. 
There were no subjects who gave mixtures of type 1 and type 3 
responsesp or mixtures of type 11 type 2 and type 3. All the 
unolassifiable responses came from children in the transition perioda. 
Following Turiel's (1969) discussion of stage mixttret these 
results are consistent withý-. a three-stage development. The develop- 
ment corresponds to something in between Flavell's (1971) models 
l(a) and l(b)p in which stage-mixture occurs only in the transitions 
between stagesp and no more than two stages can belmixed'. It is 
illustrated in figure 9. 
It must be emphasised that this stage delineation can only be 
supported within the limits imposed by the methods employed. ' Flavellp 
for exampleg stresses that functional maturity can only be inferred 
from a wide range of situations, and it is quite possible that the 
range represented by problems B1 - B4 may not be wide enough. This 
would mean that if the range of difficulty encompassed by the problems 
were to be increasedý some subjects might move from their present 
position within stages 2 or 3 into the transitions. However2 major 
shifts, such as from stage to stage, should not occur. 
This kind of effect can beeseen in the answers to problem B6 and 
B7. Problem B6 and B7 were designed to investigate whether the 
model 3 strategy is used by children in a carefully controlled situation, 
and in general the results show that it is. Howevert in most cases 
children who have given type 3 answers to all parts of problems B1 - B4 
show 'regression' to type 2 answers in some part or parts of problems 
B6 and B7 (see Appendix B). Of the six subjects in the primary 
obhool group who were placed in stage 3, five showed this kind of 
regression. 
What is causing this? The answer seems lie in Flavell's concept 
of functional maturity. Both problem B6 and problem B7 present an 
increased level of difficulty over problems B1 - B4, because of the 
larger numbers of beads involved. However, problem B7 involves 
the most beads and only one out of the six stage 3 subjects regressed 
when faced with this problem, whereas five out of six regrcssed whbn 
faced with problem B6. Problem B6 is the problem on which model 3 
leads to the prediction that either box can be chosen because there 
are two more greens on each side. If the model 3 type of reasoning 
is not fully functionally mature then a tendency to go along with 
the experimental set and make a choice is to be expected2 and the 
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next best way of making a choice becomes the model 2 type of reasoning. 
This explanation accounts for the regression quite neatly and 
can be pursued further. Problem B3 is similar to problem B6 in that 
model 3 leads to the choice of either boxg and inspection of the 
results shows that in the transition between stage 2 and stage 3P a 
stage 2 response is more likely to be given to this problem than 
to problems Blý B2 or B4. Of course the argument 
' 
that difficulty 
over choice leads to regression could equ;: U*y be turned on its head, 
i. e. difficulty over choice might lead to improvement. Within the 
primary school group this was not found to be the casev but of 
course the older children in this group are only just moving into 
stage 39 and some evidence of improvements on difficult problems 
is noticeable in the secondary school group. 
Perhaps improvements might be more profitablp sought in the cases 
where the model 2 type of reasoning runs into difficultiesp such as 
problem B2. The answers to problem B2 when red is the target colour 
indicate that both model 2(a) and model 2(b) represent ways in which 
children handle this problemp 2(a) being rather more common than 2(b). 
Two subjects in the transition period between stage 1 and stage 2 
gave type 2(a) answersy sixteen subjects in stage 2 gave type 2(a) 
answersy five subjects in stage 2 gave type 2(b) answera and three 
subjects in the transition period between stage 2 and stage 3 gave 
type 2(b) answers. This indicates that the developmental sequence 
may well be from type 1 to type 2(a) to type 2(b) to type 39 but 
the evidence is scanty and such a conclusion cannot be prb6sed. 
Both improvements from type 2 to type 3 and regressions from type 2 
to type 1 on problem 52 can be seen in the two tra=. itiQn-per49, dz. 
TI-. 9 sýamo trend'can be'-s6en in the secondary school group 
results in the transition from stage 2 to stage 3 (the secondary 
school results begin at stage 2) hence they contain no evidence 
concerning the stage 1 to stage 2 transition). 
Cluster analysis of results of the first beads experiment. 
The analysis of results as carried out so far is dependent upon 
the initial interpretations of the children's responses made by the 
experimenter) albeit in accordance with an explicit classificatory 
scheme. It has been argued that some form of independent confirmation 
cafthe validity of this scheme is necessary, and that high correlation 
with the interpretations of another scorer is not sufficient for 
this purpose. TheBrimer cluster analysisp however, does appear to 
meet this need. 
The aim of the Brimer technique is to strip the analysis of as 
much subjective baggaCe as possible by making the minimum possible 
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interpretation of the datap which is a decision whether any two responses 
are the same (identical) or different (in any way). Of course such a 
decision will always be subjective to a certain extentp for example, 
most people would not consider the answers1there are four' and 'there's 
four there' as being different. Thus complete objectivity is recognised 
as, unat. tainable from the outset, but its pursuit is not abandoned. 
The power of the technique depends on the riohne6s and limitations of 
the available data, rather than the richness or limitations of the 
experimenter's interpretations. This has certain. disadvantaces as 
well as advantages. As Pylyshyn (1972) points out9 such methods do 
not allow the derivation of process-type constructsp since this 
invariably requires bringing external considerations to bear on the 
data. 'The end-product of this type of analysis is always some 
economy-driven description of the variance inherent in a particular 
sample of observations. The difficulty here is that, as anyone who 
has ever spent time in an undergraduate laboratory knows2 most 
observational variance is irrelevant- to theories or to the understanding 
of a phenomenon. ' (Op. cit. 9 p-191). Fortunatelyt such criticisms havo 
been circumvented here by the fact that the experimental problems are 
designed to distinguish various theoretical modelsp and the fact that 
the cluster analysis is only being used to add strength to other analyses, 
not as the sole method of data interpretation. 
Although involving minimal interpretation of the data collectedy 
the Brimer analysis cannot be carried out without some theoretical 
preconceptions$ since these enter at the level where decisions concern- 
ing the data to be recorded are taken. Most people would not record 
ýhe colour of the child's sweaterp and many more relevant features can 
be overlooked carelessly or deliberately. (Harrisq 1964, argues 
convincing-ýy that it is impossible to eliminate all preconceptions). 
The results of the first beads experiment comprise only choice data 
and verbalisationsq other possible data such as latencies or outcomes 
of choices have been ignored for the purposes of analysis. Any response 
is ultimately a unique response to a unique situation, and as soon as it 
is considered in any other way an implicit or explicit theory is involved. 
In the present experiment the selection of verbal and choice data was 
dictated by the need for data which would be rich enough to allow the 
Brimer technique to be profitably used, without being so individual as 
to lead to a set of almost unique categories. 
The starting point of the Brimer analysis is to define an initial 
set of response categories consisting of the responses ikiven by the 
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first subject to each of the experimental problems. This set of 
categories is then added to every time a new response to one of the 
problems is detected until the last response of the last subject has 
been categorised. This technique was applied to the data generated 
in the experimental problems B1 - B40 and was carried out with two 
Groups of subjects: 
Group A: The primary school children onlyp i. e. the 72 children 
aged 5 to 10 years. 
Group B: The primary and secondary school children, i. e. the 
whole sample of 120 children aged 5 to 14 years. 
The analysis was performed twice in this way because of the 
reservations which have been expressed concerning the secondary school 
children's performance. There ia also the additional advantage that 
the clusters obtained in each analysis can be comparedo thus eliminAting 
some of the redundancy inherent in the technique (see Satterly and 
Brimero 1971). 
The categorisation scheme evolved for the Brimer analysis must 
now be described. This will be done by considering responses to 
problem B1 as a typical case and outlining all the categories necessary 
for their analysis, any extra categories necessary for analysis of 
responses to the other problems can then be discussed separately. 
Problem B1 involves four green and two red beads in one box, and 
two green and four red beads in the other box. Considering the case 
where the target colour is greeno the following categories of response 
are distinguishable: 
(. 'Pass' choices are defined as choice of 4G2R, Ifaill choices are 
choice of 2G4R, when green is the target colour). 
FU: A 'fail' choicey without any reason given, or an unqualified 
assertion of the rightness of the choice, or repetition 
of the experimenter's instruction. 
e. g. SB51: Chooses 2G4R- ýDonlt know why'. 
SB3 - Chooses 2G4R, . 'To get a green one'. 
PU: A 'pass' choicey with a reason like the reasons specified 
for FU. 
e. g. SB4: Chooses 4G2R. 'That's my best one*. 
FSR: A 'fail' choice with a spurious reasong e. g. the colour 
of the box. 
e. e. SB5: Chooses 2G4R- 'Got brown on it'. (The box containing 
the beads has brown on the side). 
PSR: A 'pass' choice with a reason like FSR- 
e. g. SB8: Chooses 4G2R: 'I like brovm'. 
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FQ5: Alfaill choicev accompanied by implicit or explicit 
attempts to quantify spurious factors. 
e. 6. BB10: Chooses 2G4R. 'Got more green round the corners of 
the box. ' 
PQS: A 'Pass' choice with a reason like FQS. 
e. g. SB14: Chooses 4G2R. 'Same again. It's always best, always 
has more patches on it'. 
PPR: A 'pass' choice with a reason based on previous outcomes 
or previous choices, e. g. left-right alternation or win-stay 
lose-shift strategy. 
e. g. BB37: Chooses 4G2R. 'I got green last time'. 
PRF: A 'pass' choice accompanied by reference to some relevant 
factor not included in the other categories. 
e. g. SB9: Chooses 4G2R. 'It's got a green one in it'. 
FQA: A 'fail' choice accoppanied by reference to the number 
of beads of the target colour in the box chosen. 
e. g. BB13: Chooses 2G4R. 'Two greens in here'. 
PQA: A 'pass-' choice accompanied by a reason like 
F, QA 
e. g. 9B, 17.: choose's' - 4G2A. It S'Got four, greenst* 
PQTM: A 'pass' choice accompanied by a claim thwG there are 
'more' beads of the target colour in the box chosen than 
in the other box2 without specification of numbers. 
e. g. SB30: Chooses 4G2R 'More greens than in that one'. 
SB39: Chooses 4G2R 'The mott greens'. 
PQTA: Apass I choice accompanied by a reason referring to the 
number of beads of the target colour in each box2 and 
choice of the box with more'. 
d. g. BB29: Chooses 4G2R. 'Got four in; other has two'. 
PQTR: 'Atpaso choice accompanied by specification of the ratio 
of the number of target beads in one box to the number 
of target beads in the other box. 
e. g. BB63: Chooses 4g2R. ITTjice as many greens as the other 
one'. 
PQJTTL: A 'pass, choice accompanied by reference to the non-target 
beads in each boxt and the fact that the box chosen has 'less'. 
e. g. SB54: Chooses 4G2R. 'Less red than the other box'. 
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PQRA: Alpass' choice based on comparison of the numbers of -target 
and non-target beads in each box. 
e. g. BB48: Chooses 4G2R. 'Four red and on! y two green in the 
other box. Also only two red in this box and four green'. 
PQHOA: A 'Pass' choice accompanied by specification of the number 
of target and non-target beads in the box not chosen. 
e. g. SB46: Chooses 4G2R. 'Only two greens in the other and four 
reds'. 
P011t A 'pass' choice accompanied by a claim that there are 'more' 
beads of the target colour than beads of the non-target 
colour in the box chosen, and that the situation in this 
respect is more favourable in the box chosen than the 
box hot chosen. 
e. g. BB47: Chooses 4G2R. 'More greens than reds. Other 
has more reds than greens'. 
PQRS: A 'pass' choice accompanied by a statement of how many 
more target than non-target beads are in the boxes. 
e. g. SB67: Chooses 4G2R. tMore chance again. Two more greens 
than reds. Other is two less'. 
The following categories were requiredlin addition to those 
listed previously, in order to analyse the secondary school results 
together with the primary school results. 
PQRR: A 'pass' choice accompanied by specification of the ratio 
of target to non-target beads in the box chosen. 
e4ge BB108: Chooses 4G2R. 'There's four greens and two reds. 
A two-to-one chance. ' 
U: Refusal to choose, together with 'philosophical' justification. 
e. 6. SB97: Refusen to choose. 'Either one. It doesn't matter, 
you can got red or green every time'. 
This completes the list of categories necessary to classify the 
responses obt4ined to the section of problem B1 involving green as 
the target colour. For the section of problem B1 involving red as 
the target oolour a new set of categories was drawn up. Many of 
these were identical to those already specified (except that they 
are new categories because this is a now problem) and will not be 
mentioned. The following additional categories were necessary. 
PQANT: A 'Pass' choice (which now becomes. choice of 2G4R) accompanied 
by a reference to the number of non-target beads in the box 
chosen. 
eggs BB69: Chooses 2G4R. 'Only two greens in there'. 
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PQI! S: A 'Pass' choice accompanied by specification of how many 
more target beads are in the box chosen than in the box 
not chopen. 
cog* SB87; Chooses 2G4R. 'Therelz ýwo more reds than there'. 
PQRL: A 'pass' choice accompanied by a claim that there are 
'less' beads of the non-target colour than beads of the 
target colour in the box chosen. 
e6go SB54: Chooses 2G4R. 'Less green than red ones'. 
Problem B2 has four green beads and throe red beads in one box, 
and two green beads and three red beads in the other box. When the 
target colour is green, only two new categories are required in addition 
to others similar to those already described. 
FRF: Alfaill choice (choice of 2G3R) accompanied by reference 
to some relevant factor not included in the other categories. 
e. g. SB9: Chooses 2G3R. 'That one's got a Green one in'. 
FQTL: A 'fail' choice accompanied by the reason that there are 
'less' of the target beads in the box chosen. 
e. G. SB55: Chooses 2G3R. 'Only two Greens. Could get green 
easily. Less green than in that box. ' 
When red is the target colour in problem b2o there are three reds 
in each box. A pass choice is defined as choice of 2G3R, and choice 
of 4G3R or assertions that either box may be chosen are considered fail 
choices. The categorisation scheme must be expanded to accomodate 
this possibility, and in addition to the categories already described, 
the following must be introduced: 
FPR: A Ifaill choice with a reason referring to previous choices 
or outcomes, e. g. left-riGht alternationsp or win-stay 
lose-shift strategies. 
e. g. SB37: Chooses 4G3R. 'Same again. Was red before$ could 
be again'. 
FQTA: A 'fail' choice or refusal to choose following an assertion 
that both boxes have the same chance of success because there 
are three reds in each* (This is slightly different to the 
way FQTA is use d as a category in later problems). 
e. g. BB28: Chooses 03R. 'Don't know why. Both got three in.. 
Doesn't matter which one. This has mostest greens'. 
PQTM: A 'fail' choice or refusal to choose following an assertion 
that both boxes have the same chance of success, without any 
further reason. (This is slightly different to the way 
FQTM is used as a category in later problems). 
6.9. SB41: Chooses 4G3R- 'Just a guess. Same really. I think'. 
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BB62: 'They're both the same. I'll pick that one. ' 
Chooses 4G3R. 
PQTA: A ýpassl choice following an assertion that both boxes have 
the same chance of success because there are three reds in 
each. (This is slightly different to the way PQTA is used 
as a category in the other problems). 
e. g. SB31: Chooses 2G3R. 'Can take any one. Both got three in. 
Guess'. 
PQTM: A 'pass' choice following an assertion that both boxes have 
the same chance of successt without any further reason. 
(This is slightly different to the way PQTM is used as a 
category in the other problems). 
e. g. SB51: Chooses 2G3R. 'Don't know why. Just guessed. Any 
will do'. 
PQýM: A 'pass' choice with an assertion that both boxes have the 
same number of target beads. The reason for the choice 
refers to the number of non-target beads in the box chosen. 
e. g. SB63: Chooses 2G3R. 'Only two greens. Same reds in each 
onete 
FQRM: A 'fail' choice accompanied by the reason that there are 
'less' target beads than non-target beads in the box chosen. 
e. g. SB55: Chooses 4G3R. 'Not as many reds as greensp easily 
get red'. 
A further category is necessary for the secondary school results: 
FQNT14: A 'fail' choice following an assertion that both boxes 
have an equal chance of success. The reason given for 
the choice is that there are 'more' non-target beads in the 
box chosen than in the other box. 
e. g. SB85: Chooses 4G3R. 'Both got three. I'll have that one 
because there's more greens'. 
Problem B3 has four green beads and four red beads in one box, 
and two green beads and two red beads in the other box. This means 
that when the target colour is green or red, a pass response will involve 
the assertion that both boxes have the same chance of success9 and failure 
to make this assertion will be considered a fail. In order to modify 
the categories generated so far to make them uaeful in this situationg 
the suffixes L and M can be added to the 'fail' categories. These 
suffixes indicate choice of the box with less or with more beads. Thus 
category FU can become FUL or FM4 in this situation, the reason in each 
case being the same, but the choice different. If the categorisation 
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scheme is modified in this way many of the responses to problem B3 can 
be handled satisfactorily, but some further categories are still 
necessary. When green is the target colour, the following additional 
categories must be introduced: 
ARI: A 'fail' choice of the box with fnore beads of both colours, 
accompanied by an assertion to the effect that this is the 
reason for the choice. 
e. g. BB34: Chooses 4G4R. 'More greens and more redo'. 
FQTA: FQTIT: FQTS: FQTR: These categories are the same as the 
categories PQTA: PQTDI: PQTS: PQTR: which were outlined for problem lt 
except that in this problem the reason involved lead tolfaillchoices 
rather thanIpassIchoices. 
. 
Only one further category is now nodded for the results of problep 
B3 when red is the target colour: 
PU: A 'pass' assertion with a tdon't know whyt reason. 
e. g. SB66: Chooses 4G4R. 'They're both equal. Dontt know really'. 
Problem B4 has six green beads and four red beads in one boxg and 
two green beads and two red beads in the other box. For the part 
involving green as the target colour no additional categories were 
required for the primary school results, and only one for the secondary 
school results: 
FQNTL: A 'fail' choiceiwith the reason that the box chosen has 
not so many non-target beads as the other box. 
e. g. SB115: Chooses MR. 'You can easily pick a red in the 
other one'. 
For the part of problem B4 involving red as the target colourg 
the following additional categories are necessary: (Pass choices are 
choice of 2G2R$ fail is choice of 6G4R). 
Pw: A 'pass' choice accoppanied by qhantificatihnt ofr., somere 
kelev; b. nt, -factor not-includedAiisthe 6thebc, catbgories. 
e. g. BB16: Chooses MR. 'Got four in'. 
PLL: A 'pass' choice accompanied by the reason that there are 
less target and non-target beads in the box chosen. 
e. g. SB35: Chooses MR. tThere's less greens and less redo'. 
FQANT: A 'fail' choice accompanied by specification of the number 
of non-target beads in the box chosen. 
e. g. SB15: Chooses 6G4R 'Got six green ones. ' 
PQTL: A 'pass' choice with the reason that there are less beads 
of the target colour in the box chosen than in the other 
box. 
e. g. SB20: Chooses 2G2R. 'Got lessest red'. 
_________________________________________________ - -H 
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FQ, RA: A 'fail' choice accompanied by specification of the number 
of target and non-target beads in the box chosen. 
e. g. SB34: Chooses 6G4R. 'There's four reds and six greens'. 
This completes the description of the categorisation scheme evolved 
for the cluster analysis. The result of applying this scheme to the 
experimental data can be found in Appendix C. When the primary school 
results only are analysed there are 72 subjects, each giving 8 responses, 
and 141 categories are required. For the combined primary and secondary 
school results there are 120 subjects, each giving 8 responses2 and 164 
categories are required. Each category was then given a separate 
number and the datay in the form of a list of eight numbers for each 
subject (the categories corresponding to his responses)y was analysed 
by computer. 
Unfortunately the computer's maximum capacity was 138 categories 
when there were 72 subjects, and 130 cateSores when there were 120 
subjects. This means that Jthe number of categories must be reduced 
by 3 for the primary school resultsý and by 34 for the combined primary 
and secondary school results. The simplification of the primary school 
categories was effected by ineldding PQRL in PQRM in the second part 
of problem 19 and by including PQROA in PQRA in both parts of problem 
1. 
As-here was only one example of each of these categories, this cannot 
be expected to affect the result of the cluster analysis significantly. 
The simplification of the combined primary and secondary school results 
in more difficult- This analysis is intended to provide a more general 
overview of the whole result of the experiment than the primary school 
analysisq so the decision was taken to 'tidy up' the categories which 
one might describe as poor performance categoriesq i. e. the 
large 
number of small categories produced by the five and six year olds. 
This is more desirable than impoverishing data from the older childreng 
and the categories produced by the younger children have already 
been 
analysed in the primary school only analysis. 
The simplification which was arrived atq involved treating the 
followinig groups of categories as single categories: 
Problem 
Problem 
Problem 
Problem 
Problem 
Problem 
Bly 
Bly 
B22 
B29 
B31 
B31 
green target: 
red target: 
green target: 
red target: 
green target: 
red target: 
(PSRIPQ. SIPPR)l (FSR, FQ. S)y (PUIPRP)I(PQRA? PQROA). 
(PSRoPQ. S I PFR) I 
(FSR2FU) I 
(PQRAqPOOA) 9 (PQRLJPG. RM). 
(PSRqPQ, S)q(FUjFRF)2(PUfPRF)- 
(PSR'iPQStPPR)9(FSRgPQSvFPR)p(PUgPRF)- 
(FSRLIFULpFPRL)9(FSRMpFPRDI)- 
(FSRL I PQSL) 9 (FSRf-I I PUM 9 PPRIT) 9 
(FUL , FRFL) . 
- ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
---. ----- 
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Problem B4P green target: (PSRtPQ32)9(FsR2rQsFpa)I(FUlplIF). 
Problem B4ý red target: (PSRPQS)I(FSRIFQý39FPR)ý(FUpl? RFpFWT)t(PUpPW)- 
This removes 35 categories from the analysisleaving 129 categories. 
The list of category numbers for each subject in the two analyses can 
be found in Appendix C. 
The cluster analysis program generates groups of subjects who exhibit 
covarying categories. The Groups are Generated according to the criterion 
of a chi-square value significant at the 0-05 level. Second-order groups 
(clusters) of the original groups are then generatedg again using 0.05 
as the level of significance. The purpose of this second application 
of the technique is to reduce the high redundancy which usually occurs 
in the first-order groupings. A more complete and formal description 
of the method can be found in Appendix I. 
Results of the cluster analysis of data from the primary school children. 
The results of the two cluster analyses will be discussed in turng 
starting with the analysis of the primary school results only. This 
analysis generated 16 first-order groupsg and 3 second-order groups, 
or clusters. The detailed composition of these groups and clusters 
can be found in Appendix C. The groupings are arrived at on a purely 
statistical basis, so an attempt will be made to expose the factors 
underlying them. Enough information is given in Appendix C for the 
interested reader to compare his interpretations with the writer's. 
Group-1: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by seeing 
which collection of beads contains more of the target-colour 
beads, but who do not use the word1morel in their answersy 
and refer only to the number of target-colour beads in each 
collection. The group has 6 members. 
Group 2: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by seeing 
which collection of beads contains more of the target-colour 
beads, and who use the word 'more' in their answersp usually 
without mentioning any numbers. The group has 28 members. 
Group 3: A group of subjects who seem tozolire the problems by comparing 
the relative number of target-colour beads and non-target 
colour beads in each collectiong and use the word 'more' in 
their answers. The group has 17 members. 
Group 4: A group of subjects who make choices but don't give reasonsý 
or whose, reasons are repetitions of the experimental instruct- 
ions or unqualified assertions of the correctness of the choices. 
The choices made by these children look erratic. The group 
has five members. 
Group 6: A similar group to group 
63. 
"Group 3 (17 members) and group 6 (14 members) have 12 members in 
common. 
Group 7: Similar to group 5- 
""Grou-n: 5 (5 members) and group 7 (5 members) have 3 members in 
common. 
Group 8: A group of subjects whose answers indicate quantifications 
of numbers of target beads, but do not always refer to both 
collections. The choices made by subjects in this group 
show an overall consistency with choices made by subjects 
in group 1 or group 21 but some individual items deviate 
from this pattern. The group has 4 members. 
Group 9: Similar to group 2. 
Group, 2 (28 members). and group 9 (29 members) have 27 members in 
common. 
Group lo: Similar to group 3 and group 6. 
7Gr'OUP-3 (17 members) and group 10 (13 members) have 12 members in 
common* 
Grou--p, 6 (14 members) and group 10 have, 6 members in common. 
Group ll: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by 
comparing the relative number of target-colour beads 
and non-target colour beads in each collection, but who 
do not use the word 'more' in their answers, and refer only 
to the number of'target-colour beads and non-target-colour 
beads in each collection. The group has 5 members. 
Group 12: Simil 
, 
ar to group 4. 
, -,, Gro'; P-4 (6 members) and group. 12 (5 members) have 5 members in 
common. 
Group 13: Similar to group 4 and group 12. 
Gro. up-'4 (6 members) and group 13 (5 members) have 4 members in 
common. 
Group 12 (6 members) and group 13 have 3cmbmberbninocommon- 
Group 14: A group of subjectp whose answers involve attempts to 
ciuantify factors which seem irrelevant to adults. Choices 
made by these subjects look erratic. The group has 5 members. 
Group 15: Similar to group 14. * 
-GrýOUP 14 (5 members) and group 15 (4 members) have 3 members in 
common. 
Group 16: Similar to group 4, group 139 and group 12. 
Group 4. (6 members) and group 16 (3 members) have 2 members in 
common. 
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Group'13 (5 members)and Group 16 have 2 members in common. 
-"Group, 12 (6 members) and group 16 have 1 member in common. 
If the preceding interpretation of the groups generated is valid, 
four groups of groups, or clusterst might be expected: 
Cluster A: A cluster of groups of subjects who make erratic choices 
and don't really justify their choices. This cluster 
will consist of group 4, group 12, group 13, and Group 16. 
Cluster B: A cluster of groups of subjects who choose erratically and 
give irrelevant reasons (group 5 and group 7) or give 
reasons involving quantification of irrelevant factors 
(group 14 and group 15). This cluster will consist of 
group 5Y group 7, group 14, and group 15- 
Cluster C: A cluster of groups of subjects who seem to consistently 
choose the box with the larger number of beads of the target- 
colour, and whose answers involve reference to the number 
of target-colour beads in the box chosen (group 8)9 both 
boxes (group 1), or both boxes with the term 'more' 
substituted for exact numbers (group 2 and group 9). This 
cluster will'con , sist of group 11 group 2t group 8, and 
group 9. 
Cluster D: A cluster of groups of subjects who seem to consistently 
choose the box with the most favourable relative number 
of target-colour beads and non-target beads. Answers 
given by these subjects involve reference to numbers 
of target and non-target beads (group ll)p or to humbers 
implied by use of the term 'more' (group 31 group 61 group 10). 
This cluster will consist of group 3s group 69 group 10, 
and group 11. 
These predicted clusters are similar in outline to the types of 
response to the experiment predicted from theoretical considerations. 
Clusters A and B correspond to model 1 (Piaget's first developmental 
stage)2 cluster C corresponds to model 2 (Piaget's second developmental 
staige) and cluster D corresponds to model 3 (not reported by Piaget)- 
The actual clusters generated by the cluster analysis are as follows: 
First cluster: Group 7 
Group 14 
group 15 
droup 5 
Second cluster: Group 13 
Group 16 
Group 4 
Group 12 
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Third cluster: Group 3 
Group 6 
Group 10 
Group 2 
Group 9 
Group 1 
Group 11 
Group B. 
(The groups in each cluster are listed in the order printed out by 
the program, corresponding to decreasing order of w6ighting to the 
cluster). In other words the first cluster is predicted cluster B, 
the second cluster is predicted cluster A, and the third cluster 
consists of predicted cluster C combined with predicted cluster D. 
Discussion: This result provides broad support for the proposed 
stage description of the results. The three developmental stages, 
corresponding to models 1,29 and 3 show up clearly in the initial 
groupsg and in the clusters models 2 and 3. which correspond to 
systematic ways of dealing with the experimental problems9 are 
separated from the more erratic strategies. The fact that two 
versions of model 1 are distinguishedg both in the groups and the 
clusters$ suggests that something important may have been overlooked. 
The failure of models 2 and 3 to appear separately in the clusters 
is initially disappointing, but might have been expected because of 
the large-overlapy in the form of a transitiong between the developmental 
stages these models represent (see table 2). This can be seen clearly 
if the first -order groups corresponding to the proposed developmental 
stages are examined. As already indicated: stage/model 1 seems to 
be represented by groups 49 129 139 and 16ý together with groups 
5s 79 149 and 15. 
Stage/model 2 corresponds to groups ly 29 8, and 9. 
Stage/model 3 corresponds to groups 39 6f 10, and 11. 
If there is a developmental sequence between these stages of the 
kind indicated in table 2, we would expect to find an overlap between 
some subjects in the groups corresponding to stage 1 and stage 21 and 
some overlap between subjects in the groups corresponding to stage 2 
and stage 31 but no overlap between subjects in the groups corresponding 
to stage 1 and stage 3. It would also be expected that the stage 
groupings of subjects will be similar to those in table 2. 
In order to test this possibilityý table 3 was compiled. This 
table shovis the stage groupings and transitions derived from the 
cluster analysis (by the method outlined) alongside the stages and 
and transitions outlined in table 2. The most noticeable difference 
is that in the cluster analysis the stages are larger and the transi- 
m 
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tions smaller than in the 'interpretative' analysis. The reason for 
this is undoubtedly that the criterion of statistical association 
used in the cluster analysis is less severe (although more objective) 
than the criteria drawn up for interpretation by the experimenter 
(which insist that unless all responses correspond to the same stque 
the subject will be considered as transitional). This causes the 
difference between the cluster analysis groupings and the interpretative 
groupings that many subjects, placed in transition by the interpretative 
procedure, are shifted into adjoining stages by the cluster analysis. 
There is one other difference between the cluster analysis stage 
groupings and the interpretative groupings, namely that SB63 is omitted 
from the cluster analysis groups entirely. The reason for this is the 
unique responses given by SB63y many of which were of the form 'there's 
twice as many reds/greens in this box as the other box'. Such use of 
ratios with a model 2 kind of overall strategy is unique in the primary 
school analysis, so that SB63, who was thought by the experimenter to 
belong in stage 21 cannot be grouped statistically with any other subjectst 
since he has no responses in common with any other subject. 
The cluster analysisp theng can be considered as supporting the 
stage description proposed epýrlierj but it also goes further because 
it distinguishes two versions of stage 1. These two versions of stage 1 
are represented by the first cluster and the second cluster. -, 
ne of these clusterb se6hs to consist of siibýects who don t-justifj , V` 
W'ir 
choices, and the other consists of subjects who give relevant t t 
ir (by adult standards) justifications for their choices. is possible 
that these two versions of model 1 may also fit into the developmental 
sequencep and for this reason the overlap between the subjects in the 
two clusters and subjects in other clusters must be investigated. 
The subjects in the groups of the first cluster (erratic choices and 
irrelevant reasons) are: SB, 21528plOil3ý14925ý26927t--)7t49- 
The subjects in the groups of the second cluster (erratic choices 
without justification) are: SB l13i4y6Y7v9vll9l6Y5O- 
These clusters of subjects do not overlap with each other at all, 
but both overlap withsubjects in the first transition as defined by 
both the cluster analysis and the experimenter's interpretative analysis 
(see table 3). This suggests that they represent parallel but separate 
developments, 
Hencev instead of the developmental model, 
Stage 1 ->Stage 2 ->Stage 3, 
we have the modc12 
Stage 1A 'ý*ý 
Stage 1B bStaf. -e 2 --'*Stage 3. 
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At presentg howeverp this remains little more than a possibilityg 
because the impoverished nature of the verbal responses of children at 
the stage 1 level does not permit satisfying inferences from verbal 
datat It is quite possible that stage 1A and stage 1B are merely 
artifacts of this impoverishmentg and a different method of investigation 
would have to be devised to follow this up. 
The overall conclusion to be derived from the cluster analysis of 
the primary school results is that the general developmental stage 
analysisq stage/model 1 to stage/model 2 to stage/model 3 is confirmed. 
Model 4 does not show up in the resultsv but then only children up to 
age 10 are being considered. The model 2(a) or model 2(b) distinction 
is also not apparent in the cluster analysisq but this might be. expected 
because only one part of one experimental problem is sensitive to this 
distinction. The possibility that there are two main types of strategy 
rather than a unitary stage 1 strategy is opened up. This does not 
contradict anything said previously as no model for stage 1 has been 
proposedg but the evidence for the distinction is equivocal, and may 
be an artifact of the impoverishment of stage 1 verbal responses. 
Results of the cluster analysis of data from the combined primar7 
and secondary school groups. 
The analysis of the combined primary and secondary school results 
involves 120 subjectsý whose responses are grouped into 129 categories. 
Initiallyp there were 164 categories, but 35 were removed in the manner 
already describedf in order to assimilate the data to the handling 
capacity of the computer. This simplification was effected with the 
data from the stage 1 subjects, so that it will not affect the overall 
analysis, as the stage I data have already been analysed by the primary 
school only cluster analysis2 and the response categories produced 
by most of the primary school children and all the secondary school 
children are not altered in any way. It does meang howeverg that the 
distinction between the two types of stage 1 response noted earlier 
should disappear. 
The cluster analysis of the combined primary and secondary school 
results generated 18 first order groups and 3 clusters. The composition 
of the groups can be found in Appendix C and an interpretation of the 
factors underlying each group will be offered here. 
Group 1: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by seeing 
which collection of beads contains more beads of the target 
colour and who use the word 'more' in their answers. The 
group has 42 members. 
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Group. 2: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by 
comparing the relative number of target-colour beads 
and non-target-colour beads in each collectiony and use 
the word 'more' in -their answers. The group has 41 members. 
Group 3: A group of subjects who choose inconsistently and offer reasons 
for their choices which are irrelevant by adult standards. 
(Tfie variety of response categories in this group has been 
reduced in the preliminary stages of the analysis). the 
group has 9 members. 
Group 4: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by seeing 
which collection of beads contains more of the target-colour 
beads, but who do not use the word 'more' in their answersq 
and refer only to the number of target -colour beads in each 
collection. The group has 9 members. 
Group 5: Similar to group 2. 
-Grotýp: 2 (41 members) and group 5 (14 members) have 13 members in 
common. The difference between group 5 and group 2 seems 
to be that members of group 5 manage to apply the charact- 
eristic 'group strategy' to problem B39 whereas members of 
group 2 often don't manage this. 
Group 6: Sifnilar to group 2 and group 5- 
-, Group-2 (41 members) and group 6 (27 members) have 21 members in 
common. 
Group 5 (14 members) and group have 13 members in common. 
Group 7: A group of subjects who choose inconsistently and offer 
no reasons for their choices, or mention relevant factors 
in a haphazard way. (The variety of response categories 
in this group has been reduced in the preliminary stages 
of the analysis). The group has 7 members. 
Group 8: Similar to group 3. 
GrGrouý 3 (9 members) and group 8 (10 members) have 7 members in 
common. 
Group 9: Similar to group 29 groUP51 and group 6. 
Grouý 2 (41 members) and group 9 (40 members) have 38 members in 
common. 
, -Grou5-5 
(14 members) and group 9 have 14 members in commong i. e. 
group 5 is a more tightly defined subgroup of group 9. 
Grp. up 6 (27 members) and group 9 have 21 members in common. 
Group 10: Similar to group 7- 
o-Gtoup-7 (7 members) and group 10 (6 members) have 5 members in 
common. 
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Group 11: Similar to group 1. 
Group 1 (42 members) and group 11 (39 members) have 37 members in 
common. 
Group 12: A group of subjects who consistently seem to solve the 
problems by seeing which collection of beads contains more 
beads of the target colourg but who don't use the word 'more' 
in their answers, and often only refer to the number of 
target-colour beads in one of the two boxes. The group 
has 6 members. 
Group 13: Similar to group 1 and group 11. 
Group 1 (42 members) and group 13 (42 members) have 41 members in 
common a 
GroulYll (39 members) and group 13 have 36 members in common. 
Group 14: Similar to group 22 group 5P group 69 and group 9. 
Group: 2 (41 members) and group 14 (38 members) have 34 members in 
common. 
,. Grnup-. 5 (14 members) and group 14 have 14 members in commony i. e. 
group 5 is a more tightly defined subgroup of group 14- 
Group'6 (27 members) and group 14 have 18 members in common. 
-rrGroup-9 (40 members) and group 14 have 36 members in common. 
Group 15: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by 
comparing the relative number of target-colour beads and 
non-target-colour beads in each collection, but who don't 
always use the word 'more' in their answersq often referring 
only to numbers of target-colour beads and non-target colour 
beads in each collection. The group has 8 members. 
Group 16: Similar to group 29 grouP5, group6, group 9, and group 14- 
-Gro, upf2 (41 members) and group 16 (26 members) have 20 members in 
common. 
, 'Group"5 (14 members) and group 16 have 11 members in common. 
q-ý-. Gro. up-. 6 (27 members) and group 16 have 18 members in common. 
Group., q (40 members) and group 16 have 19 members in common. 
-Group_14 (38 members) and group 16 have 15 members in common. 
Group 17: Similar to group 7 and group 10. 
, Grcuý'-7, (7 members) and group 17 (7 members) have 6 members in 
common. 
Group, 10 (6 members) and group 17 have 4 members in common. 
Group 18: A curious group of two subjects who don't seem to 'belong' 
together, except that both subjects would be classed as 
Stage 2 in the 'interpretative' analysis. 
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These initial groupings are similar to those identified in the 
cluster analysis carried out on the primary school results only. 
This confirms the view that the data obtained from the results of the 
experiment with the secondary school children fall into a similar 
pattern to the primary school results. The combination of the primary 
and secondary school results, with the consequent increased frequency 
of the more 'advanced' categoriesq leads to a more detailed analysis of 
relations between the more 'advanced' categories whose result can be 
seen in the large number of overlapping groups. The fact that so much 
overlap occurs between certain sets of groups, is, of course, evidence 
for common factors underlying these groups. There is still no sign of a 
group of the categori. es corresponding to model 4( the 'true proportion' 
modelg Fiaget's third developmental stage) although certain individual 
categories do appear to be something of the kind. 
What clusters might be expected on this basis? Probably some- 
thing similar to the kind of clusters which were anticipated in the 
first cluster analysis: 
Cluster A: A cluster of groups of subjects who choose erratically and 
either don't really justify their choices (group 71 Croup 109 
group 17) or give justifications which are irrelevant by 
adult standards (group 3, group 8). This cluster will 
consist of Croup 3, group 7, group 8, group 10 and group 17- 
Cluster B: A cluster of groups of subjects who seem to consistently 
choose the box with the larger number of beads of the target- 
colourg and whose answers involve reference to the number 
of target-colour beads in the box chosen (group 12), both 
boxes (group 02 or both boxes with the term 'more' substituted 
for exact numbers (group 1, group 119 group 13), Also the 
'odd' group 18. This cluster will consist of groups 11 
group 4t group 112 group 12, Croup 139 and group 18. 
Cluster C: A cluster of groups of subjects who seem to consistently 
choose the box with the most favourable relative number of 
target-colour beads and non-target-coloar beads. Answers 
given by these subjects involve reference to numbers of 
target and non-target beads (group 15)9 or to numbers implied 
by use of the term 'more' (group 2t group 5Y group 69. Croup 99 
group 14P group 16). This cluster will consist of group 21 
Croup 5Y group 6, group 99 group 149 group 15 and group 16. 
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These predicted clusters correspond to developmental stages 1, 
2, and 3 respectively. The split between the two varieties of stage 1 
response evident in the primary school cluster analysis is not anticipated 
here because of the artificial way in which the homogeneity of the stage 
1 responses was increased by the elimination of certain categories. 
The actual clusters produced by the cluster analysis are as 
ollows: 
Pirst cluster Group 3 
Group 10 
Group 8 
Group 7 
Group 17 
Second cluster Group 11 
Group 18 
Group 12 
Group 1 
Group 13 
Group 17 
Group 7 
Group 8 
Third cluster Group 5 
Group 9 
Group 14 
Group 6 
Group 2 
Group 16 
Group 15 
Group 4 
Group 1 
Group 13. 
(The groups in each cluster are listed in the order generated by 
the program). 
This result is best described by considering in turn both the 
groups in each clusterg and the groups not in each cluster. 
The first cluster consists of the predicted cluster A9 in other 
words-all the groups which look like the results of stage 1 strategies. 
All gjap 2 groups and stage 3 groups are excluded from the first cluster. 
The second cluster consists of all except one of the stage 2 groups, 
that is all except one group from the predicted cluster B9 plus three 
stage 1 groups, which are also in the first cluster. The groups excluded 
from the second cluster are., ', iill the stage 3 groups, two of the stage 1 
groups, and one of the stage 2 groups. Inspection of the weightings of 
all the individual groups to this cluster reveals however, that the 
exclusion of the stage 2 group (group 4) is because its weightingil 
positive but fails to meet the criterion of statistical significance. 
What has happened is that group 4 shows a much stronger weighting to 
the second cluster than the other excluded groups, but this weighting 
is not quite strong enough to be significant. 
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The third cluster consists of all the stage 3 groups and three 
of the stage two groups (including group 4). The groups excluded 
from this cluster areAll the stage 1 groups and three of the stage 
2 groups. Againt inspection of the weightings shows that the three 
excluded stage 2 groups are weighted positively towards this cluster, 
but their weightings are not significant. The weightinga of the 
excluded stage 1 groups are, by contrastg all negative or almost zero. 
Discussion: Once again the clustering section of the analysis has 
separated the erratic strategy represented by stage 1 from the strategies 
of stage 2 and stage 3. In addition the developmental sequence from 
stage 1 to stage 2 to stage 3 is supported because the clusters are 
made up of groups corresponding to stage 1, stage 1 and stage 29 
stage 2 and stage 3t respectively. In other words9 the clusters 
separate stage 1 and stage 39 but mix stage 1 with stage 20 and stage 2 
with stage 3. This is what would be expected from a three-stage 
developmental sequence with two transitions, because the statistical 
association criterion used in the analysis is not as strict as the 
criteria used in the initial interpretative analysis. Groups correspond- 
ing to stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 show up clearly in the initial 
groupings9 so that independent confirmation of the original interpretation 
of the experiment is provided. 
SummaEy of result of the first beads experiment. 
This concludes the description of the Brimer cluster analysis and 
brings the description of the first beads experiment to a point where 
it can be summed up by restating the aims initially put forward for the 
experimentl together with the conclusions that can be derived from the 
results of the experiment. 
The first aim of the experiment was: 
A. To find out whether the models put forward provide satisfactory 
models of children's behaviour when faced with this type of problem. 
The conclusions regarding this aim are dependant on the way the aim 
is initially interpreted. It is clear from the analysis of the results 
of the experiment that the proposed models are satisfactory descript- 
ions of the overall strategies employed by children in the solution 
of problems of this type. It is equally clear that they do not 
account for much of the variance in the children's behaviourg as is 
shown by the large number of first order groups corresponding to 
each of the three main strategies in the two cluster analyses. 
There are many possible reasons for this. The models may need 
refinements of detail in order to account for the varieties of 
individual usage2 or some other factor may be involved. It is 
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possiblev for example, that the models outlined describe accurately 
the strategies used by individual children to handle the information 
contained in these kinds of problems, but that an additional set 
of models is required to illustrate the way children initially 
oreanise, or fao; leý, this information. This possibility will be 
pursued in some detail later. Reservations must also be expressed 
about the st; age 1 strategy for which no actual model has been 
proposed, and which may well be a ragbag of different strategies. 
This possibility is supported by the result of the first cluster 
analysis, which distinguished two varieties of stage 11 but this 
may have been an artifact of the impoverishment evident in the 
stage 1 verbal responses. 
The second aim of the experiment was: 
B. To find out whether model 2(a) or, model 2(b) provides the more 
accurate description of PiaCet's second developmental stage, 
or whether both apply. 
The experimental results leave little doubt that model 29 or 
Piaect's second developmental staGep is a valid description of a 
strategy employed by many children to solve this kind of problem. 
The results of the 'interpretative' analysis indicate that both 
versions of model 21 i. e. 2(a) and 2(b), are used by different 
children in the 'tricky' case when there are equal numbers of 
target-colour beads in the two collections of beads. The cluster 
analysis, howeverv does not seem to distinguish children using 
2(a) and children using 2(b), because only one item out of the 
eight involved in the experiment (four problems, peach in two 
parts)was sensitive in this respect. 
The third aim of the experiment was: 
C. To find out whether model 3 is only a theoretical possibility, 
or if it corresponds to an actual strategy employed by children 
to solve problems of this type. 
The result of the experiment supports the view that, in the 
present type of situation at leastv model 3 does represent a 
strategy employed by many children. Support is also leant to 
the contention that model 4 corresponds to a strategy which is 
not common in the sample investigatedt and that previous 
researchers may have confused the strategies represented by 
models 3 and 4. This possibility was mentioned as a consideration 
in the design of the experiment, but its investigation was not 
one of the explicit aims of the experiment. The results also 
show little evidence of anything like the combinatorial system 
of Piaget's : fQrmal qp. , qýZ0, k9,4al stageg but this cannnt, be stated 
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with certainty without a sample of even older subjects. This 
would be impracticablebecause of the adverse reactions to the 
experiment by secondary school children which have been mentioned. 
The final aim of the experiment was: 
D. To find out whether there is a developmental sequence from the 
first stage described by PiaGet to model 2 to model 3 to model 4, 
or even a sequence from PiaGet's first stage to model 2(a) to 
model 2(b) to model 3 to model 4. 
Throughout the analysis a General developmental sequence from 
Piaget's first stage (stage 1) to a strategy corresponding to 
model 2 (stage 2) to a strateey corresponding to model 3 (stage 3) 
is found. No evidence of further development to a stage 4 
corresponding to the model 4 strategy was producedg although some 
subjects did produce solutions of the model 4 type, The possibility 
of a stage 4 cannot be completely ruled outq as the performance 
of the secondary school group was poor by comparison with that 
of the primary school Groupp and the maximum age of the subjects 
was 14 yearsý which is arguably not far enough into Piaget's 
formal operational period for an adequate test. In addition 
a study by Fischbein et. al (1970)ý which seems to satisfactorily 
take account of the model 3 strategy, does find a 'true proportion' 
stageg and in particular find that many children aged 9- 10 and 
12 - 13 will Give answers based on comparison of proportions after 
a short instruction. This instruction involved showing how to 
use a Grouping technique to answer questionsý uo that the procedure 
adopted is to considergsayp the number of red beads for every 
Green bead in eadh collection. A similar strategy was found to 
occur spontaneously in a different situation (making 'walls' 
of the same length with different Cuisenaire rods) by Lunzer 
and Pumfrey (1966). 
Evidence that model 2(a) and model 2(b) also represent steps 
in this developmental sequence was produced in the 'interpretative' 
analysisý but was not confirmed by the cluster analysis. The 
cluster analysis of the primary school results didg however, reveal 
the possibility that stage 1 describes two separate strategies 
used by childreng and that these strategies develop independently 
into stage 2y with no children exhibiting both forms of stage 1. 
This remains to be confirmed by a more suitable technique for use 
with five and six year olds. 
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Some possible criticismsand a control exnerimcnt. 
Now that the conclusions to be drawn from the first beads experiment 
have been summarised, there are certain common criticisms of this type 
of experiment which must be considered. One such criticism is that 
too much stress is placed on verbal reports by children of what they 
are doing, and the analysis of these reports, throughout the experiment. 
This criticism was discussed in some detail during the preliminary 
stages of the design of the experimentg and it was argued that use of 
verbal data could be justified if the following conditions were met: 
(a) The experimental design is arranged to 'disambiguate' the 
reasons for their choices given by the subjects as much as 
possible. 
(b) The choices made by the subjects and their justifications 
of these choices do not conflict with each other. 
(c) The analysis of the verbal data involves a minimal amount 
of interpretation by the experimenter. 
The designv results and analysis of the experiment appear to 
have satisfied these conditions. 
It is possible to criticise the lack of full Irandomisation' in 
the experimental design. One or two cavalier measures were tak6n 
in this respect in order to speed up the execution of the experiment 
and remove artificial holdups of the kidd where the experimenter must 
consult his instructions to find out the exact specification of the 
next trial. Such measures included shuffling the experimental cards 
bc. tbetireen problems rather than following a latin square orderingv and 
always using, the same set of cards instead of mixing two setsy one 
set having a red-Creen arrangement. The consistency of the experimental 
results and the lack of evidence of colour preferences indicates that 
the randomising measures which were taken were sufficiento and there 
is little danger of artifacts arising from order-effecis. 
Another possible artifact might by caused by the reinforcement 
of successful choices, either by direct pay-off or experiment6r's 
approval. The direct pay-off type of reinforcement does not seem 
to affect the choices of any except stage 1 subjects, as the consistency 
of the stage 2 and stage 3 choices demonstrates, but the possibility 
of unwitting reinforcement by the experimenter himself of the type 
of answers he likes can never by ruled out, even though every effort 
was made to avoid it. 
It can be argued that in an experiment of this type, involving 
a number of similar trialst the subjects' responses may show a 
spurious consistency, ihothe sence that many subjects will choose 
p7 
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a way of getting an answer, and then stick to it. Effects like this 
cannot be eliminated in any experiment involving more than one trialq 
although the present experiment minimises them by explicitly trying 
to dislodge subjects from their preferred strategies with 'tricky' 
problems. Nevertheless, the results can be interpreted as supporting 
a weak form of this criticism. 
A more sophisticated criticismp which is in some respects similar 
to the preceding criticism2 is that the solution strategies found in 
experiments of this typep and hence the developmental stages outlinedg 
are constrained by the structure of the experiment, both in terms of 
its underlying 'logical' structure and the actual set up of materials 
and instructions used. A comprehensive discussion of this point is 
provided by Newell and Simon (1972)9 who introduce the concepts of 
'problem space' and 'task environmentt. 
The context of Newell and Simon's discussion is an attempt to delineate 
concepts applicable to human information processing in order to prepare 
the ground for computer simulations of human problem solving. They 
point out that if there is such a thing as behaviour demanded by a 
situationg and if a subject exhibits itp then his behaviour tells more 
about the situation (task environment) thanýabout him. All that is 
learnt about the subject is that he is in fact motivated toward the 
goa12 and that he is capable of discovering and executing the behaviour 
called for by the situation. In a different situation he would behave 
differently. I 
The term 'task environment' is used by Newell and Simon to refer 
to an environment coupled with a goal, problem or task (for which 
the motivation of the subject is assumed). 'Problem space' is used 
to describe the subject's representation of the task environment, so 
that the construction of a problem space is an essential pre-requisite 
to any problem solving activity on the part of the subject. The import- 
ance of these concepts is well illustrated by an example drawn from 
Newell and Simon (1972): 
11. To the extent that. the behaviour is precisely what is 
called for by the situation, it will give us information about 
the task evirohment. By observing the behaviour of a grandmaster 
over a chessboard$ we gain information about the structure of 
the problem space associated with the game of chess. 
2. To the extent that the behaviour departs from perfect 
rationality, we gain information about the psychology of the 
subject2 about the nature of the internal mechanisms that are 
limiting his performance. ' (Op-cit-9 P- 55). 
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This distinction between demands of the task environment and 
psychology of the subject as aspects of the theory of problem solving 
is notq of course, meant to imply that psychologists should only concern 
themselves with the psychology of the subject. Newell and Simon insist 
that the two as*oects are in fact like figure and g-round, and that 
which is which depends on the momentary viewpoint. The importance 
of the distinction for present purposes is that it highlights two 
points which might otherwise be overlookedg namely that the task 
environment of the experiment constrains the set of strategies which 
subjects can usefully employ9 and that the subjects must make an 
internal representation of the task environment in the form of a 
problem space before the7r c, -n co,, -iý-, i6cr wh, t ý-, nlizt4i()n str, -te-, y -to 
employ at all. 
This is not so much a criticism of the experiment as a caution 
against reaching premature conclusions as to the generality of results 
obtained in research of this type. One very glaring example of the 
way in which the experimental set-up might influence the solution 
strategies available to the subjects is apparent in the linear 
arrangement of the display cards used in the first beads experiment. 
The cards are used to act as a reminder to the subjects of the exact 
constitution of the collections of beads which have been placed in 
the two boxesq and the information contained on them is arranged in 
the form of two rows of beads in one-one correspondence as far as 
possible. For exampleg the experimental card for problem B4 is 
like this: 
< oL 
This layout was arrived at from considerations of thc necessity 
of providing a clear and simple illustration of the situation. 
Howeverg it is perhaps too striking in its demonstration of the fact 
that there are two extra green beads on the left-hand sideq especially 
as it has been a common finding since Binet (1890) that one-one 
correspondence is a method of quantitative comparison available to 
most school c1iildren (see Bryantq 1971b; Brainerdq 1973b). ilhis 
means that the stage 3 strategy of comparinf-; the number of target- 
colour beads and non-target-colour beads in each collection ! -, ay be 
facilitated or even induced by this method of representation. 
In order to test this possibility it was decided to carry out 
an experiment in which this 'seductive' layout wou1C, be avoided. 
There are various ways in which this cmi be achieved. -ilhe one-one 
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correspondence of the beads in the two rows might be elirninatedý but 
their linearity retained; 
This is effective with the larger numbers involved in the lcft-hand 
side of problem B4ý but is not so helpful with some of the problems 
involving smaller numbers of beads, where the linear disI)lay allows 
one-one pairing off to still be feasible without too much effort on 
the part of the subject. The representation could be modified to a 
'mixture' type, in which the physical separation of the two collections 
of bea(Is is ii,, aintainedq but the red and green beads in each collection 
are scrambled: 
This is undoubtedly more realistic, but it is no longer clear and 
simple. A compromise solution would be to destroy the linearity and 
one-one correspondence of the original displays, but maintain the physical 
separation of the red aný, green elements in each collection: 
This seems to satisfy the need to remove the compelling aspects 
of the original cards without greatly increasing the amount of processing 
required for the successful application of the various solution strategies. 
An experiment using cards of this type was designed to act as a control 
on the result of first beads experiment. 
Procedure: There were two differences in experimental procedure between 
the control experiment and the first beads experiment. The first 
difference was that a new set of experimental cards was produced to 
conform to the specification outlined above. In additiong the experimenter 
was allowed to ask either 14hat do you mean by that? ' or 'How many more 
are there? ' to try and get subjects to clarify inexplicit choice reasons. 
The second question was not allowed in the original experiment on 
methodological grounds. Howevery as questions of this type are only 
rarely requiredt it was decided to allow it in this control experiment 
because it is a riore precise way of disambiguatin- rcs-: ýonssess t1har, Vie 
first question. 
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experimenty and then a mixture of stage 3 and unclascifiable responses 
in the control experiment. The extreme discrepancy between his strategy 
in each of these experiments is well illustrated by the following 
examples: 
First beads experiment: 
Problem Bl green. 
Chooses 2G4R. 'Both the same size. The one I use looks 
bigger. ýStage 1). 
Problem B4 red. 
Chooses 6G4R- 'I like the colours on the side. t (Stage 1). 
Control experiment: 
Problem Cl green. 
Chooses 4G2R. 'It's got more greens than reds9 the other 
is less. ' (Stage 3). 
Problem C4 red. 
Chooses MR. 'There's two of each. I say it's a medium 
chance. I don't want to get muddled upq so I'll get this. 
It's a drawq but I might win. ' (Unclassifiable). 
It would seem that this subject hadn't fully grasped what was 
required of him in the first beads experiment. This interpretation 
is supported by the fact that he was the only child over eight 
years old to give more than one stage 1 response in that experiment. 
The shift in his performance between the two experiments, but not 
within either expeftmentp also provides an interesting example of 
how little children will modify their solution strategy over a series 
of trials unless it leads to serious cognitive conflict. 
Apart from this single subjeot, the results of both experiments 
(in the case where each subject did both experiments) are closely 
comparable and support the conclusion that the stage 3 strategy is 
not dependent on the initial presentation format. Howevert the order 
in which the subjects did the experiments did not vary and it might 
be argued that the result is confounded with some sort of training 
effecty even though the two experiments were separated by a period 
of some three months. 
This criticism is avoided in the second comparison, which is a 
comparison of results from two different sets of rhildren who each 
did only one experiment. Six eight-year-olds and six nine-year-olds 
did the control experimentv and their performance can be compared 
with the performance of the eight and nine-year age groups in the 
first beads experiment (twelve of each) by comparing the proportion 
of the total number of responses of each stage produced by each age 
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group# (Thin is preferable to randomly selecting six subjects from 
each of the age groups in the first beads experiment). This comparison 
is illustrated by table 4(a). 
Table 4(a) shows a decrease in the proportion of stage 3 responses 
in the control experiment at age eight, and an increase at age nine, 
with an overall slight decrease. There is an appreciable increase 
in the proportion of unclassifiable responses, but the general spread 
of responses. indicatee that the three-stage model still provides a 
valid description of the results of the control experiment. This is 
the most important finding. Quantitative differences between 
experiments using different presentation styles are-b. ound to-occur, 
but as long as the differences are quantitative and not qualitailve 
the conclusion can be drawn that the control experiment confirms 
the general model evolved from the first beads experiment. A statist- 
ical test of the 'significance' of the difference between the two 
treatments represented by table 4(a) has not been made, as there is 
clearly no significant difference. 
In conclusion, thenp the results of the first beads and control 
experiments are very similar2 especially for the subjects who took 
part in both experiments. The subjects who only did the control 
experiment show a slight fall-off in performance as compared with 
subjects from the first beads experiment, especially at the lower 
of the two ages considered. This result is consistent with the 
view that the control experiment is slightly 'harder' than the 
first beads experimentl since the result in the case where subjects 
did both experiments may not show a drop in performance as a result 
of a few months age difference and increased familiarity with the 
experimental situation. 
However, the overall pattern of results in both experimental 
conditions is similar and the claim that the presentation format 
of the first beads experiment induces the stage 3 strategy can be 
rejected. (An--. analogous result is reported by Wohlwill, 1968ý who 
found that the spatial arrangement of experimental materials had no 
significant effedt on class inclusion performance). 
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CHAPTM 
Theoretical considerations: 
A digression concerning the word 'more' 
,: 
Further pilot work was now undertaken to assess the feasibility 
of using the prod 'How many more? ' to clarify ambiguous reasons. 
For example: 
Collecti6ir. A Collection B 
xxx 
yy. yy 
When the target is a bead of type Xq some children choose 
collection A and give as a reason 'Because there's more'. This might 
mean 'Because there's more X's than Y's or 'Becuase there's more X's 
here than in BI or it might mean something completely different. In 
the first beads experiment the question 'What do you mean by that? ' 
was asked by the experimenter whenever such uncertain cases arose, in 
the hope that this might lead to a more detailed statement of his 
reason by the child. This tactic sometimes works, but sometimes it 
just leads to a repetition of the original response. The question 
'How many more? ' looks more promising because it is more specific 
and stage 2 reasoning leads to the answer 'One more' whereas stage 
reasoning gives 'Two more'. 
The difficulty with this kind of precise prodding is that it draws 
the children's attention to the quantitative aspects of the situation. 
This may lead to lack of flexibility in their reasons oreven worsey to 
the production of reasons which might otherwise have been overlooked. 
Because of this the question was not used in the first beads experiment, 
but it was allowed in the control experiment after the results of the 
first experiment had indicated how seldom it would have to be used. 
The reason for further pilot work in this atea is that it was felt 
that a 'clinical' check on the value of this prod might be worthwhile. 
One of the first things that became apparent was that some of the 
problems used in the first beads experiment are unsuitable for use 
with specific questions of the 'How many more' type. For examplel 
problem Bl: 
Collection A 
xxxx 
Collection B 
xx 
yy yyyy 
is symmetrical in the sense that the number more X's in collection A 
than in collection B is the same as the number more X's than Y's in 
collection A. 
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The other three of the four main experimental problems do not 
suffer from this drawbackv but additional probl6m B6 and the part of 
problem B7 where green is the target colour are also symmetrical. 
In problem B61 however, stage 2 and stage 3 lead to different choiceog 
so that the consequences of the symmetry are unimportantg whereas in 
problem Bl and problem B7 green, both stage 2 and stage 3 lead to the 
same choice. Thus for future work problem Bl and problem B7 green 
will have to be replaced by better designed problemsy since even if 
the question 'How many more? ' is not used much information of this 
kind is given spontaneously by subjects and is being wasted. 
Another reason for carrying out this pilot study was to provide 
a clinical assessment of the validity of using the subjects' verbal 
reports of their reasons for their choices as data in the first beads 
experiment and the control experiment. It is possible that in some 
cases children give answers which may suggest a different solution 
strategy to one they are really using. 
For examplegin problem B4: 
Collecti6n. A Collection B 
XXXXXX XX 
MY YY 
when X represents the target colour, a subject might use the model 2 
strategy to choose collection Aq which has 6 X's as opposed to the 
2 X's of collection B1, and then justify the choice with a stage 3 
reasony such as 'There's more X's than Y's'. In all problems where the 
model 2 and model 3 strategies lead to the same choicey this kind 
of juxtaposition of model 2 strategy and stage 3 reasong or model 3 
strategy and stage 2 reasong can occur without any inconstency between 
the choice made and the reason given for the choice. The following 
problems allow model 2 and model 3 reasoning to lead to the same 
choice: 
Problem B19 whether red or green is the target colour. 
Problem B2p when green is the target colour. 
Problem B4, when green is the target colour. 
Problem B52 when green is the target oolour. 
Problem B7Y when green is the target colour. 
Howeverp in all the above cases except problem Bl and problem B7 
green, it it possible to find out whether such juxtapositions occur 
by asking 'How many more??, 
In order to assess the usefulness of this question a pilot study 
was carried out, using the non-linear presentation designed for the 
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control experimentl with the experimenter asking the question 'How 
many more? ' whenever possible. This is very time consuming, as the 
question is often inappropriate. The data Gathered (from twelve 
children aged b6tween five and eight years) revealed that the question 
is uff6fulifornelarifSring ambiguous responses (although it may still 
be undenirable on other grounds)y and that there doesn't seem to be 
any danger of artifacts in the first beads or dontrol experiments 
caused by children saying one thing and meaning another. Children 
who give stage 2 or stage 3 responses seem to be very consistent in 
their use of themp and do not appear to juxtapose stage 2 reasons with 
stage 3 choices or stage 3 reasons with stage 2 choices. Howeverp 
children who give stage 1 responses show much greater variabilityý and 
do seem to say things they don't mean. They Give the impression of 
justifying their choices in a purely post hoc fashion, so that reasons 
which contradict the choice made, or reas6ns which might apply equally 
well to either collectiong abound. In addition to providing clinical 
confirmation that verbal-response plus choice-made is a reliable source 
of data, the pilot work revealed an unexpected phenomenon which might 
be of importance concerning the use of the relational term 'more'. 
It is well known that the way in which children use relational 
terms such as 'more' can be different to adult usage. (Donaldson 
and Balfour, 19682 Donaldson and Wales7 1970). However, the work 
cited involved younger children than were used in the experiments 
reported here, so that it was assumed that considerations of this 
kind would not affect them. Briefly, there are two points usually 
made about the way young children use the word 'more'$ 
(a) They often fail to differentiate it from 'less'. 
(b) They don't use it in a fully relational mannerp but view the 
largest item of a group as being 'the more'. 
Such effects tend to be highly dependent on what 
Campbell and 
Wales (1970) call the 'eliciting context'. By investigating children's 
comprehension and use of such expressions in as diverse a range of 
situations as possiblep Wales (1971) is able to argue that what appear 
to be 'absolute' uses of relational terms in one context turn out 
to 
be comparative uses in different contexts. This means that point 
(b) 
must be treated carefullyg and must not be taken as implying that 
children acting as if orýe part of a display is 'the more' are incapable 
of relational considerations. 
The children involved in the first beads and control experiments 
who used the word 'more' all seemed to be using it in the adult fashion. 
That is, they said things like 'There's more here than there', 'This 
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one has more than that one', and so on. But the pilot experiment 
revealed that for many children, although their linguistic usage is 
adultý the term may mean something slightly different to the adult 
meaning. What happens is that many children, when faced with two 
collections of beads, 0 andD, of which C has (C-D) more beads than 
D9 claim that there are C more beads in C than there are in D. This 
appears to be quite common even with eight and ninc-year-olds. Of 
course the lelicitinC context' in this case is quite complexp being 
the experimental task involving two collections of red and green 
beads. Further pilot work revealedthoweverg that the same effect 
can be observed in simpler cont6xts involving only two collections 
of beadsof a single colour. 
From this it is possible to put forward the following ways in 
which children might use the word 'more' in situations involving 
two or more collections of objects: 
(a) 111orel is applied to the larger collection, but is not 
differentiated from 'less'. 
(b) 11-Torel is applied to the larger collection and differentiated 
from 'less', but used as if it was a property of the 1: arger 
collection rather than a relation between the collections, 
e. g. 'The one there is moral. 
(c) 11.1ore, is used as aýrelatiorr.. liniguisticallyq e. g. 'There is 
more there than therelg but when the difference must be 
quantifiedy that is when the question 'How many more are 
there? ' is asked, it is not treated relationally and the 
answer given is the number of objects in the larger collection* 
(d) 114orel is used as a relation linguistically and quantitatively. 
It is tempting to regard this as a four-step developmental sequencev 
ýalthbujghvitcnan be-, -argUed that thetdistinctionobotwttziý.; (b)-;. aud (c) 
is overdrawn)tbut the evidence assembled here is too meagre to justify 
this. It would be interesting to know how use of the word 'less' 
develops after it is distinguished from Imorely as there are good 
reasons, for supposing that the course of its development will not 
merely be mirror image of the development of 'more' (see'Campbell 
and Wales, 1970'; Nales, 1971)- For present purposesy however this 
is unnecessary. 
. 
The reason for this digression is that the word 'more' features 
prominently in the reasons given by subjects in the experiments 
reported here. 1, Then used it seems to be used in the linguistically 
correct wayv so that children giving reasons involving 'more' are 
beyond the steps (a) and (b) reported above (this is partly to be 
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expected, as the youngest children in the sample are aged 5 years). 
However, the possibility that they are not all beyond step (c) is 
tantalising. Could it be that steps (c) and (d) are related tn a 
systematic way to the solution strategies children use in this kind 
of experiment? 
An experiment to investigate this possibility was designed. It 
consisted of various problems to test both the strategies the subject 
would use to solve problems of the type used in the first beads 
experiment2 and his comprehension of the word 'more' for linguistic 
and quantitative purposes. The problems used in the experiment 
are shown in table 4(b). After extensive pilot work (involvinC over 
thirty subjects aged between 5 and 8 years), and several revisions, 
the only conclusion to be drawn from this experiment was that 'every- 
thing is related to everything else'. No trends or systematic 
interrelationships were apparent, and the expdriment was abandoned. 
This failure indicates the extreme difficulty involved in investigating 
language-thought interrelationships, and may well be attributable to 
inadequate design or oversimple aims. 
Further deYelopment-of the theoretical position 
It is now necessary to consider irrigreater detail the theoretical 
position being developed in this thesis. The experiments reported 
involve decisiomby children as to which of two chance events has 
the greater likelihood of a successful outcome. Models are then 
proposed to account for the decisions made and reasons givent whilst 
meeting the criteria of sufficiency (Gregg and Simon, 1967) and 
developmental tractability (Klahr and Wallacep 1970b). The reason 
for using the forced-choice situation is that it can provide an 
extremely sensitive source of data if it is carefully set up* 
The problems used in the experiments concern what the Genevan 
school would call 'the child's conception of chance and probability'. 
Simill-IF'problems were in fact used by Piaget and Inhalaer (1951). 
Unfortunately to talk in this way is misleading. It suggests that 
children would themselves classify the problems as concerning chance 
and probabilityq whereas this is really the experimenter's d1lassifi- 
cation system. This sort of mistake leads ultimately to a 'cognitive 
phrenology' in which children have conceptions of numbers spaceq time, 
causality, movement, speed, geometry, chancep probability, the world, 
moralityq and anything else the investigator may care to name. In a 
trivial sense this is2 of courseq the case I 
but the point being made is 
that it is important that we understand the way in which the children in 
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the experiments classify what is happening rather than imposing a 
ready-made classification system onto our theory. Examples of this 
tnndency to read complex conceptions into performances on fixed (and 
often non-verbal) tasks can be found throughout the literature (e. g. 
Davies, 1965; Carlsong 1970)- 
There is nothing in these studiesv nor in any of the experiments 
reported so farv to indicate that chance and probability correspond 
to the way the children involved classify such problems. Conversely, 
there isn't anything to suggest that this isn't the case either. 
Ross (1966) seems initially to take this pointq but then argues 
that there are certain types of behaviour which correspond to the 
use of probability concepts, and that certain tasks are more likely to 
lead to use of probability concepts than others. For example, in a 
task involving drawing balls out of a box and predicting which colour 
will be next when there are two possible colours and the number of balls 
of each colour in the box is knownv Ross claims that alterations of 
predictions from trial to trial according to the results of previous 
trials will indicate the application of probability concepts. The 
exact meaning of 'probability concepts' in this sense is not clear 
and Ross's assertion that 'probability concept studies try to sample 
responses that show Sts., characteristic mode of responding in probability 
situations' (Ross, 1966, p- 917) doesn't help. It is parsimonious to 
suppose that until contrary evidence is produced such experiments only 
demonstrate the way children reason when faced with problems concerning 
what adults call chance and probability, not the child's conception 
of chance and probabilityq which might be something completely different. 
What seems to happen in experirdents of this kind is that the 
subject is faced with a complex problem of which he has at best only 
a limited understanding. He then has to use whatever means are 
available to him to produce an answer. If he can think of more than 
one way of obtaining an answer he, *111 probably use the method he thinks 
most likely to produce whatever react16n he wants from the experimenter. 
The Itask thus becomes one of utilising problem-solving methods learnt 
in other situttionsq rather than drawing on knowledge of chance or 
probability (of course the appropriateness of methods learnt in 
other situations might be assessed by the child in terms of his concept- 
ion of chance or probability, but this will not always be so). This 
is particularly the case with topics like probability, which are not 
normally encountered in school work, so that no situation-appropriate 
solution methods will hav. e been taught to the child. (It is true that 
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some schoolchildren are now encouraged to 'discover' probability 
theorems, but thin was not the case in the schools selected for this 
study. ) 
This view in consistent with the information-procesaing analysis 
of Piagetian tasks undertaken by Klahr and Uallace (1970a), although 
it lacks their level of detail and precision. The idea that the 
subject will want to produce some kind of reaction from the experimenter 
is very important, and often overlooked. Hayes (1972) points out that 
the child's conception of thoexperimenter can influence the result of 
an experiment in many ways. In fact it would probably be fair to say 
that the experimenter, being normally the only other person present, is 
the most important and the most problematic part of the child's tahk 
environment. The child must construct some sort of model of the 
experimenter for his problem spacef and his behaviour throughout the 
experiment will be related to properties of this model. 
Unfortunately there appears to be very little research on this 
interactive nature of experiments in developmental psychology9 so that 
the present remarks will have to be confined to a few suppositions and 
anecdotes. Hayes (1972) starts from a position which seems to oweý- 
much to ethhbme%hodology, which is concerned with the way rules and 
meanings are negotiated in interaction by means of 'interpretive 
procedures' (Cicourelý 1973). He argues that in normal interaction the 
frequency of sppech errors (and, one might addy allusions) means that 
we often have to 'fix up' what someone else says by interpreting what 
he meant rather than taking his*words at face value, To do this the 
listener must have a good model of the speaker. Some quite oommon 
situations where the speaker and listener use the same word to refer 
to different conceptey such as the detection of ironyq dichonestyg and 
misunderstandingg can put severe demands on the listener's ability to 
model the speaker. Similarlyt the young child may be misled by an adult 
in the role of experimentert because the adult is likely to ask questions 
not because he wants the indicated informationg but because he wants 
to 
determine if the listener has that information. Unless this understood 
the child may well react by trying to patch up anomalies in what the 
experimenter said without being tactless enough to tell the experimenter 
he is doing so. 
A case relating to the class inclusion problem where such an 
interpretation could be made, is culled by Hayes from Fiaget 
(1952): 
'Tap (5; 6)... Tap was then given two sets of beads in two boxesf 
each one contained 20 brown and 18 green all made of wood. "The 
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little-; girl who has thin box makes her necklace with the brown 
beadsp and the girl who has the other box makes her necklace 
with the wooden beads in it. Which necklace will be longer? " 
- "The brown one because they are most. 11 - "And what colour 
will the necklace of wooden beads be? " - "Only green". (Piaget 
19529 p. 169) 
Hayes comments ..... it strikes me that these very came results 
also cast doubt on Piaget's own interpretation of the class 
inclusion data namely that the child cannot simultaneously 
conceive of a class and a subclass of that class. In this 
new version of the problemp the child is not required to 
conceive class and subclass simultaneously - yet he still 
fails. These resultsv however, are consistent with the 
interpretation that the child treats the experimenter's 
question as anomalous and fixes it up. ' (Ilayesp 1972p p. 180) 
The came interpretation might also beapplied to an observation 
by Inhelder (1972): 
'When faced with a bunch of flowers containing a great 
may roses and a few tulips, and asked if there are more 
roses or more flowers, the child replies that there are 
more roses. If he is then asked "more than what? " he 
often answers "than tulips. " (op. cit. p P. 111). 
Another examplep where an inappropriate model of the experimenter 
clearly leads to faulty interactionjis given by Wales (1971)p 
'A boy of four is asked how many legs a horse hasp and 
he refuses to answer. Margaret Donaldsong knowing that the 
boy knew the correct answer asked him afterwards why he had 
not given it - "If that big man didn't knowt then I wasn't 
going to tell him! " (Op. cit. p P. 73). 
In the present research an example was found (SR26 in a later 
experiment) where the child either failed to construct an adequate 
model of what the experimenter wanted, or else overruled his model 
of the experimenter's wishes because of his own interestsp 
B: 'Why did you choose that one? ' 
SR26: 'Don't know why. Why do you keep asking me why? l 
E: 'I'm interested'. 
SR26: 'Well I'm nottl 
In another experiment the same child adopted a different 
deviant positionp 
N: 'Why did you choose that one? ' 
SMR26: 'I want to ..... Hee Ha! He writes down everything I say! # 
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Since most psychologists have failed to concern themselves with 
such problems these anecdotes can act as little more than a caution 
against underestimating the social nature of experiments. 
There appear to be two main things the subject must do in any 
experiment of the type under discussion: 
(a) He must encode the information he is going to have to deal with. 
In Newell and Simon's (1972) termsphe must construct a problem- 
space when faced with the task-environment. This problem-space 
will include a model of the experimenter as woll as the 
experimental task. 
(b) He must select a strategy of come kind in order tocbrive an 
answer from the encoded information. 
Obviously there will be many constraints on the subject. 1s 
ability to do these thingsp not the least of which will be the amount 
of information he can keep accessible at any time. The possible 
role of different types of memory store in the development of problem- 
solving abilities is given a clear and: bimple exposition by Simon(1972). 
In more general terms (a) might be called representation and (b) 
problem-solving strategy. Since representation occupies such a 
central position in problem-solving it is surprising how little 
attention it has received in comparison with problem-solving strategy. 
Miller (1956 a2 1956 b) has indicated how codiiig--can affect memory 
and the information handling capacity of the brainy and the same topic 
is given a more extended treatment by Neisser (1967)- In Simon and 
Sikl6'ssyq (1972) a number of possible representations of task environ- 
ments are discussedg but these are mostly unsuitable for present 
purposes as they tend to be excessively formalised because of their 
direct link withcttem. pts to model human behaviour using computers. 
A psychological theory which is explicitly concerned with 
representation, and which is sufficiently flexible to be worth 
considering is that of Kelly (1955). Kelly holds that people represent 
things to themselves in terms of a system of dichotomous constructs, 
each of which is applicable within a certain range of convenience, and 
that this representation is used as a basis for predicting events and 
deciding what to do. This approach is useful because it provides a 
way of thinking about what the child's model of the experimenter 
might be like. Uhfortunatelyq the theory is only applicable to 
representations corresponding to evaluations made by the subject, 
which is why it appears to break down the cognitive-affective 
distinction. It is difficult to imagine how the more 'objective' 
aspects of hituationsy such as the fact that there aret say, red and 
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green beads jumbled up in a boxp might be represented in terms of 
constructs. 
Bruner (1966) provides the basis for a more general theory of 
representation. He maintains that there are three main modes of 
representation, which he calls enactivegikQnialand symbolic. 
Brieflyt enactive representation i2 a way of representing things 
by the actions that one can perform on them, ilconie representation 
involves an image or spatial scheme that is relatively independent 
of action2 and symbolic representation involves some kind of arbitrary 
or conventional symbol referring to the thing signified. It can be 
seen that constructs constitute one form of symbolic represontationy 
since although Kelly maintains explicitly that all constructs need 
not have names, the relation of construct to whatever is construed" 
can be seen as similar to the relation of symbol to significate. 
Howeverf Bruner suggests that any symbolic activity is logically and 
empitically unthinkable without the properties of categorialityp 
hierarchy2 predication, causation, and modificationg but this seems 
to rest more on an analogy, with the analysis of natural language systems 
by Hockett (1960) and Chomsky (1965) than any more pertinent considera- 
tions. 
Bruner claims that the modes of representation develop in the 
order in which they have been presentedg and that much of the course 
of cognitive development can be understood in terms of their developmenty 
interactioný and integration. He argues that when systems of represent- 
ation come into conflict or contradiction the child is likely to make 
sharp revisions in his way of solving problemsyfor instance when 
there is a discrepancy between 'appearances' (ikonio) and 'reality, 
(symbolic). 
In the problems under consideratipn at present one of the first 
steps in the forrpation of an internal representation of the actual 
task must be to separate the two collections of beads and the red and 
green beads in each collection. This might well be Ariewed as a function 
of perceptioný without needing to claim that perception is activeg passive, 
continuous, categoricalv innateg learnt, or whatever. In other words 
the only claim made is that all children of the ages used in the 
experiments are capable of doing this and will do itq unless they 
ate colourblind. A choice of enactive, ikonicq or symbolic mode 
of representation must also be made, possibly before this1perppt. 11a1, (, - 
processing' , possibly after. It follows from Bruner's arguement 
that the younger children in the experiment (ages 5 and 6) are likely 
to use ikonic or symbolic representationsq whereas the older children 
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will probably rely on the symbolic mode. An initial ikonic imn. ae of 
collections and colours can easily be translated into symbolic form 
for this purpose by some such expedient as labelling the collections 
Ileftlandlright' and the beads 'red' and 'Green'. This however, 
is only one of a variety of possible symbolic representations. 
Another possibility, used by Klahr and Wallace (1972)p is to 
represent the objects in the set of materials by lists of valuesp 
which in this case would mean a list of objects in terms of two values 
(colour and collection-membership) plus a list serving as a record of 
the values appearing in the set. The list of objects might then be 
transformed into four lists representing the interaction of the two 
values by assigning each object on the original list to one of the 
new lists (note that this is only possible when the resulting four 
lists are mutually exclusive in this wayg and no object will appear 
on two of the new lists. In problems which would require assignment of 
the same object to two or more listsý such as class-inclusion problems9 
a more complicated way of constructing the new lists would be necessaryg 
e. g. Wallaceý 1973)- 
A very powerful improvement can be made to the list representation 
if the introduction of quantitative symbole. -which can be compared in 
magnitude by appropriate operations is permitted. This is a point 
of general importance as many kinds of representation are amenable 
to quantification2 and the quantification process itself generates 
new symbols. KUhr and Wallace (1973) introduce the idea of quanti- 
fication operators to describe this processy 
'A quantification operator is an organized collection 
of elemtntgry processes that takes as input the stimulus to 
be quantified (e. g. a collection of blocks) as well as specified 
constraints (e. g. red only) and produces as output a quantitative 
symbol. Quantitative symbols are labeled internal representations 
(e. g. "two$" I'longf" "tiny") that can be used in quantitative 
comparisons. Given two such symbolaq the oreanism can determine 
their relative magnitudes ... I (Op. cit-s P-303). 
The existence of three quantification operators, subitizincy 
counting and estimationý is postulated by Klahr and Wallace. The 
evidence for these operators is drawn fron,. analyses of the reaction 
times and errors of adult subjects in taska requiring them to report 
the number of items in a display. These experiments show a monotomic 
increase in reaction time with increasing number of elements in the 
display in the range btween one and about thirty items. The slope 
of this increase is approximately 40 milliseconds per item for the 
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range between one and five items, and approximately 300 milliseconds 
for the rest of the range (Klahr, 1973; but see also Woodworth and 
Schlosbergp 1954)- The subitizing operator, for which the symbol 
0, is usedf is postulated to account for the 40 millisecond slopep 
the counting operator2 Qc accounts for the 300 millisecond Olopep 
and the estimation operator, (ý, is introduced to account for what 
happens outside the one item to thirty items range where there 
appears to be zero slope. 
In adults Q. ) (ý, q and Qe are fully developed, so that Q. is used 
for quantifications involvinC a small number of items and Q-e is used 
for quantifications involving a large number of items or continuous 
quantityt leaving Qc for the intermediate situations. However, the 
development of the three quantification operators seems to be very 
complex. There is some agreement that Qs and Q0 develop concurrently 
whereas Qe is a later achievement. The exact relationship between the 
development of Q, and Qc is more problematic. It is a general principle 
of the developmental theory advanced by Klahr and Wallace (1973) that 
if the child is viewed as a developing information processing system 
then that system will constantly search for any consistent sequences 
which will enable it to eliminate tedundant processing. This means that 
the thncurrent development of two reliable quantification operators 
will lead to a good deal of interaction between these two developments 
in the form of mapping of the properties of one system onto the other. 
Gelman (1972a, 1972b) has claimed that counting precedes 
subitizing. She defines subitizinG by the absence of overt counting, 
and has shown that by this criterion children aged 4 to 6 years 
are more likely to count than subitize the younger they are (with 
displays containing 3 to 6 items). Klahr and Wallace (1973)gdispute 
this, claiming that Gelman's criterion underestimates subitizing in 
cases where both % and Qc are used. Fortunately the details of 
this disagreement are not pertinent to the present discussion as 
long as it is accepted that by age 5 or 6 both QS and Qc are 
sufficiently developed and co-ordinated to lead to consistent 
results within the range where they overlap, whereas Qe is not. 
The existence of some quantification operator other than Q,, and 
Q0 is clear, because quantitative symbols can be produced in situations 
involving great numbers, or limited exposure durationg or continuous 
quantity, where neither Q. nor Qc could function. Wallace (1972b) 
goes so far as to claim that Q is in operation along with % before 0 Qc- If this is the case then while Wallace's child is detecting 
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consistent sequences between Qs and Qcp he would seem to be failing 
to detect consistent sequences between Qs and Qep or between Q0 and 
Qe* This failure is attributed by Klahr and Wallace (1973) to the 
fact that the wider scope of Qe means that it can be applied to a 
number of different dimensions in most situations. Initial attempts 
to compare the results of Q. and Qc with quantitative symbols generated 
by applying Q. to only one dimension of a situation are thus bound to 
lead to apparent inconsistencies. 
The second general principle of Klahr and Wallace's developmental 
system is that if the system fails to discover consistent sequences in 
a particular context it will widen the basis of its search. This means 
that it will begin to apply Q, to more than one e-dimension of a given 
situation, and in this way co-ordinations can be discovered which will 
allow reconciliation of the discrepancy between Qe and the other 
operatorst Qý and Q., by a further mapping of properties from system 
to system. 
This outline of Klahr and Wallace's ideas has been of necessity 
brief and vagueg and much greater detail can be found in the references 
cited. The notion of quantification operators has been introduced into 
the present discussion because it seems to clarify certain aspects of 
the resultZ dfý-theý-bxperiments being considered. References to explicit 
or implicit quantitative symbols and comparisons of the magnitudes of 
sets of items represented by quantitative symbols were very common in 
both the first beads and control experiments. In fact all reasons 
corresponding to models 29 39 and 41 and some stage 1 reasons involved 
reference to some sort of quantification processes. This is of course 
circularý because one of the defining properties of models 29 39 and 4 
is that quantitative comparisons are madeq but it does draw attention to 
the importance of quantification processes in the childrenýs performance. 
At this point the observant reader will have noticed that the 
discussion has drifted a lone way from Bruner's (1966) positiong since 
the three quantification operatorsy as described by Klahr and Wallace 
(1973)t seem to violate his three modes of representation. The quantit- 
ative symbols generated by counting (numbers) are clearly symbolic and 
culturally transmitted. Subitizing is often regarded as largely percept- 
ually based, but Wallace (1972b) argues that consideration of the 
information processing required for a sufficient Q, indicates that this 
is a misconception. The quantitative symbols generated by Q_ are at 
first personal but become mapped onto the culturally transmitted number 
system as links between Q. and Qc are established. Estimation might secrn 
to*be purely ikonicy but Klahr and Wallace (1973) maintain that like any 
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measurement it must involve repeated aý,, plication of a IstanO. ard' unit. 
These standard untis will be based upon the experience of the particular 
systemp and will thus be personal sybola. Some people may estimate 
lengths in terms of football fields, others in terms of carsq and so on. 
Wallace (1972b) calls these size analogue symbols. Repeated application 
of Q0 to different dimensions of a situation can result in its represent- 
ation by a variety of size analogue symbols. 
It seems that much of this apparent contradiction may be attributable 
to different uses of the terms 'representation' and 'symbol'. The way 
these words are uned at present is very much a matter of individual 
style, but clear awareness of the various possibilities is shpwn by 
Werner and Kaplan (1963)9 
'The term "representation" is a rather common word used in 
various areas of discourse. In the area of cognition, the term 
is sometimes used to designate the relation between an abstract 
concept and a concrete example: one may thus be said to "represent" 
the concept tree by a percept or image of a particular tree. This 
"examplificatory representation" differs clearly from symbolic 
representation: the concrete object, tree, is a 11substantialization" 
of the connotations of the concept but does not symbolize or 
depict the concept; it would be preferable to sneak here of 
"reification" instead of "representation" of a concept. In 
contract, the word "trew, truly signifies or symbolizes the concept 
tree: the dynamic structuring of the word by the speaker (and 
- 
the 
hearer) is taken within the linguistic medium to correspond to the 
significate (connotational structure of. the referent). In order 
for such correspondence between vehicles and significates to be 
attained, the sybolic vehicles - e. g. the word-forms - have to be 
constructed systematically; language has become the medium of 
representation par excellence precisely because its vehicular forms) 
from the phonemic sound elements to the most complex syntactic 
structures, are built on systematic principles, making it possible 
to reveal, within the linguistic domain and by genuinely linguistic 
devices, the connotational structure of the referent'.. (Op-cit-9 
pp- 15-16, underlined word italicised in original). 
The distinctions drawn in this extract are most useful. The kind 
of representation referred to by Werner and Kaplan as symbolic represent- 
ation seems to bear a relationship to Bruner's symbolic mode in that 
the symbols refer to concepts and are organined into a language system. 
At the same time they make clear that the kind of representation referred 
to by Bruner as ikonic is not merely a different mode to symbolic 
q6. 
1 
representation, it also: cerves a different purpose. This is touched 
on by Bruner (1966) when he claims that representation can be understood 
in two aenses2 in terms of the medium employed and its objoctivep but 
he plays down the qualitative differences between his modes of represent- 
ation in order to emphasize the idea that partial translation between 
modes is possible. 
It is notable that Werner and Kaplan use the term symbol only with 
respect to concepts. They stress the wholistic aspects of concept 
symbolisation and its systemic properties* The type of symbol involved 
in Klahr and Wallace's (1973) notion of quantitative symbols does not 
seem to fit this type, and emphasizes the abstractive and analytic side 
of things. 
Throossteps will be taken here to clear away come of these difficulties. 
Firstlyq the term representation will be used in the 'loose' sense, 
advocated by Brunery although the importance of the qualitative differences 
between different types of representation highlighted by Uerner and 
Kaplan must not be ignored. Secondly, it will be conceded that symbolic 
representation refers to a variety of phonomenag'ranging from concept 
systems to the products of operations, with the symbols transmitted 
culturally or defined from personal experience. Thirdly, it is suggested 
that mapy problems can be'avoided if levels of representation are considered. 
Kl; ýhrand Wailacbq(1973) maintain that a quantification operator takes as 
input the stimulus to be quantified and certain specified constraints 
producing as output a quantitative symbol. If it is rembmbered-1hthat'ithe 
input must take the form of an internal representation of the stimulus 
to be quantified together with the necessary constraints9 the apparent 
disagreement with Bruner's (1966) theory can be avoided (since this can 
be seen as applicAble to the initial representation)g and the special 
nature of quantification processes as operations on inputs is emphasized. 
This formulation also draws attention to the fact that whilst quantifi- 
cation may be an important way of transforming inputs into manipulable 
reprosentationsg it cannot be applied without prior representation of 
at least the constraints on its applicationg i. e. quantification 
processes can only be considered in the context of a more general 
representation. An easy way of digesting this is to think in terms 
of Bruner's translation analogy and consider that quantification 
processes provide a way of recoding representations into a special 
symbolic form. 
Returning-to the experiments under considerationý it can be seen 
that the problems involve sets of items within the counting range of 
most subjects in the studyy and sometimes within their . -slibitizing range, 
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sometimes not. The main experimental problems have aetc: -of: *beads varying 
in numerosity between two and six, and two of the additional problems 
involve a set of eight beads. The youngest children in the experiments 
are five years oldp by which age subitizing up to three or four items 
might reasonably be expectedq together with counting in the complete 
range used (although this need not imply precise co-ordination of 
subitizing and counting). With the subjects aged seven years and above 
it is safe to assume subitizing ability in the range up to four or five 
items and accurate co-ordination of subitizing and counting (by making 
a pessimistic interpretation of thu a-Vidence presented by Klahr and 
Wallace, 1973, and Klahr, 1973). 
This means that all of the subjects aged over seven years should 
have available to them a reliable method of quantification for all of 
the problems used in the experimenty and subjects below this age will 
often be. An the same position. The reliability of Qs and Qo in this 
way (irrespective of their hypothesised relationship to each other) 
means that the fact that items in some of the parts of the experimental 
problems can be subitized or counted, whereas others can only. be countedg 
should not affect the experimental results at the level of analysis 
employed. The fact that some of the younger children may not be in 
possession of some reliable method of quantification coveting the whole 
range from one to six items (five and six year olds were not normally 
given the additional problems) is more important. 
However, it should not be assumed that the absence of a reliable 
ciuantification operator compels the child to adopt the stage 1 type 
of solution strategy9 since there is nothing in models,, 29 3ý or 4 which 
stipulates that reliable quantifications have to be made. Estimation 
could be used in any of the problemsp but is likely to be ignored when 
more reliable methods are available. In certain of the problemsy 
however2 many subjects would be able to use Qe reliably. For exampleg 
in problem B4 when green is the target colourg there are six green beads 
in one box and two green beads in the other box; with a discrepancy of 
this size most children would be able to use Q0 to deduce which box 
contained more green beads and thus avoid having to count or subitize. 
This is particularly likely to hap,, )en with the original 'linear' problem 
displays2 where length of line is the only dimension which needs to be 
considered in order to generate a reliable quantity estimate. In the 
control experiment problems a compensation between length and density 
would be necessaryp whilst the irrelevant non-linearity of the displays 
would h,,,. ve to be ignored. 
Investigations of problem-solving strategies are more common in the 
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rdaearch literature than attempts ot investigate forms of representation, 
possibly because strategies are more amenable to current experimental 
techniques. The first beads and control experiments are in line with 
this trend in that they were desi, -ned and analysed in order to investigate 
the applicability of various rgodels of problem-solving strategies. Thus 
they contain the implicit assumption that the distinction between 
representation and strategy is validg and that any interaction between 
the two will not be of a kind which might contaminate the ty: )e of 
analysis employed. 
The present theoretical considerations su. pport the view that the 
separation of representation and strategy is valid for analytic purposest 
but indicate that the distinction is by no means as sharp as tras initially 
supposed. There appears to be a close tie between the strategies distina- 
uished in the beads experiments and quantification processes. The three 
modelled strategies, moel-els 2,31 and 4, all involve various quantifications 
and the exact nature of these quantifications is dictated by the requirements 
of each strategy. As an example of this, the model 2 strategy involves 
comparison of the amount of target-colour beads in each of the two collectiongg 
and selection of the collection with the larger amount. This means that 
some kind of quantification process is necessary to determine the amount 
of target beads in each collectiony but the amount of non-target beads 
in each collection need not be quantified. If representation is considered 
as completely separate from strategy9 the representation would have to 
be in. -,, a form suitable for the strategy chosen to be applied to it, so 
that the amounts of both target and non-target beads in each collection 
would have to be quantified (as it cannot be known in advance what the 
particular requireýjents of the strategy will be). This may in fact happeny 
but it seems more likely that the necessary quantifications will be dictated 
by direct strateeic considerationsg so that the amount of non-target beads 
in each collection need not be quantified when using the model 2 strategy. 
This would be consistent with the view expressed earlier that quantification 
processes provide a way of redoding representations into the more specialised 
form of quantitative symbols. At present2 howevery it is not possible to 
bring empt-ricalbvidence to bear on this point. 
The overall model of what the subject does in the experimental 
situation is now as follows: 
ý, i) Initial representation of the situation and its requirements. 
(b) Selection or assembly of an appropriate strategy for coping with 
the requirements of the situation. 
(o) Any redodine of initial representations necessary for the application 
of the chosen strategy. 
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(d) Ibcooution of the chosen strategy. 
Within this general framework an attempt has been made to elucidate 
the strategies used by children in a particular type of situation, and 
to ihtroduce the idea of quantification operators as a way of viewing 
the quantifications carried out in the execution of thece atratogies. 
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CHAPThT 4 
The Roulette ExDeriment 
First thoughts and pilot work for the roulette experiment. 
At thi: s point it would be interesting to try out these ideas by 
seeing how well they can be applied to different experiments in related 
fields of enquiry. Unfortuncktely, this isn't possible with most of 
the extant work as the details which would be required in order to make 
a precise application aren't always available. Instead, an experiment 
will be designed to test out the ideas developed so far in a different 
context. It is quite possible that the strategies outlined from the 
results of the beads experiments may be situation specific. This is 
particularly likely with the model 3 strategyý which was not reported 
by Piaget and Inhelder (10,51)9 and was found to be infrequent in the 
experiments carridd out by Fischbein et. al (1970). The new experiment 
can be used to assess both the generality of the strategies identified 
and the usefulness of the theoretical position which has been developed. 
What is needed is a type of problem which appears different to the 
problems already used, but it conceptually similar (to adults). This 
could be achieved most simply by changing the materials usedg 
for example 
dice or roulette wheels might replace beads in boxes. Dice2 howeverp are 
not very satisfactory as some faces will always be hidden from the subject 
doing the experiment, and even if a two-dimensional representation of 
what is on the faces is set up (as in the 'beads' experiment), it will 
be tricky establishing that this is really like what is on 
the dice. 
Roulette wheels with different proportions of red and green marked on 
their faces are more suitable in this respect, and also allow the use 
ofacontinuous instead of discontinuous quantities. 
In order to arrive at a similar 'logical' set-up to the beads 
experiments it is necessary to use roulette wheels of different sizes. 
(The term 'roulette wheell is used to refer to a pointer spinning on 
a circular face. This is not quite the same as the casino arrangement). 
If wheels of the same size are used, 
K7 : rJt; 
I 
are quantitative symbols representing the sizes of the red segments. 
ý.,, ýre quantitative symbols representing the sizes of the green segments. 
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It can be seen that -X, + yl = xx. + ! fj. 
This means that there is an inverse relationship between the sizes 
of the red and green segments on each whoell which causes the model 2 
strategy of choosing the wheel with more of the target colour to always 
lead to the choice which is mathematically most likely to succeed (as 
long as a valid and reliable way of quahtifying the sizes of the sogmento 
is discovered). As long as this happens the model 3 strategy is spurious. 
This doesn't necessarily mean that children will not use itp but that 
with wheels of the same sizes the model 29 31 and 4 strategies will 
always lead to the same choices. In order to avoid this it is necessary 
to have wheels of different sizes, in which case, 
4 
'3C ++ 
depending on the way in which ', )C, IXX Lý-,, are obtained. 
e. g. , if --. >cl 12C2.1 are 
fractions then -X I -t- 151 =7C. 1. t 
If are size estimates then 
The possibility of using continuous quantities is very interesting 
in view of the theoretical position devcloped so far. It has been 
maintained that the use of small discontinuous quantities in the beads 
experiments led to quantification mainly by subitizing and counting, 
Q. and Qc. With continuous quantities Qs and Qc are inappropriatep and 
estimation (Q. ) will have to be used. Howeverg Qe is unreliable by 
comparison with Qs and Qc; especially at the younger ages used in the 
beads experiments9 which leads to the prediction that the use of 
continuous quantities will lead to a result which will be 'retarded' with 
respect to the results of the beads experiments. 
As an aid to designing an adequate experimentp a short pilot study 
was, carried out to see if the use of roulette wheels of different sizes 
was feasible, and what methods children would use to encode information 
of this kind. The materials used were cards with wheels of different 
sizes marked on them. Each wheel was divided into a red and a green 
segment by means of shading lines, and a pointer was placed in the 
centre of the wheel whicht after being spun, would f4 nish pointing to 
the red or green shaded segment. The wheels used were either 165 mm- 
in diameter or 280 mm. in diameterg the shading lines were 13 mm. apartý 
the fractions of green used were 9 and hence -1 ., - I ý, 9., 
red). Subjects (seventeen children aged from 7 to 11 years) wore 
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offered a choice between a gamble with one of the large wheels (chosen 
by the experimenter)or a gamble with one of the sinall wheels to get a 
specified colour. 
The results of thim pilot experiment will not be reported in detail 
, as they conform to the patterxrffound in the more elaborate experiment 
about tbýbo described. Howeverp it is worth drawing attention to the 
following methods of quantification which were referred to by subjects 
in the pilot experiment (some of the same methods can also be found in 
the sample protocols of subjects in the roulette experiment proper): 
(i) Counting the number of shading lines on a particular segment 
or the whole circle. 
e. g. SRP14, J RS v ýS RL*ý green target. 
(Pilot experiment subject number 14,, offored a choice of small wheel 
with a red segment covering a third of its surface or a large , viheel 
with a red segment covering a third of its surface, to got green). 
Chooses ýS RL. 'It's got more lines thah the other one. Fifteen 
onto nine', 
(ii) Estimating the area occupied by a particular segment (its' size) 
or by the whole circle. 
e-9- SRP 39 -1- RS v RL, green target. 2 
Chooses J RL. 'It's bigger than that one. The circle is bie. 1 
SRP89 ý RS v -ý RL, red target. 
Chooses -§T RS. 'The other hasn't got as much red space as this one. 
' 
(iii) Estimating the width of a-segment. 
e. a. SRP13, RS v ['; RL2 green target. 
Chooses RL. 'More green than on the other one 1cos it's a 
wider bit'. 
(iv) Estimating the size of the angle a particular segment substends 
at the centre of the wheel. 
0-9- SRP17t, 32ý RS v -ý RL, red target. 
Choosos2-- RS. 'It's got more spread than the other one. Goes 
round further'. 
(V) Recognising a certain shape of segment (or range of shapes)as 
corresponding to a particular fraction. 
e. g. SRP11, -ýRS v RL9 red target. 
Chooses § RL. 'There's three-quarters of red there and only half 
of rbd here'. 
(vi) A more elaborate use of fractions in which the necessity of the 
two segments on each 14heel adding up to one unit is realised, 
ar-companied by attempts to calculate rather than recognise fractions. 
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e. g. SRP12, RS v RL, red target. 
Chooses :t RL. 'It's only got a quarter greený so three-quarter is 
red. That one is thirds'. 
In terms of Klahr and Wallace's (1973) proposed quantification 
operators, there is no sign of Q. in the above list. Countine the 
number of shading lines corresponds to Qc applied to an inappropriate 
feature (from the adult point of view). The next three methods in the 
listq (ii) - (iv), are ways of applying Q-e* Method (ii) (size estimation) 
is the most primitive as it involves more than one dimension, and Klahr 
and Wallace (1973) have argued cogently the need for viewing the 
development of Q-e as one of increasing analytic separation of the various 
possiblc dirhensions to which it can be applied. The early appearance 
of method (ii) is confirmed by the fact that it is often applied to the 
size of a whole wheel rather than a particular segment, and this 
corresponds to the stage 1 outlined in the beads experiments. The 
more refined versions of Q. were not used in this mannerg but (as 
applied to the number of shading lines) sometimes was. 
Some subjects in the pilot experiment used what at first sight 
appears to be a different method of quantification to those appcaring 
in the above list, but may be a special case of the size estimation 
method. This involved a failure to discriminate anything exce-pt which 
segment of a wheel was larger than the other (i. e. which segment occupied 
more than half the circle). Nhen faced with two wheels, one having 
red and green marked oný the other ý red and ? '"Creen a child using this 
method would give the impression that as far as he. was concerned there 
was more green than red on each wheel and nothing more to be said. 
It is difficult to be sure that this is really what is happeningy and 
that the child is not just confused or holding backt but it can be 
seen as an early form of Q in which what Wallace (1972b) calls size e 
analogue symbols are not well developed, and only relational attributes 
are coded. (Evidence is presented by Bryanty 19741 suggesting that 
young children do code relations in this way). 
Estimates of the widths of segments, method (iii), are an improve- 
ment over size estimates in that only one dimension of the situation 
is being estimated. Method (iv)g estimating the size of the angle 
a segment substends at the centre of the wheell is similrLr in this 
respect but represents an advance by adult criteria because this is 
an aspect of the display which is relevant to a satisfactory solution 
of the problems9 whereas sizes and widths of segments are irrelevant. 
A method of quantification which seems to be a variation of method (iV), 
and so was not included in the listq can sometimes be observed in 
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cases where the two different-sizod wheels have red (and croon) segments 
occupying the same fractions of their surfaces. This can elicit 
comments like 'They look the same' or 'looks like the same on each'. 
Such decisions could only be based on comparisons of angles subtended 
at the contret or segment shapesg which amounts to the same thingo 
(the only difference between the shapes of segments of a circle is in 
terms of the angle subtended at the centre). 
The use of methods of quantification involving fractions might be 
thought to be very different to estimation. Estimation is an imprecise 
tool, and the development of Qe seems to consist to a large extent of 
attempts to improve its reliability by specifying precisely the constraints 
under whibh it will be used. In spite of this it remains essentially 
imprecise. Fractionst on the other hand, are a very precise quantitative 
symbol implying some depth of relationships. Howeverg method (v), the 
recognition of fractions, is arguably more like estimation than true 
fractional quantification. This is because the fraction is only 
determined by what it looks likeý so that misquantification is possible 
if the child only knows one or two fractions. Thusq in the pilot studyt 
examples are found of children who only seem to know of the fractions 2 
and ý claiming that segments representing both ý and of the whole 
wheel are ý-, and hence failing to distinguish them. When used in this 
way a fraction is no more than a culturally transmitted size analogue 
symbol, and this interprotation is supported by statements of the type 
'that's more than a half, but less than a quarter', which can be found 
in the results of the pilot experiment. 
True fractional quantification, unlike recognition of fractions, 
involves a certain amount of calculation. Because of this it has a 
different logical status to the other methods of quantification which 
have been commented on. These other methods can all be seen as forms of 
QC or QeI but fractional quantification does not correspond to any 
quantification operatorg being instead something that can be done with 
a set of data which has already been quantified. With continuous 
quantities there is thus no precise way of arriving at 'true' fractions 
(unless one hands out pTatractdrs-ýorrsome other sort of measure is 
available) since'the only initial quantification possible is in terms 
of Qe. This means that methods (v) and (vi), recognition of fractions 
and appreciation of the real nature of fractions, are sometimes 
indistinguishable, particularly as so many of the relationships 
expressed in a fraction remain implicit. The importance of this point 
will become clearer laterý when the results of the experiment being 
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led up to are discussed. At present it will suffice to say that 
although the distinction between methods (v) and (vi) is sometimes 
blurred it is still valid, as is illustrated by cases where children 
merely recognizing fractions can claim that a wheel has red and 
green, or ýS red and greeng and so on. The children who realize 
that a fraction expresses a relation of part to whole are unlikely to 
say such things. 
In spite of the line of reasoning developed aboveg it could be 
argued that the recognition of fractions involves a greater degree of 
calculationv and hence establishment of relationshipog than the model 
presented would suggest. The model given assumed that the basic 
process was one of matching segment shapes to some kind of internalised 
and that the main development in this type of recognition 
would involve the addition of new templates to the repertoire and 
tightening of the match-mismatch criterion. Howeverg there are other 
possible models. For example, fraction recognition may involve the 
iteration of an internally generated size analogue symbol (s. a. s. ) 
into the segment to be quantified. Thus the fraction three-quarters 
would be calculated by applying the z. a. s. for a quarter three timesý 
whereas with the previous model three-quarters is recognized as a unit. 
Alternatively the smaller segment of the circle might be used as a 
metric for the larger) and the number of iterations necessary to cover 
the larger segment calculated. 
The examples of misquantifications given tend to support the 
original model rather than the alternative 'iterative' models. 
However2 this is not very 
, 
conclusive and so it is important to keep 
in mind the possibility that fraction recognition may be more complicated 
than it appears. One possible test between the alternative models 
would be to measure the time taken by children to recognize different 
fractions. With the iterative models an increase in processing time 
proportional to the number of iterations necessary would be expected, 
whereas the model adopted here should not lend to differences of this 
kind. 
Itis hoped that this descriptive treatment of the methods of 
quantification revealed by the pilot experiment will assist the 
reader in understanding the results of the next experiment. No figures 
have been quoted because a principle is being followed of using short, 
clinical, experiments in order to prepare the ground for and elucidate 
certain aspects of the more conventional experiments, and it is felt 
that the quotation of figures obtained in non-standardised situations 
is misleading, if not invalid. 
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The roulette ex-oariment. 
The number of different possible methods of quantifyine data 
in this kind of situation revealed by the pilot experiment, and the 
different outcomes produced by the different methods, means that an 
experiment which is both logically identical to the first beads 
experiment for all subjects and standardiced for all subjects cannot 
be designed. However, an experiment which will give a similar i-ange 
of problems to the first beads experiment is feasible. The 'roulette' 
experiment is thus a compromise between this ind, its previously stated 
aims. 
As in the beads experiments a forced-choice situation was used. 
Subjects were faced with a laree -and small wheel, each shaded with -a 
red and green segment. A pointer was placed on each wheel and the 
subject was asked which pointer he would spin if he wanted it to 
finish pointing to red, and which if he wanted it to finish pointing 
to green. After each choice the gamble was made. 
The fact that different methods of quantification can be applied 
to problems of this. type means that the kind of design used in the first 
beads experiment, which is intended to identify certain strategies with 
a high degree of precision, is not possible here. Instead a design 
will be adopted for the main part of the roulette experiment which 
will exhaust all possible combinations of the fractions of 
red and green on the large and small wheels. As long as colour 
preferences are ignored (so that a problem having a large wheel with 
red, "' green, and a small wheel with -I- red, -ýL green, is regarded as 
equivalent to*a problem having a large wheel red, ýS Green, and 
red, -!, - Green) this produces five problems. In a si, -, all wheel with 
addition, two extra problems were intr6duced where the discriminations 
and Jv these were given required of the subject are finer (2 v 
at the end of the experiment in cases where the experimenter considered 
that the'result might be interesting. One of these problems wr. ur also 
given at the beginning of theenxperimon-t as a pretest to ensure that 
the subject had understood the instructions. Two pretest problems 
had been used in the beads experiments, but this was found to be excess- 
ively cautious in view of the case with which the instructions seem to 
be understood. 
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Procedure: The general format and inatructions of the experiment 
have been arranged to make comparison of the results obtained with 
the results of the beads experiments as easy as possible. The 
experiment begins with a protest intended to make the subject familiar 
with the experimental situationy materialsý and instructions. The 
pretest is followed by the five experimental problemsq presented in 
an order varied from subject to subject by shuffling the experimental 
cards. Finally, there are the two additional problemsq which replace 
tho'clinicall interview often used in Genevan experimentsq and which 
are only given to certain subjects. Each of the problems used in the 
experiment has two parts, namely the part where red is the target 
colour and the part where green is the target colour, which are always 
presented in this order (reasons for thisq and its effect on the results, 
will be discussed in detail later). The orientation of the segments 
on the wheels and the left or right hand position of the large and small 
wheels were varied haphazardly throughout the experiment (againt by 
shuffling the experimental cards). 
The materials used consist of two pointers which can be spun, and 
these are placed on cards with a wheel drawn on,, The wheels are either 
165 mm- in diameter or 280 -nm. in diameter, with a red and greon segment 
marked by paralled shading lines 13mm. apart. No representation of the 
situation of the kind used in the beads experiments was necessary as 
all the relevant features remain visible throughout the experiment. 
Data were collected by the experimenter in the form of a written record 
of the reasons given by the subject to justify his choiceaq the choices 
he makesq and their success or failure in producing the desired. outcomes. 
The order of presentation of the problems was; also recorded The 
problems used are illustrated in Table 5- 
The initial instruction given to each subject were as follows: 
tWe're going to try out some games and I want yoii to tell me what 
you think of them. 
If we spin this pointer it can stop on the--rdd bit of the circle or 
the green bit. ' (This was then demonstrated with one of the 
pointers). 
'And if we spin this one it can stop on the red bit or the green 
bit as well. ' (This was demonstrated with the other pointer). 
'What I want to know is if we wanted to get one to stop on a red 
bit would it be better to spin this one or this one? ' (Pointing 
as appropriate). 
'Now why did you choose that one rather than the other one? ' 
loo. 
(If the reply to this is unclear, ask 'What do you mean by that? ') 
k1hen an answer has been givent 'Now you can try spinning the one 
you chose and if it stops on the colour we want9you got a pointy if 
it stops on the other colour you got nothing. If it stops on red 
you got a pointy if it's a green you got nothing. O. K.? ' 
If the subject didiýst seem to understand any part of these instruct- 
ions, it was repeated. After the initial trial a shortened form of 
instruction could be used: 
'Now this time we want to got one to stop on a green/red (as 
appropriate)bitiso which one would you spin now? 
Why did you choose that one rather than the other one? ' 
(If the reply to this is unclear, 'What do you mean by that? ') 
When an answer has been given: 'Welly výelll try spinning the 
one you chose and if it stops on the colour we want you got a 
pointy if it doesn't you get nothing. If it stops on a green/ 
red you got a pointy if it's a red/Creen you get nothing. O. K.? ' 
As in the beads experiments these instructions were memorised by 
the experimenter in order to allow the situation to be as natural as 
possible. 
Sample: The experiment was carried out in the same primary school 
as the beads experiments. Seventy-two children were uscdf divided 
into six groups of twelve subjects aged 6 years, 7 years, 8 years, 
9 years) 10 yearsy and eleven years. Some of the these subjects 
had already taken part in one or more of the beads experiments, but 
this was not considered important as the roulette experiment was 
carried out some nine months after the last of the beads experiments. 
Ten of the bubjects come into this category2 they are SR5 (SI36)2 
3 20), SR! 69 (SB24)ý SR18 (SB21)y SR22 (2'915), SR30 (S]325)2 SR)3 (SB", 
SR51 (SB48), S1158 (AJ and 332 6,0 (SB63). (The nizze-, 056), SR60 (SB57), 
of the classes in the nrimary abho6l used- for tho stud,, r 6id not allow 
completely independent samnlos of children to be used. in uvery expurimrnt). 
los) . 
Results of the roulette experiment,. 
The results were analysed both as data in their own riCht and as 
data to be compared with the results of the first bca6s experiment. 
In order to Drovide a comparison with the first beaCc experiment results 
the categorisation sbheme used for those results wan applied to the 
results of the roulette experiment, an6 the validity of the scheme in 
this context was assessed independently by means of the Brirwr cluster 
analysis. 
In order to apply the oategorisation abheme developed for the beads 
experiment it is necessary toEpecify criteria for deciding which of 
the four theoretical models a given response corresponds to. The 
following list was drawn up: 
Type 1: Any answer corresponding to the first stage of development found 
in the results of the beads experiments. Such answers seem to the 
experimenter to involve spurious factorsy or guesswork. Choices made 
are erratic and their justifications often seem post hoc. The following 
illustrations of this type of answer are taken from the results of the 
experiment: 
SR11 (roulette experiment subject number ll)q problem R5 green 
(problem number R59 target colour green. ) 
Chooses -jRL (the large wheel, which has 4 red and green marked 
on it). lh'very time it Goes on the right one'. 
SR11y problem R3 red. 
Chooses 'I haven't tried it'. 
SR122 problem R4 green. 
Chooses -ý. -RL. 'It goes faster'. 
--IZR14j problem R3 red. 
Chooses ýRL. 'It's got those bits there'. (Pointing to shading lines). 
SR15P problem R2 green. 
Chooses 'Don't really know whyl. 
SR15t problem Rl green. 
Chooses -4, -RL. 'I just tried the little one'. 
SR192 problem R5 red. 
Chooses 12, -RS. 'It's a small circle'. 
Type 2 Answers corresponding to the model 2 strategy. Such answers 
involve a comparison of the amount of each wheel covered by the target 
segment, and a choice of the wheel with the larger amount covered. 
Answers involving comparisons of the amount of each wheel covered by the 
non-target segment followed by choice of the one with less are also 
scored as type 29 although these are rare. The actual method used for 
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the quantifications is disregarded as lonu- ao tlc subject indicates 
that he compared the amount of each wheel covered by the target 
segment and chose the one with more. 
1ýxamples of type 2 answers: 
SR23ý problem R4 red. 
Chooses -! ARL. 'Got more red than that one'. 
SR24, problem R5 red. 
Chooses 'It's Got a bigger space of red than that one. 
It's a lot better'. 
SR32, problem R3 red. 
Chooses 'It's three-quarters of red. Other has lose'. 
SR341 problem R3 red. 
Chooses -, "RS. 'The red's three-quarters, only one quarter red 
on the other'. 
SR361 problem R7 Green. 
Chooses ýVRL. 'The green Goes round the circle more than on 
the other one'. 
BR412 problem R5 red. 
f Chooses -ýý: RL. 'It's still bigger. This red hal. is bigger than 
that half a circle. ' 
SR442 problem R5 Green. 
Chooses rýRS. 'It's just a guess. Looks the same amount on each 
one'. 
SR4151 problem R2 red. 
Chooses 'There's too much Green on the other one. Vore 
than on this one'. 
SR47, problem R6 red. 
Chooses -, IRL. 'It's Got more red--lines thah the little onet. 
SR50, problem R1 red. 
Chooses -ýRL. 'That red bit's wider than the other onolo 
Ty2e 3: Answers indicating use of the model 3 strategy. This involves 
comparison of the difference between the amount of each wheel covered 
by the target and non-tarect sogments, and choice of the most favour- 
able case (i. e. the wheel with the largest 'surplus' or the smallest 
'deficit'). As with the type 2 answer category the method of 
quantification used is disre. gardod. 
i1cam ples of type 3 answers: 
SR24, problem R4 red. 
Chooses 11RLo 'They're the same red and Green, the other has a 
smaller space of red than green, ' 
ill. 
SR329 problem R4 green. 
Chooses ý-RS. 'There's one quarter more Croon than red. ' 
SR47ý problem R2 green. 
Chooses t, RS. 'There's more green than red lines?. 
SR59) problem R7 green. 
Chooses IMlore green than red. Lose red than the other one, 
a bit of green extra'. 
SR602 problem R1 red. 
Chooses ýSRL. 'Doesn't matter, green has more on both than red'. 
SR72, problem R2 green. 
Chooses 4'ý-RL. 'There's more of it than the red, it goes over the 
half way marks'. 
SR46, problem R3 red. 
Chooses -f, ý, RS. 'Got more red on than green'. 
It must be pointed out that some of these answers only refer to one 
wheell so that they do not completely meet the criteria for the type 3 
categorisation. However, as all the responnes of this type produced 
in the experiment were found to be associated with choices consistent 
with the model 3 strategy, they were classed as type 3, since the 
impression is gained that the lack of reference to the other wheel is 
due to 'laziness' rather than not having taken it into account. It 
is interesting to note that the same high consistency was not found in 
a later experiment. 
Type 4: Answers which seem to involve some understanding of proportional 
relationships. For example: 
SR51ý problem Rl red. 
Chooses iRL. 'They're the same. If you make that one smaller 
it's the same'. 
SR721 problem R1 red. 
Chooses ýAL. 'Any one. They're both the same if you cut them 
down to their sizes. I'll have the big one'. 
Type 1? 1: As in the beads experiments, a certain number of responses 
were found to be unclassifiable within this ochemot and were grouped 
together as type 1? 1. All of these responses appear to involve 
application of the model 2 or model 3 strategy with a choice of the 
wheel with less rather than more of whatever is required. ibcamples are: 
SR221 problem R5 green. 
Chooses -; ';!!: -RS. 'Got less green than that one'. 
SR22, problem R4 green. 
Chooses -. -, -RL. 'Got less green than that one. This is straightp 
that goes up'. (A reference to the qjýapos of the boundaries ý4111 
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between the red and green segments). 
SR38, problem R2 red* 
Chooses ý4-RL. 'The red's smaller than the green'. 
It is perhaps as well to point out the ways in which this classi- 
fication scheme has had to be modified from the scheme used in 
interpreting the repults of the beads experiments. The main difference 
is caused by the fact that in the beads experiments the almost universal 
use of numbers as quantitative symbols means that the choices to each 
part of each problem which would be consistent with each strateCy can 
be specified precisely, so that if a subject does not choose in 
accordance with the reason he gives wo can ponder about his 'real' 
reason and, more importantlyg the fact that most choices and reasons 
are not inconsistent supports this -typQ of analysis. 
Such clear-cut decisions cannot always be made in the analysis of 
the roulette results because of the highly personal nature of estimation 
and its size analoGue symbols. If a subject maintains that half a small 
circle seems bigger thanua third of a larger circle the experimenter 
is in no position to contradict himp and likewise if he had maintained 
that half the small circle seemed smaller than a third of the larger 
one. The validity of an analysis of the reasons for choices obtained 
in the roulette experiment might thus be questioned were it not for 
the support given to this method by the results of the beads experiments. 
Another difference is that in the classification scheme for the 
roulette results the criteria for identifying an answer as belonging 
to type 4 have been relaxed. In the beads experiments type 4 was used 
to refer to answers which seemed to be generated by the model 4 strategy. 
It would not be possible to do this with the results of the roulette 
experiment because accurate recognition of fractions removes the need 
for most of the calculation involved in the moael 4 strategy. Because 
of this it was decided that it would be most profitable to use the 
type 4 c; tLtegory as a way of distinguishing the subjects who appeared 
to show some genuine grasp of proportion from those subjects who 
merely attached a fractional label to a certain range of segment shapes. 
This obviously involves a greater than usual degree of interpretation by 
the experimenter and it is left to the reader to decide whether he 
thinks that this is justified by the examples given. The category 
turns out to be comparatively rare in the results anywayg so that 
the decision as to its validity is not as important as it might have 
been. 
Even though the type 4 category is uncommon in the roulette results 
it could be hold that the relaxation of its defining attributes daml-ges 
1.1 , ý, . 
the comparison about to be mc. do, between the results of ýJie bead. c and 
roulette experiments. In order to find out whothor or not this is tl), - 
case the results of the firct beads experiment wore ro-intor, T)reted 
according to the new set of typo 4 criteriag : ý,. nd no d-ifforence to tho 
original interpretation was found. In other words, the bnada oxneriment 
provides the same examples of the typo 4 cate[; ory whether the strict 
or relaxed criterion is usedq whereas the roulette oxneriment hac 
some examples of type 4 according to the relaxed criterion, but none 
by the original strict criterion. 
The result of applying this classification schomc to the data 
collected in the roulette experiment ir set out in Appcndix E. A 
graphical illustration can be produced in order to facilitate comparison 
with the result of the first beads experiment. Thera are ciý; ht rcapon-cs 
from each subject in the first beads experiment, and ten nor subject 
in the roulette experimentt whilst the number of subjects of each a-c U 
sampled is thecsame in each experiment, so 1-, hat the comparison could be m1nde 
by, multiplying by4/5 the scorer, in the table of frequency of res, -)onse 
types against age for the roulette experiment (coo AT)pendix S, -, ýIhc 
comparisons could also be effected ýy means of proportions, but multiply- 
ing by 4/5ths hL, s the same effect, and is more convenient). 1101.7ever, 
the comparison will only be meaningful if the sets of nroblems used in 
the two experiments can be seen as in come way equivalcnt. It has been 
pointed out that it is impossible to make the und. erlying structure of 
the two sets of problems identical for all subjects) but that a si,; iil%r 
range of problems in both cases can be achieved. Because of this, the 
design of the roulette experiment was worked out with the aim of 
providing an experiment which would be satisfying in its oim right as 
well as a possible comparison with the beads experiments. This leads to 
the roulette experiment's having two of the main experimental problems 
of the 'tricky' kind where each collection h<-. s the same proportion of 
red and green2 and the subject must point out their equivalence rather 
than choosing one (to pass). In the first beads experiment only one 
of the main experimental problems was of this form. 
The problems referred to are: 
Beads nroblem B3: Collection A Collection B 
4 red and 4 green beads 2 red and 2 Croon beads 
Roulette problem Rl: Large wheel Small wheel 
red and 2, greeno red and green. 
Roulette problem R5: Large wheel Small wheel 
11 
'' red and red and 
1- Croon. -L, Croon. 2 1. 
The nresence of two problems of this kind in the roulette experiment 
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and only one in the first beads exporiment constitutes a source of 
difference between the twovoto of problemsp so that a more meaningful 
comparison might be obtained if one of the roulette problems is ignored. 
The best one to ignore seems to be problem Rlp since problem R5 and 
beads problem B3 both utilise the same proportions of red and green 
for their collections. The trouble with doing this is that whether 
the results of problem Rl are ignored or not the problem was present 
in the experiment and may influence the results obtained from the 
other problems in some significant way. 'Phis seems unlikelyp but the 
question is not of pressing importance since Appendix E includes tables 
of thr.. ; fTequencies of the different types of response at different ages 
compiled by including all problems and multiplying each result by 
four/fifths, and by only using results from problems R2 to R51 which 
demonstrate that there is little difference between the two methods 
except in the number of type 4 responses, which Coos down if only 
problems R2 to R5 are considered. As the type 4 responses are only 
produced on problems R1 and R59 the results from problems R2 to R5 
only have been used in the comparison of the roulette and first beads 
experiment results which is illustrated by figure 10. 
In order to test the differende between the proportions of stage 11 
29 and 3 answers obtained in the first beads and roulette experimentsp 
the chi square test for two independent samples was used1with subjects 
in the age range six to ton years, (strictly speakineg the samples 
are not completely indppendentg but in view of the very different format 
of the two experiments and the long time interval between them the 
use of the test was considered justifiable). In order to apply the 
test each subject was assigned to the stage to which most of his 
answers belonged (ties were resolved by assigning the subject to the 
lower of the tied stages). The difference between the proportions 
of subjects falling into the three stages in each experiment is 
significant at the . 001 level (See appendix J). 
Discussion: From the graphs of the results of the first beads and 
roulette experiments (figure 10) it can be seen that there are two 
main differences between them. Firstlyt the results of the roulOtte 
experiment appear retarded by comparison with the results of the beads 
experiment, if we consider that the four response types represent 
increasingly relevant and sophisticated strategies. Secondly, the 
model 3 strategy (type 3 answers) features less prominently in the 
results of the roulette experimentý although it is still quite clearly 
present. A minor difference is the appearance of a few type 4 answers 
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at a much younger age in the roulette than the beads experiment, but 
this is of questionable significance. The shapco of the curves 
representing the type 1 answexuand the curves representing the typo 3 
answers obtained in each experiment from subjects between six and ton 
years of age are closely comparable, and median testa show that the 
modian of the type 1 curves is significantly higher in the roulette 
experimentg whilst the median of the type 3 curves ic significantly 
higher in the first beads experiment. (See appendix J. ) 
The apparent drop in performance between the first beads and 
roulette experiments is consistent with the prediction made that the 
unreliability of Qe would cause the results of the roulette experiment 
to appear retarded. However, this is by no means the full story. The 
results of the roulette experiment show much more heterogeneity than 
the results of the first beads experiment and it is only by virtue of 
the conceptual framework which has been developed that much sense can 
be made of them. 
In the beads experiments any quantitative symbols generated to aid 
solution of the problems were almost invariably numericalt so that the 
way in which the quantitative symbols were organiced to arrive at a 
solution provided the major source of variability between answers.; In 
the roulette experiment, on the other hand, although Q. is the principal 
quantification operator used, there are a variety of ways in which it can 
be applied, so that the way in which the quantitative symbols it produces 
are organised can only account for some of the variance in the results 
and is no longer so illuminating. If the examples of answers correspond- 
ing to each of the major'strategies in the beads and roulette experiments 
are compared a striking difference can be seen between the homogeneity 
of the examples of these categories in the beads experiment and the 
heterogeneity of the roulette experiment examples. 
This point about the role of the different types of quantitative 
symbol as well as different strategies involved in the roulette perform- 
ances merits further discussion. Suppose that the model 2 strategy is 
used to solve problems of the type involved in the roulette experiment. 
In order to apply this strategy it is necessary to generate quantitative 
symbols representing the amount of the target colour which is marked on 
each wheel. If this is done by estimating the area occupied by the 
target segment on each wheel the choice finally arrived at will sometin-CS 
be the wheel with the highest mathematical. probability of success9and 
sometimes the other wheel. If, on the other handt the shapes of the 
target segments are recognised as corrcsnonding to certain fractionsg 
and these frc. ctions are then used as quantitative symbols, the choice 
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made will always be the wheol with the hiChoot m-thomatical probability 
of success, as long as the fractions have either boon recognined correctly 
or been adequately discriminatod in the range necosoary for correct 
solution of the problem. This is caused by the fact that the idon, of 
proportionp so necessary to the r; athomatical conception of probability, 
is implicit in fractionsg which are expressed --o p"rtc of the -wholo 
object. In factq fractions express the ratio of part to whole which 
in required for the calculation of the mathematical probabilityt rather 
than the ratio of part to partý v; hich would have to be turned into an 
expression of part to whole so that the probability of success can be 
calculated. 
Despite this, errors (in the sense of dcvi, --Ltion from the choice 
'which has the highest mathematical probability of success) are possible 
when fractions are used as quantitative symbols together with the model 2 
stratogy9 because there is no method available in the situation used 
for calculating these fractions preciselyg they must simnly be recognised. 
The level of discrimination nceeded to get a 'correct' solution by this 
method varies from problem to problem. in problems R6 and R7 it in 
necessary to spot the difference between and or -ý and and to 
know in each case which is larger. In the main experimental problems, 
J 1-- 2.1 Rl-R5P it is only necessary to know the relationships between 9,, 9 and 1ý S, 1J 
but the point is that the source of error now lies in the quantification 
method itself rather than the, way the quantified information is used. 
This property of fractional quantitative symbolov that they 
encapsulate the relation of part to wholog may be one reason why the 
model 3 strategy is not found so often in the roulette experiment as 
in the beads experiments9 since anyone with some understanding of 
fractions will see that it has been superseded. Another possible reason 
concerns the fact that the model 3 strategy requires the comparison of 
two pairs of quantitative symbols, followed by a comparison of the 
results of these comparisons. The size analogue symbols arising from 
area eiýtimation will often lack the precision necessary for this to 
be possible, except in cases where the comparisons are of a gross order. 
The point at which a particular child will simply produce nonsense from 
attempting to use the model 3 strategy will obviously depend on the 
point to which he has managed to refine his use of estimation of areas. 
A similar point can be made concerning the use of the model 3 strategy 
with quantitative symbols arrived at by recognisini; fractions. 
A further complication caused by the depth of relationship implicit 
in fractions is that this leads to subjectO verbal reports being less 
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informative than in the beads experiments* When a subject Civec a 
justification for a choice involving the model. 2 strategy with fractions 
as quantitative symbols he may understand quite a lot about the relevance 
of the relation of part to whole in this kind of situation, or he may 
understand very little* He may take for granted the experiment's under- 
standing of the implications of the fractions, or lie may not understand 
them hifaself. Without introducing extra and probably non-standardiced 
questioning into the experiment it in almost impossible to tell which 
is the case. Studies of the way in which children solve problems 
involving proportionality have been reported by Lunzer and Pumfrey (1966) 
and Pumfrey (1968), but it would be unwise to make inferences from these 
to the present situation. 
As well as the variety of methods of quantification which can be 
seen in the results of the roulette experiment, the results of the 
categorisation of each nubject's responses into four types also reveals 
a more heterogeneous result than the beads experiments. In the main 
part of the beads experiments several subjects gave only responses 
corresponding to stage 11 stage 29 or stage 39 and the other subjects 
only displayed mixtures of adjacent stages (ignoring unclassifiable 
answers). In the roulette experiment 26 subjects gave all type 1 
responses2 but only 1 subject gave all type 29 and 1 subject all type 3- 
Furthermore, if a developmental trend from responses of type 1 to responses 
of type 2 to type 3 to type 4 is assumed, many of the subjects' profiles 
show mixtures of more than just adjacent response stages. There are cases 
of mixture of type 1 and type 3, of type lf type 21 and type 3, of type 29 
3, and 47 of type 19 2f and 41 and in one case of type 19 2y 3, and 42 as 
well as the adjacent mixtures of types 1 and 21 and types 2 and 3. In 
other wordog the only 'pure' stage which seems to exist corresponds to 
the type lcresponsesý and since type 1 is more of a ragbaf; of irrelevant 
strategies than a unified category this isn't a very promisine start. 
There is some evidence supporting a stage interpretation of the 
results of the roulette experiment in the graph of these results. 
This shows that around 8 or 9 years of age the type 2 responses take 
over as the dominant type of response from the typo 1 responses. The 
use-of model 3 (type 3 responses) increases týroughout the age range 
sampled (up to 11 years old), but never takes over from model 2 (type 
2 responses) in the way that it does in the beads experiment. The 
number of type 4 responses alto increases throughout the age range, 
but can hardly be said to be important. 
One noticeable feature of the result of the roulette experiment is 
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that the slopes of the curves contained in the graph of thoce results 
are less steep than the slopes in the corresponding graph of the 
results of the fýrst beads experiment. This is perhaps significant 
as the roulette results forrp the sort of pattern that might be expected 
from a version of what Flavell (1971) calla the 'gradual development 
model'. The results of the first beads experiment correspond to a 
version o, f Flavoll's (1971) developmental model lb (see fign- 5,8pg)p 
in which each stage is exhibited in a pure form for a time followed 
by a period of transition involving stage mixture of the stages preceding 
and following this transition. Dy using the criterion of stage mixture 
adapted from Turiel (1969), it is apparent that the results of the 
roulette experiment show the more gTadual ctage development of Flavell's 
(1971) model lc (see fics- 5t 8). A version of this model which has 
been modified in the same manner as the model adapted from Flavell 
(1971) 
for the interpretation of the results of the beads experiments is shown 
in figure 11. 
Cluster analysis of the results of the roulette expieriment. 
In order to obtain an independent check on the validity of the 
interpretation of the results of the roulette experiment put forward the 
Brimer cluster analysis was again employed* The analysis was applied to 
two sets of results: 
Analysis A; the results from problems R2 - R5 only. This analysiý_ Was 
performed to facilitate comparison of the results of 
the roulette and beads experiments. 
Analysis B; the results from all the experimental p=, o1bld=j R1 - R5- 
This analysis was--performed in order to make an appraisal 
of the ovetall result of the roulette experiment in 
its own right., 
The underlying'theory tand Ceneral method employed in the Brimer 
analysis have already been dcscribedý so the comments made here will 
be restricted to the details necessary to an understanding of the way 
in which it was carried out in this instance. 
The first step in the analysis is the cateC; orication of all the 
responses obtained to the different items used in the experiment into 
categories consisting of indistinguishable responses to the came item. 
The mott convenient way of describing this categorisation is to beggin 
by outlining all the categories found for one itamt and then adding any 
further categories required for other items to this list. As problems 
R21 R39 and R4 require a rather different categorication scheme to 
problems R5 and R19 and as R1 is only used in one of the two analyscs, 
the first item to be considered will be the part of problem R2 where 
Aid 
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red is the target colour. 
Problem R2 involves a large whcol which is divided into a red 
segment covering one third aanO a u-reen soCmont covering two thirds 
of its surface, and a small wheel which is h,, rL1.1L rcd ,, nJ hal. C -, reon (thir, 
situation will be represented by the convention ý, RL v -. -ns). 11hon 
red is the target colour a pass choice is defineO, as choicr, of the 
smaller wheel and a fail choice is choice of the large o r wh el 
(j? RL). The following response categories could be distineuishad on 
this item: 
FU: A 'fail' choice without any reason givong or an unqu;, ýified 
assertion as to the correctness of the choicog or repetition 
of the experiment's instruction. 
e. g. SR6: chooses -, F-RL. 'Don't know whyl. 
PU: A Ipassl choice accompanied by a reason like tho reacons 
specified for FU. 
e. g. SR23; chooties-1-M. 'I don't know why'. 
SR43: choooes-, "M. 'You can got to it better'. 
FSR: A 'fail' choice accompanied by a 'spurious' reasong such as 
the size of the wheel chosen, or the speed --t which the 
pointer can rotate. 
e. d. SR4: chooses -ýRL. 'It's biggest'. 
PSR: A 'Pass' choice with a reason like FSH. 
e. g. SR8: chooses -ý-, RS. 'Itts the littlest'. 
SR1: chooses -_--RS. 'It'll go much faster'. 
These examples seem at first sight to belong to two categoriesq 
namely choices of the small wheell and assertions that one wheel is 
faster than the other. However2 inspection of all the results of this 
type shows that they cannot be reliably separated-in this way, because 
many of the answers are like this: 
SR19: chooses -, ',. -RS- 'It's small. It'll go slowl. 
i. e. many children seem to equate the small size wheel with slow 
speed of rotation of the pointer. 
As the answers cannot be reliably separated into further categories 
they are left together. 
FFR: Alfaillchoice with a reason based on previous outcomes or 
previous choices, e. g. left-right alternationt large-small 
alternation, win-stay lose-shift strategy. 
COCO SR11: chooses ; 6-RL. 'I haven't tried it. ' 
PPR: A tpass' choice with a reason like FPR. 
066* SR7: chooses -jRS. 'I got green before'. 
SR15: chooses , TRS. 
'I haven't tried it'. 
1 1n 
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FRF: Alfaill choice accompanied by reference to come relevant 
factorp without any olear reason for introducine it. 
e. (;. SR22: choosea -ýýRL. 'The otherIc a half, this ic not like 
a half I. 
SR28: chooses -: 3ýRL. 'It's a triangle shape, that is a 
rectangle. ' 
PRF: Alpass' choice with 
e. g. SR14: chooses-IM. 
PQS: A 'pass' choice acc 
fadtors. 
e. g. SR12: chooses 
a reason 1 
'It's got 
ompanied by 
tIt's the 
ike FRF. 
a half'. 
quantil7ication of spurious A. 
same amount of lines on 
the bits' . 
FQTE: A 'fail' choice with a reason based on a comparison of the 
sizes of the target segnento on each wheel. 
e., -. SR36: chooses JRL. 'The red's got a larger space than the 
other onelo 
PQ. TW: A 'fail' choice with a reason based on comparison of the 
widths of the target segments on each wheel. 
C. go SR50: chooses -ýO-RL. 'It's wider than the other red bit'. 
PQTE: A 'pass' choice with a reason based on a comparison of the 
sizes of the target soM,, cnts on each wheclo 
coos SR40: chooses -ýfRS. 'It's got a bigger bit than th, ', 'A one 
of red'. 
PQTP: A 'pass' choice with a reason based on a comparison of the 
fraction of each whool covered by the target so, -mcnt. The 
fractions will not necessarily be recognised accuratelyo 
e. g. SR69: chooses 'Red's half of this circleq the other 
red one isn'tO, 
PQNTE: A 'pass' choice with a reason based on a comparison of the 
sizes of the non-target segments on each wheel, and choice 
of the wheel with the smaller non-target segmcnt- 
e-G- SR45: chooses 'There's too much green on the other one. 
More than on this one'. 
PQNTF: A 'pass' choice with a reason based on a comparison of the 
fraction of each wheel covered by the non-target segment, 
and choice of the wheel with the smaller fraction of non- 
target segment. 
cog* SH71: chooses -; "-, RS. 'Half kcre. The other has more against 
it'. 
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POE: Alpass' choice with a reason based on a comparison .. I 
: ýdf the sizes of the tarCet and non-target segments on 
each whoel. 
e. g. SR24: chooses -_'ý-RS- 'Same amount of red and Cýrecr.. P. 1orc 
chance. The other has a stmaller sDaco of red 1, han creen. t 
Pw: A 'pass' choice with a reason based on a comDarison of the 
fraction of each wheel covered by the tarCot and non-target 
segments. The fractions are not necessarily recoL-, nisca 
accurately. 
0.61 SR60: chooses -'-; -RS. 'Halves. ', let an even chnnce with green. 
Green has more space than red on the o-ther'. 
POOB: A Inass' choice with a rea. -Jon based on a comparicon of the 
relative sizes of the target and non-target segments on the 
wheel not chosen. 
e. g. SR44: chooses -; 'ýRS. 'That other one might rfet green and not 
red. More -reen on it than red. ' 
This comrletes the list of categories necessary to classify the 
responses obtained to the section of problem R2 involvinZ red as the 
target colour. Many of the results to the section of R2 involving 
u -rcen as the target colour fall into the same categoriesq but the 
following additional categories are necessary: 
FQTF: A 'fail' choice (choice of ý-RS) with a reason based on a 
comparison of the fraction of each wheel covered by the 
target colour. The fractions are not necessarily recognised 
accurately. 
e6ge BR51: chooses-. 1-RS. 'It's got half green. The other green 
isn't half'. 
PQýW, L: A 'Pass' choice (choice of -ýRL) accompanied by a reason based 
on comparison of the numbers of lines on the target -and non- 
tar, get segmentsq without overt counting. 
e. g- SR47: chooaesýJ-RL. 'There's more green than red lines. That 
one is the same red and green lines'. 
PQRO: A 'pass' choice accompanied by comparison of the amount of 
target and non-target colour on the wheel chosen only. No 
reference is made to the other wheel. 
This category is the only one in the analysis which is not defined 
in isolation since it was decided that if a subject produces a number 
of PC4RO and P= answers, and none which might be FZZO, his PQRO answers 
will be considered as POE. This was done because the answer seem like 
either a lazy way of giving a PQRE justification, or a post hoc reason 
to support a guessý and it was felt important to keep these two possibilities 
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apart. This is strictly not allowed by the analysis, but the choice 
is between tampering with this one category or deliberately allowing 
a possible source of artifact into the statistical analysis. 
e. g. SR12: chooses S'RL. 'That's smaller (points to the red 
segment) and that's bigger' (points to the green seCment). 
This completes the list of categories necessary for problem R2. 
The same categorisation scheme was found to cover problems R3 and R4 
adequatelyt but modifications are necessary for pboblem R5- In problem 
R5 the large wheel is half covered by the red segment and half covered 
by the green segmentt the small wheel is likewise half red and half 
green. This means that in both parts of the problem a pass responso is 
defined as an assertion that it doesn't matter which wheel is chosen, 
and any preference for one wheel or the other would be regarded as 
a fail. The simplest way to accomodate the categorisation scheme used 
so far to the results of problem R5 is to add the suffixes B and Sy 
representing choice of the large or small viheelg to the fail categories. 
Category FU would then become FUB or FUS, depending on which choice was 
accompanied by the FU reason. After the categorisation scheme has been 
modified in this way only two other categories are necessary to cope 
with R5. These will be described for the case where red is the target 
colour: 
FQSB: Alfaill choice of the larger wheel with a reason involving 
quantification of spurious factors. 
e. g. BR28: chooses -LRL. lItts got eleven linesq that has 
seven on the circle'. (Trying to count the number of 
shading lines on each circle). 
PQ, RV. - A 'pass' choice accompani6dclby a reason to the effect that 
the circles 'look the same'. 
e. 1;. SR70: 'Both the same. They look the same'. Chooses--ýRS- 
BR66: chooses -ýRS- 'I might be lucky. They're both 
the same except for the size. Lines in the same place. ' 
These two examples are not identicalg because the second one is 
more explicit about what is meant than the first one. In the initial 
analysis the first example would be scored as type 21 whereas the second 
would be type 4. Howeverg such a distinction rests heavily on the 
experimenter's interpretation of what the subject meant by what he said, 
and cannot be allowed into the Brimer analysis, where any distinctions 
made muzt be based on clear and firm criteria. As there are various 
gradations of explicitness between the answers brought together in 
this category no further reliable separation can be made and the category 
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has not boon broken up into smaller categories. 
This completes the specification of the categories involved in 
the first of the cluster analyses of the roulette experiment rosultsý 
analysis A, which involves problems R2 - 115 only. The., -second cluster 
analysis, analysis B, uses the results of all -the main problems in 
the roulette experimentg R1 - R5- In problem RI the red segment 
covers one third and the green segment two-thirds of each wheel. A 
pass response is thus an assertion that either wheel may be choseng 
and preference for one of the wheels is regarded as a fail. This 
situation can be dealt with to a large extent by using the same response 
categories as those apecified for problem R5, but the following 
additional categories are necessary for the part of problem R1 
involving green atr the target colour: 
FOOB: A Ofaillchoice of the large wheel with a reason indicating 
comparison of the amount of target and non-target colour on 
the wheel chosen only. No reference is made to the other 
IM wheel. e. a. SR44: chooses ; 13--RL. 1he green's bigger than 
the real. 
FOOS: A 'fail' choice of the amall wheel with a reason like that 
outlined for FQROB. 
Cog* SR54: chooses -, ýSRS. 'It's got more Green than the red bit'. 
POIZ: A 'fail' choice of the small wheel with a reason indicating 
an attempt to compare the relative amount of target and 
non-target colour on each wheel. 
cog* SR69: chooses ýRS. 'It's bigger than the red. The red 
in the big circle's too big for the green bit'. 
With the addition of these categories the results to the part of 
problem R1 which has red as the target colour can also be incorporated 
into the schomeg and the description of the categories necessary for 
the Brimer analysis is complete. 
Having completed the description of the categorisation scheme2 
there are certain aspects of it which must be clarified. The scheme 
is intended mainly as an aid to the reader, to show him the wide 
variety of answers produced in the experiment and to provide a way of 
making sense of the bewildering number, of categories required. Because 
of this it is entirely post hoc. The way the categori,, -, s were nroduced 
was simply by Grouping together indistinCuishablo responses to the same 
experimental itemg and the labels were applied to the categories after 
this had been done. This is more satisfying than fitting the results L., 
to a predetermined schemeg no matter how elaborate that scheme mi, -ýht 
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be. Defining the categories ohly after they have bccn formed inutead 
of starting with the category defiriitiono lead. s to come imnortant 
differences between the clucter and lnterT)retativo aaalYZ401which 
have already been pointed out. 1.1hat happens is that certain distinctions 
which can be made on a prior: Crounds turn out to be unworkable in the 
Brimer analysis because an--wers which may appear quite different are 
so intermixed in the results that they canrot be reliably separated. 
The complete categorisation of the results of the roulette experiment 
can be found in Appendix F. Whon every category produced in response 
to each item of the experiment is azoi. -ned a separate number 'Uherc are 
116 categories for"414he analy,,, I's of R2-R5FO- 148 categories for the 
analysis of R1 - R5. There are 72 subjects, so -the data for the first 
analysis are within the capacity of the proGram, used2 but in the 
second analysis the number of categories must be reduced to 140 by 
the inclusion of 8 cateeories in other catcCoric, s. This vias effected 
by eliminating small categories which seemed very similar to othcr 
cateCories in the following manner: 
Problem Rl, red target: FQ. TW (2 instances) is included in FCO-E. 
Problem R2, red target: FQTW (1 instance) is included in FO. T-1-4 
PQS (1 instance) is included in PSR. 
POOE (2 instances) is included in PQRO. 
Problem R2, green target: PQREL (1 instance) is included in PQRE. 
PQRO (1 instance) is included in PQTWI. 
Problem R3, red target: PQRO (1 instance) is included in PQJU. 
Problem R3, gTocn target: PQRO (1 instance) is included in PQ. Rý- 
Thuc7 in the second analysis) the separation of PQRO and PQREI 
which is of questionable validity as has already been pointed outq 
is abandoned. The results of the, cluster analyses will now be presented 
in the same way as the. results of the bead analyses were presentedg 
starting with analysis A. The category numbering scheme and the list$ 
of category numbers for each subjectq which constitutes the data for 
the cluster analysis program) is included in Appendix F. 
Analysis A used data from problems R2 - R5 onlyq and generated 
the following first-order groups of subjects: 
Group 1: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by 
choosing the wheel with the larger sized segment of the 
target colour. The pqTE and FQTE categories correspond 
to this method. The group has 23 members. 
Group 2: A group of subjects who choose erratically and give reasons 
for their choices which are spurious or irrelevant by adult 
standards. The group hL. s 15 members. 
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Group 3: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems success- 
fully by comparing the relative sizes of the target and non- 
target segments on each wheel, especially in resnonse to 
, Problem R3. The group has 16 members. 
Group 4: A similar Croup to Croup 2. 
Group 2 (15 members) and group 4 (13 members) have 12 
members in common. 
Group 5: A similar group to group 2 and group 4. 
Group 2 (15 members) and Croup 5 (12 members) have 10 
members in common. 
Group 4 (13 members) and Croup 5 have 12 members in common. 
Group 6: A similar group to group 19 but group 1 is made up of PQTE 
and FQTE categoriesý whereas group 6 is biased toward Fq2E, 
especially in response to problem R5- 
Group 1 (23 members) and group 6 (16 members) have 14 
members in common. 
Group 7: This group covers a wider range of responses than most of the 
other groups, and it is difficult to see a unifying thread 
running all the way through it. The first nine members of the 
group all give answers of the PQRV (%hey look the same') type 
to problem R5. The remaining five members all give a lot of 
PQýIB responses2 making them like group 39 as do some of the 
first nine members. The group thus has certain similarities 
to group 3. 
Group 3 (16 members) and Croup 7 (14 members) have 9 members 
in common. 
Group 8: All the subjects in this group often solve the problems 
successfully by comparing the fraction of the surface of 
each wheel covered by the target colour. The fractions 
appear to be recognised rather than calculated. The group 
has 9 members. 
Group 9: A group of,,, subjects who make mainly fail choices accompanied 
by reasons based on previous choices or outcomes, and 
sometimes make pass choices with similar reasons. The group 
has 6 members. 
Group 10: A group of subjects who make erratic choices and don't give 
any reasons for their choices other than repetitions of 
the experimental instructions or unqualified assertions as 
to their correctness. The group has 5 members. 
Group 11: A group of subjects who make mainly pass choices accompanied 
: reason based on p? ý, ýyi, ous outcomes7 and sometimes make 
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fall choices with similar reasons. The gyroup h%s 7 members. 
Group 12: A similar Croup to group lt but group. I is made up of PQPS 
and FQTE categoriecý whereas group 12 is biased toward PQ2E, 
especially in response to problems R2 gracnq R39 and R4 red. 
Group 1 (23 members) and Croup 12 (22 members) have 18 
members in common. 
Group 13: An almost identical group to group 3. 
Group 3 (16 members) and group 13 (16 members) have 15 
members in common. 
Group 14: Almost identical to group 129 and similar to group 1 in 
the same way as group 12 is. 
Group 1 (23 members) and group 14 (20 members) have 16 
members in common. 
Group 12 (22 members) and Zroup 14 have 19 membera in common. 
Group 15: A group in which the members all give some answers involving 
a pass choice with comparison of the sizes of the target 
segments on each wheel, together with fail choices of this 
typei pass choices involving comparison of the fraction of each 
wheel covered by the target sagmentg or pass choices involving 
comparison of the relative sizes of the target and non-tareet 
segments on each wheel. The group has some similarities to 
group 19 group 12, and group 14. , 
Group 1 (23 members) and group 15 (19 members) have 16 
members in common. 
Group 12 (22 members) and group 15 have 16 members in common. 
Group 14 (20 members) and group 15 have 13 members in common. 
Group 16: A group of subjects who often seem to produce pass choices by 
comparing the sizes of the target segments on each wheelq 
especially in response to the part of problem R4 in which red 
is the target colour. The group has similarities to group 11 
group 129 croup 14, and group 15- 
Group 1 (23 members) and group 14 (23 members) have 15 
members in common. 
Group 12 (22'mernberES) and Croup 16 have 20 members in common, 
Group 14 (20 members) and group 16 hive 17 members in common. 
Group 15 (19 members) and group 16 have 13 members in common. 
Group 17: A Croup of subjects who make mainly fail choices accompanied 
by reasons which seem spurious or irrelevant by adult standards. 
The group. has certain similarities to group 21 grouD 49 and 
group 5- 
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Group 2 (15 members) and group 17 (18 members) have 1. ) 
members in common. 
Group 4 (13 members) rýnd group 17 h, --vc 10 members in comi,. on- 
Group 5 (12 members) and gToup 17 have 8 members in common. 
Group 18: A group of subjects who often meem to produce pass responses 
by comparing the sizes of the target serr , ments on each wheel, 
especially in response to the part of problem R2 involving 
green as the target colour. The group has similarities to 
group 19 L-roup 12, group 14, -, roup 11-9 , -. nd group 16. 
Group 1 (23 members) and group 18 (23 members) have 21 
members in common. 
Group 12 (22 members) and Group 18 have 17 members in common. 
Group 14 (20 members)and group 18 have 16 members in common. 
Group 15 (19 members) and group 18 have 15 members in common. 
Group 16 (23 members) ana group 18 have 15 members in common. 
Group 19: A heterogeneous group, of subjects who sometimes make choices 
without giving justifications7especially in response to the 
part of problem R2 involving green as the target colourp but 
often also give n:! ýss choices with reasons based on previous 
outcomes or comparisons of the sizes of the target scginents 
on each wheel. The group seems to represent a transition 
period between the erratic choices of stage 1 and the more 
systematic model 2 strategy. It has 6 memberer. 
Group 20: Thim group seems to consist of subjects who make fail choices, 
with a mixture of irrelevant reasons and inexplicit reasons 
referring to relevant factors. The group has 5 members. 
These groups seem to correspond to the stages outlined in the 
initial 'interpretative' analysis of the results of the roulette 
experiment. The various response styles associated with the stage 1 
types of response appear in different groups9 there are several groups 
corresponding to the stage 2 strategy, and a few Groups indicating the 
model*3 strategy. This fits the gcner,,,, _l observation made 
that there 
seems to be a retardation of ne roulette results by con-paris, on urith t1le 
beads results, leadinG to an increase in the numlicr of stc-Cc 1 ,,. nC1, -Tcrs 
-nO a decrease in -the model 3) strata, --, r. "Phe -rouns also cl,. o -r tr 
heterogeneity of cateGorics than the L-, roapo 
founE in the beaOls ýý: -ý, Ayoessj 
which accords with the view that the slower developmental trend foun, '. 
in this situation leads t6'a greater degree of stage mixture. The 
analysis also separates the two principal quantification methods of 
size estimation and fraction recognition. 
----fl --- 
-- -- 
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On the basic of this interpretation the following clusterc-of-groups 
might be anticipated: 
Cluster A: A cluster of a group of subjects who choose erratically 
without justifying their choices (group 10)9 and Groups 
of subjects who make erratic choices based on previous 
outcomes (group 9'and Group 11), with a linking croup of 
subjects exhibiting both forms of response (group 19). 
This cluster will consist of Group 9, Group 109 Croup 11, 
and Group 19. 
Cluster B: A cluster of groups'of subjects who make erratic choices 
and Give irrelevant reasons (group 2ý croup 49 croup 59 
Croup 17)t or who make erratic choices and give a mixture 
of irrelevant and relevant but inexplicit reasons (group 20). 
This cluster will consist of group 2, group 49 group 51 
Croup 17y and Group 20., 
Cluster C: A cluster of Groups of subjects who consistently choose the 
wheel with the 1mrger sized target segment (Group 19 group 69 
group 12, group 14t Group 169 group 18), a group of subjects 
who consistently choose the wheel with the larger looking 
fraction of target colour on its surface (group 8), a 
transition group of subjects mixing this strategy with a 
more advanced strategy (group 15)9 and a transition group of 
subjects mixing this strategy with less advanced methods of 
responding (group 19). This. cluster will consist of group 19 
group 69 Croup 8, group 12, group 149 group 159 group lb, 
group 18p and group 19. 
Cluster D: A cluster of groups of subjects who consistently compare the 
relative sizes of the target and non-target segments on each 
wheel in oder to make a choice (Group 31 group 13)y a group 
of subjects who do this and yet may rely on what things 
tlook' like in problem R5 (croup 7)9 and a group of subjects 
mixing this strategy with a less advanced strategy (Croup 15)- 
This cluster will consist of group 3t group 79 group 13, 
and group 15- 
It can bý seen that of these predicted clustersp A and B correspond 
to stage 1, C is stage 29 and D is a third stage. In each case the 
transitional groups are tidied up by assigning them to the adjacent staceg 
as this was found to be the effect of a statistical association criterion 
in the analyses of the beads experiment results. It might be doubted if 
Cluster D will actually be separated, or if it will remain as part of 
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cluster C, since the model 3 strateay never becomes dominant in the 
experimental resulta. 
The actual clusters generated by the program were as follows: 
First cluster: Group 9 
Group 11 
Group 10 
Group 19 
Second cluster: Group 2 
Group 4 
Group 5 
Group 20 
Group 17 
Third cluster: Group 12 
Group 14 
Group 6 
Group 7 
Group 13 
Group 3 
Group 8 
Group 1 
Group 16 
Group 18 
Group 15 
Group 19 
Fourth cluster: Group 17 
Group 19 
Group 2 
Growo 4 
Fifth cluster: Group 15 
Group 17 
Group 19 
(The groups in eadh cluster are listed in the order printed out by 
the programcorresponding to decreasing order of weiChting to the cluster). 
Thus the first cluster is the predicted cluster A and the second 
Cluster is predicted cluster B. The third cluster combines the predicted 
clusters C and D, quite understandably (see above). This leaves the 
fourth and fifth clusters, whose appearance is quite unexpected. From 
the descriptions given of the first-order groups making up these clusters 
it is not possible to find any reason for what has happened. This 
means that either some kind of artifact is present in the analysis, or 
a way of considering the results has been overlooked. 
Fortunately, the program used for the roulette analysis was more 
advanced than the program used in analysing the beads results, and it 
specified the subjects belonging to each cluster as viell as the rProuPs 
(see Appendix P). By inspectine the categories describing the subjects 
in the fourth and fifth clusters the reason for the nroduction. of these 
clusters can be seen. The fourth cluster consists of a groun of subjects 
who give a variety of different responses to problems R2, R3, and R4, 
ii iff TilE TTi. fl. ffL1 Ir1Thrrr,! Ti 
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but who all tend to make erratic choices with irrelevant reasons on 
problem R5. The fifth cluster consists of a, groun of subjects ran-ed 
around a core of stage 2 res--)onscs based on size estimatest all of whom 
mix ýhese with other types of response. This cluster is thus a cluster 
of subjects drawn from the hypothesised transition -eriocls belween stace 1 LJ 
and stage 2 t-. nOL between stage 2 and stage 3. Inspection of the initial 
cateCorisation of the roulette responses into the stages they represent 
(contained in Appendix E) confirms that most of the transitional subjects 
can be found in the fifth cluster. 
Discussion: What exactly does this result mean? Leaving aside the 
fourth and fifth clusters, the other three clusters show the general 
pattern seen in the cluster analysis carried out on the beads experiment 
results for the primary school children only. The groups of the first 
and second clusters show no overlap vrith each other, whilst the -groups 
in the first cluster overlap with those in the third cluster, and the 
subjects in the second cluster overlap with the subjects in the third 
cluster. This is consistent with a development of -the following type: 
Stage 1A 
Stage 2 
Stage 1B 
In the analysis of the results of the first beads experiment evidence 
for a further development from stage 2 to a stage 3 was adduced by showing 
that one of the clusters contained two distinct but overlapping stages. 
If the same principle is applied to the current analysis the following 
result is obtained: 
Subjects who are only in groups of the third cluster corresponding to 
stage 2: 
SR221 34t 37,39Y 41Y 421 459 48t 521 539 55Y 561 57,64,672 68,69. 
Subjects who are in groups of the third cluster corresponding to 
stage 2 and in groups corresponding to stage 3: 
SR23ý 24,35f 36t 38) 43,461 50s 51t 581 59,66ý 709 719 72. 
Subjects who are only in groups of the third cluster corresponding 
to stage 3: 
SR44Y 47,60. 
In the above list subjects who are also in the groups of the first and 
second clusters (stage 1) have been left outl so that only the possible 
stage 2 to stage 3 development is considered. There is evidently a large 
transitional overlap between stage 2 and stage 3, and it can also be seen 
that stage 3 is only attained by a few of the subjects. It cannot be 
stated unequivocally whether this is idua to the upper ceiling of the age 
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range sampled being too low1or if stage 3 never attains the prominent 
position it occupies in the beads type of situation. However2 it has 
been argued that the inaccuracy of size estimation will limit the 
convenience and. efficacy of the stage 3 strategy, and that the development 
of fradtion recognition as a method of estimation renders it unnecessary. 
The prosenbe of two distinct versions of the stage 1 type of response 
which iras found in the analysis of the beads experiment is repeated here, 
and may be worth following up. At present it looks more like a difference 
in the subjects' response styles. than a difference in the way they cope 
with the problems, but this too is open to dispute. 
The significance of the fourth and fifth clusters is difficult to 
assess. They were not antieipated, but the factors responsible for 
them can be easily seen in the results. The problem io to dcci(le whether 
these factors are important ones which have been overlookcd, or ones which 
are unaerstanEable but of little importance. The fifth cluoter, at least, 
seems to belong to the latter categox"yy but the fourth clu. -Iter may be 
more significah-t. 
The property common to members of the fourth cluster seems to be that 
they make fail choices with irrelevant reasons on problem R5- On -the 
other problems some of the subjects in the cluster also choose erratically 
with various reasons given, but many Go consistently for the wheel with 
the larger sized target segment. In other words, many of the members of 
this cluster give stage 2 performances on problems R2 - R41 and stage 1 
on R5. This seems to imply that problem R5) in which each wheel is 
half red and half greent is more difficult for these subjects than the 
other problems. This is very interestino because the size discriminati6n 
necessary to make the stage 2 type of response is no harder in this than 
the other problems, but the equal proportions of red and green on each 
circle is very striking in this case ( to adults anyway). It may 1,1011 
be that these subjects aremufficiently aware of this property to drop 
the stage 2 st -rategy, but unable to put anything in its place. Put 
simply, the cluster may show that the application of any strategy 
is always based on a prior consideration of its plausibility and in 
problem R5 the stage 2 strategy may look implausible to some subjects* 
If this interpretation is correct it is a useful caution against under- 
estimating what children can do if conditions are favourablet and above 
all against assuming that children following a particular strategy will 
limit their attention to the dimensions of the situation appropriate 
to that strategy. 
Such an interpretation is obviously speculativey and goes a long 
way beyond the facts available at present. For this reason it will be 
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set aside and a description of the results of the second cluster 
analysis, carried out on problems RI - R5, will be given. If the 
fourth and fifth clusters found in the first analysis do not show 
up in the second analysis they can sdfcly be considered artifacts. of' 
some feature of the first analysis. If they do show up then they are 
either more general artifacts or interesting groups which need invest- 
igating. 
Second cluster analysisof the results of the rouletteexperiment. 
The category numbering scheme and the list of category numbers for 
each subject used in the second cluster analysis of the roulette 
experiment results can be found in Appendix F. The result of the 
analysis will not be described in such detail as the result of the 
first analysis since it is to a large extent a repetition of the same 
result. Instead, the points of difference between the two analyses 
will be highlighted, and the clusters will be singled out for particular 
attention. 
The second cluster analysis generated 26 first order groups of 
subjects2 whereas the first cluster analysis produced 20. These first 
order groups are similar to the groups produced by the first cluster 
analysis, the extra groups being accounted for by groups of subjects 
with characteristic ways of answering problems R1 and R5 (which are 
to some extent similar). The exact constitution of many of the first 
order groups in the two analyses varies, but the reasons for the 
groupings appear to be closely comparable. 
The second cluster analysist like the first, produces five clusters 
of groups. The first three of these clusters are very much like the 
first three clusters from the first analysis, as inspection of the 
lists of subjects belonging to each cluster contained in Appendix F 
reveals. The first cluster produced by the second analysis is an 
enlarged version of the first cluster from, the first analysis, in the 
sense that all subjects belongin- to the first cluster from the first 
analysis are also members of the first cluster from the second analysis. 
The second cluster from the second analysis, on the other hand, is a 
condensed version of the second cluster from the first analysis (with the 
exceDtion of one member). The third cluster from the second analysis, 
which has 22 members, has 17 members in common with the third cluster 
from the first analysis, which has 21 members. 
Discussion: The fact that these three clusters are so similar in the 
two analyses indicates that they-correspond to' zome general effect (if 
only a procedural artifact). The minor differences between the two 
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sets of clusters arc bound to occur because the criterion for t)-, cir 
generation is otaticticalf so that with the two overlapping sets of 
d-ata the co-varying categories will be clightly different in each case. 
The fourth and fifth clusters -encrated by the second cluster analysis 
do not have tho same -ne-nbcrs cas the fourth anO fifth clusters from the 
first analysis. Insooction of the response categories produced by its 
members reveals that the fourth cluster from the occon6 analysis is a 
cluster of subjects who choo,: e erratically without givin, - any justification 
in response to problem R19 and the fifth cluster is made up of subjccts 
who choose erratically and give irrelevant reasons in response to problem 
Rl. In both cases the clusters consist solely of subjects who choose 
erraticially on the othcr problems as well) so that they can be seen 
ponding to forms, as corres, 'of-tho btage 1 type' of response. In fact cluster 
is a subCroup of cluster 1 whilst cluster 5s which hLLs 9 members, has 6 
of these in cornmon with cluster 2, which has 17 mc%ibers. The production 
of these clusters thus contributes little to our understandinZ of the 
result of the experiment. 
"'he Brimer techni(lue can lead to highly redundant and sometimes 
Spurious cluster formation (Satterly and Brimer7 1971)7 so that the 
fact that the fourth and fifth clusters from the first analysis are 
not repeated in the second analysis indicates that they are not of 
general significance and strengthens the view that the three clusters 
coin. -mon to both analyses encapsuLate the important dimensions of the 
responses. This is supported by the fact that the fourth and fifth 
clusters of the second analytis7 which did not occur in the first 
analysis7 are closely related to the first and second clusters 
generated in both -analyses. 
Summary off the result of the roulette ex2eriment. 
An attempt will now be maAa to summarise the conclusions which can 
be drawn from". 1he result of the roulette experiment. The main aim, of 
the experimcnt was to find out if the developmental model derived from 
the beads experiments was applicable to a different but related situation. 
In general, this'appcars to bb-the care. The results of the roulette 
experiment show a development from a first staac to a second sta-c which 
are closely comparable to the stages found in the beads experimenty even 
to the extent that the same two versions of the first stage are found. 
However, the stages observed in the roulette results seem to lag behind 
those found in the beads results by a few ycars7 and the development 
to a third stage is not so noticeable in the roulette results. The 
greater degree of stage mixture observed in the roulette results than 
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the beads results supports this more Cradual developmental moacl. 
A sccon0_ aim of the experiment was to test the more general theoretical 
model which was developed from the results of the beads experiments. 
This test was made in an informal way by seeina how well the model would 
fit the repults obtained. Obviously this is not as satisfying as the 
established method of making predictionsg but the case with which the 
model can account for the results is very convincing. 
In terms of this mod-el the results of the roulette and beads experiments 
can be seen as products of the same strategies for producing aolut16nnj, 
with a retardation in the roulette performances caused by the later 
development of reliable methods of estimation (Q. ) than reliable counting 
(Q 
0 
). The lack Of reliability of size estimationg and above all the 
lack of prepision inherent in its size analoCue symbolaq can also be used 
to explain the fact that the third developmental stage is not as prominent 
in the results of the roulette experiment as in the results of the beads 
experiments. The development of recognition of fractions as a means of 
estimation in this type of situation may also be responsible for the 
partial eclipse of the third stageg as it provides a quantitative symbol 
which) if used in conjunction with the second stage strategy9 will lead to 
solutions whose validity is limited only by the accuracy with which the 
different fractions can be recognized and ordered. This viewq howeverg 
is dependent on the validity of the proposed template-matching model 
of fraction recognitiont and would have to be modified if either of the 
iterative models proved to be correct. 
It is perhaDZ also worth mentioning that throughout the analysis 
two overlapping sets of data were considered. These were the results 
from all the main experimental problems involved in the roulette experimcntý 
RI - R5, and the results from a subset of four of the five main problems, 
R2 - R59 which it was considered would be more directly comparable with 
the results of the beads experiments. In fact, little difference was 
found between these two: sets of results9 especially in the initial 
'interpretative' analysis. In the two Brimer analyses slight variations 
were foundq particularly in the second stage of the analysis which led 
to the generation of the clustersý and the availability of the two 
analyses allowed the common features to be emphasized over those features 
which seemed to be more closely linked to only one analysis. 
13ý. 
Some Possible criticisms and retorts. 
These conclusions are open to some of the same lines of attack 
as the conclusions derived from the beads experiments. The possibility 
Of Contamination of the results by artifacts arising from the reinforcing 
effect of succe ssful gambles has again been overruled, on much the 
same grounds as it was ignored in the beads recults9 namely that this 
1--iri only, lik6ly, -ýo ý6ý influencing the stage 1 subjects who don't seen, 
to have adequate reasons for'their choices. 
It is possible to argue that the cause of the difference found betwoenthe 
redults., of the -roiAdtte and: beads experiments rda: f hot li-e in, the. Týeasonp sugGested. 
but may be due to the problems used in the roulette experiment being 
harder than those used in the beads experiment. For this argument 'harder' 
would have to mean something like 'more complicated', since the fact 
that the problems present more difficulty to children than the beads 
problems is not disputed. However, care was taken in the design of 
the experiment to ensure that only simple proportions of red and green 
were used in each problem, and in fact the roulette problems often 
involve simpler proportions than those used in the beads problems, so 
that this criticism cannot apply in any important sense. 
One way in which the roulette and beads experiments did vary which 
might be responsible for the retardation is in manipulation of the 
experimental materials by the subject. In both experiments the subject 
made the Cambles'himself, but in the beads experiment he also set ur the 
situation by putting the beads in the boxes. This may have served to 
draw attention to relevant aspects of the situation, but it is unlikely 
that this could account for the whole of the difference between the 
experiments, particularly in view of the ages of the subjects used. 
However2 for the moment it cannot be entirely discounted. Offset against 
the greater degree of manipulation of materials in the beads experiment 
must be the fact that throughout the roulette experiment the relevant 
dimensions of the problem situation are clearly visibleý whereas in the 
bea6s experiment only a representation of what is inside the boxes is 
used. 
The use of verbal data is another feature of this type of experiment 
which is often criticised. It has been argued that this is legitimate 
if certain conditions are metq such as that the possible choices are 
arranged to disambiguate the reasons given in cases where this may be 
necessary. In the beads experiment this could be achieved without 
much difficultyq but the inaccuracy of estimation and the number of ways 
in which it can be applied severcly lijjits the possibility of doing this C--) 
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in the roulette oncrimont. Thin means that the case for analysing 
verbal data from this experiment rests pnrtly on the succoss of this 
method in the beads situation, anJ the high consistency that 11M, s then 
observed between the choices made and the reasons given by subjects. 
It is possible that the result of the roulette experiment might 
not indicate a retardation in the subjects' performance as compared 
with the beads experiment, but merely increased difficulty experienced 
by the subjects in explaining how they made their choices. If this 
were the case it would be expected that if an analysis was made solely 
in terms of Mother the choices made were of the collection mathematically 
most likely to succeed or the collection less likely to succeed, then 
the roulette and beads experiment results would appear the same. Such 
a comparison can be made quite easily, since all the choices have been 
divided into pass or fail choices for the Brimer analysis (a Pass is 
a choice of the gamble Mich is mathematically most li%cly to succccE, 
or an assertion that either can be chosen Men both posAbilities arc 
equally likely to lcad to successo any other choice is a fail). By 
using the puss and fail cat6gorisations of subjects' choices in the 
main problems of the first beads experiment, and problems R2 - R5 of 
the roulette experiment (the problems which are most directly comparable 
to those of the first beads experiment), a comparison of the number of 
poss scores for each of the age groups used in the two experiments can 
be made. This is figure 12. 
Figure 12 shows that the performance of subjects on the roulette 
tasks is retarded by comparison with performance on the beads tasks 
in terms of 'corrent' choices as well as sophisticated reasons. The 
shape of the two curves is similar, and a median test shows that for 
the six to ton year old group the median of the roulette experiment 
scores is significantly lower than the median of the first beads 
experiment scores ( see aDpendix J). This means that the difference 
between the two experiments cannot beisolely attributable to any 
greater difficulty experienced by the subjects in talking about the 
reasons for their choices in the roulette experiment. 
Unfortunately this conclusion cannot be accepted without qualifi- 
cation as there is a feature of the roulette experimental pr6ccdurc 
which will introduce an artifact into the pass-fail analysis. The 
procedure, as has already been mentionedy was not systematically 
randomiscd9 but the order of problems, left or right position of large 
and small wheels, and orientation of target segments on the wheels 
was varied haphazardly by shuffling the experimental cards. Howevcrg 
the order of presentation of target colours on each problem was red 
I PIN 
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first, then grocný throughout the experiment. Tho advantage of dDin,, ý 
this is that it makes it much eacicr to score the rosultC of the 
experiment if the problem partc are ko-A in the s'-v""C order. The 
disadvantage is that some of the younýýor subjects tend to alternate 
their choices between the lorge and small whoolng choosin- the 1. rgo 
one first, then the small one. The combination of alternation of 
choices with the alternation of target colours will determine the pasc 
and fail scores of any subjects doing this. It is i%, orth criphasioing 
that only the stage 1 choices can be affected in this wayp an st. age 2 
and stage 3 subjects do not alternate. Neverthelcoct the tendency forma 
a possible source of artifact in the pass scores of the yoimgcr subjects. 
The direction of this artifact will be as follows: 
Problem R2: tends to decrease nass rate 
Probelm R3: tends to docreaso pass rate 
Problem R4: tends to increase pass rate. 
Problem R5: no effect. 
In the cases wherdsubjects tend to choose small firsty then largeg 
rather than large first, then smallg this direction willg of coursoý be 
reversed. Hence the contribution of the artifact to the results will 
be dependent on how much the tendency to choose large then small dominates 
the opposing tendency to choose small then largo. Inspection of the 
results gives the impression that thin dominance is only slightý if it 
exists at all. However, the possibility of contamination existat and 
the results of the analysis of pass and fail choices mu5t be treated with 
consequent reserve. 
Other research of interest in relation to the roulette experiment. 
Before considering the next steps to be taken in the investigation, 
an attempt will be made to incorporate the results of the roulette 
experiment into the framework of other research. There are three 
main types of research which might be relevant in this respect. These 
are, 
(a) Studies of probability - learning by children. 
(b) Studies of children's estimates of quantities and proportions. 
(c) Studies of children's performance in similar exporiments to 
the roulette experiment. 
The probability learning studies have not been mentioned until now. 
The situations they use are similar to the situations used in the 
experiments reported here inasmuch as subjects are offered bhoices 
which have different probabilities of leading to successful outcomes. 
In the probability learning experimcnt, howeverg the information requirea 
to calculate his chances of success is not made available to the subject 
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on any one trialy but over a series of trials. Thic makes it difficult 
to pick out what is 'really' happening in a probability learning 
experiment. As Stevenson (1970) points out, 
'The apparent simplicity of the probability learning task 
is deceptive ...... Since no solution yields consistent reinforcementy 
ýSs are required to function as prediction-makers to a greater 
degree than in other learning problems'. (Op-cit-9 P-893). 
Because of these difficultiesq probability learning experiments 
have not yet been considered. However, there iv one feature of the 
behaviour of subjects in such experiments which is similar to something 
noticed in the roulette experimentt namely that many subjects tend to 
alternate their choices. 
This effect has been investigated by Weir (1964). Weir had 
consolidated data from a number of studies of probability learning 
involving three-choice problems to demonstrate that terminal levels 
of response, when plotted against age, give a U-shaped curve. The 
same effect was found wit4 two-choice problems by Dorks and Paclisanu 
(1967)- One of the factors contributing to this effect was found by 
Weir to be the tendency of some subjects to follow a LDIR (left, midd-109 
right) or R14L spatial pattern of responses. A plot of this tendency 
against age gave an inverted U-shaped functionp with children aged 
seven to ten employing these patterns with a high frequency. 
Sullivan and Ross (1970) have argued that this claim in oversimplifiedg 
on the grounds that many subjects use more than one alternation pattern. 
Nevertheless, the inverted-U relation seems to provide an interesting 
comparison with the alternations observed between some of the stage 1 
responses in the roulette experiment. As in the probability learning 
experimentsp these alternations tend to disappoar as the children 
progress to other strategies, but they reappear in a much more sophisti- 
cated form later on. Most adultsý for example, accept that the SaTIC 
collection cannot possibly be 'beat' for both red and green. Paradox- 
ically7 the stage 1 children pursuing alternation strategies also 
perform 'as if' they know this, but the stage 2 children are quite 
capable of preferring the same collection for both colours. This 
reappearance of alternation at a later age does not seem to occur in 
the probability learning experiments, probably because the situations 
and the reasons for the alternations at the different ages arc very 
different. Thiz shows the dangers inherent in attempts to draw simple 
generalisations from complex performances. The safest thing to do 
at present is to avoid comparison of the results presented here with 
I 
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the results of probability loarning oxneriments until a more udequato 
model. of what the subject in doinC in the nrobability loarnina situation 
is available. 
The second reseVch area Mich may be relevant to the precert 
discussion concerns the development of children's abilities to make 
estimates of quantities and proportipns. There is a certain anount 
of conceptual confusion in this field cauued by tho tendency of some 
authors to regard these different kinds of estimate to in come way 
equivalent. It has already been made clear that pronortion involves 
a relation between quantities, so that = estimate of a prcportion 
occnies a very diVerent status to an. estimate of a quantity. To 
illustrate this point it is worth considering the experiments reported 
by Ginsburg and Rapoport (1967). 
As a method of invectigatina children's estimates of proportionog 
Ginsburg and Rapoport used the following procedure: 
'He was show an opaque container an(! told thL-, t in it 
were some black and white marbles. The E chook the box anat 
without looking, pulled out one marble; at a time. He showed 
S each marble and required him to call out its colour. The 
marble was then transferred into a second opaque container. 
After the total contents of the containerv forty marblest were 
show to Sv he was instructed to make his estimates by moms 
of a special apparatus. This was a large boardp 23 inches 
long, 4 inches wide, and I inch deep. Along the longth of 
the board were out two yoovec separated by 1 inch. One groove 
was filled with a line of forty wliite marblest the other a line of 
forty black ones. Over each groove (und line of marbles) was 
a thin strip of wood Mich could be moved so as to reveal as 
many of the marbles in the line as desired. The S was shown 
how to do this. He was told, "ant I want you to Jo is to show 
me how many white marbles and how many black ones you just saw 
me pull'., out of the box. If you saw me take out a lot of bl, -4ck 
ones, you make this (black) line very high; if I took out very 
few lite onest you make this line very short. If you caw about 
same number of black and Kite, you make both lines the same 
height. You try it now". I (Ginsburg and Rapoport, 19671 p-207). 
In experiments of this type Ginsburg and Rapoport report that six 
and eleven year old children areq in gencralp accurate in estimatinc; 
proportions. However, all the tacks require the children to do is 
to make an estimate of the number of white beads that wero in the box 
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anO, ari estimate of the number of blach beads, and to match these to 
the display. How such -an estimate : night be arrived. at in uncertain, 
since the beads are drawn out over what must be an extended period of 
time. Hence these estimates might be based on several po.,,; sible critoriap 
suýý -,. z total proportion, relative frequency of w1hite to 7alack, or an 
impression of the number of white and black separately. No firm 
conclusions about estimates of proportion can then be drawn from the 
experiment. 
A similar drawback can be found in the first experiment of a caries 
reported by Hecox and Hagen (1971)- One of the aims of Hecox and Hagen's 
work wan to investigate 'the ability of children to form accurate -., nd 
consistent estimates of proportions based on a visual display' (op-cit. 
P- 107). The first experiment they report involves presentation of an 
array of 100 dots in a 10 x 10 matrix. The dots were red or green and 
the stimuli varied in the proportions of red and green dotop with 
various positionings of the red and green dots in the matrix. The subject 
is given an apparatus on which he can alter the proportion of red and 
green dots in a 10 x 10 matrix until he thinks it matches the proportion 
in the display. Only whole columns of the response apparatus can be 
made red or green, so that exact matching to the display is impossible. 
This experiment provides an intriguing opportunity to test the views 
advanced here. Notice that the display and response matrices both have 
10 columns of dots and 10 rows. This means that all a child ht-. s to do 
to perform successfully is to match estimates of the numbers of dots 
of a particular colour on each display. He does not have to estimate 
proportions. Key sentences in the instructions are: 
'The idea of this Came is for you to make your picture 
have just as many red and black dots as there are on the 
screen in front of you. There will be too many dots to 
count so I don't want you to try. This is a guessing game. ' 
(Hecox and Hagan, 19719 P- 110). 
In this situation the present view would expect the child to use 
Qe to estimate the number of dots of one colour in each display and try 
to obtain a match. As the number of dots of the colour to which this 
strategy is applied increases, accuracy will go down. This is precisely 
the result obtainedg as can be(; secn from the following extract: 
'If subjects actually based their judgements on the proportion 
of both exhibited colours there would be no apparent reason 
for the disparity between performance on the high and low 
proportions. Ono possible explanation for the difference is 
that subjects were attending only to the red dots. As the 
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number of red dots increased so did the difficulty in judging 
their numerosity. It may be that attention straterics are 
important even for such relativoly simple estimation tasks. ' 
(Hecox and Hageng 1,0712 P-111). 
In this extract 'high and low proportions' refers to the proportion 
of red to black items in the display. It seems that it is the number 
of red items which is most likely to be estimated, but quite why this 
should happen isn't clear. Possibly the subject's response apparatus 
was reset to all black dots after each trial. At any rate in their 
analysis Hecox and Hagen ignore the possibility that the same strategy 
could have been applied to the black dots. 
The second experiment reported by Hecox and Hagen (1971) uses a 
display of 48 closed red and Green boxes containing red or green balls. 
The response apparatus Was, a 10 x 10 matrix of red or green boxes or 
balls. The idea is to see how well children can adjust their estimates 
by showing clue slides with open green boxes always containinG green 
balls and open red boxes containing a certain proportion of red balls. 
A test can then be made of the subject's estimate of the proportion of 
red and green boxes in the display, or his estimate of the proportion 
of red and green balls in the boxes in the display. This experiment 
really does require estimates of proportions for success as there are 
a different number of items in the stimulus and response displays. 
Again) they found that what they call 'attention focussing' is a 
major variable in the results, able to account for the patterns of 
errors across the age levels studied (children of 6t 71 and 8 years). 
However, it is difficult to be certain as to what this experiment 
demonstrates, since the task is unnecessarily complex. The conclusion 
of Hecox and Hagen (1971) iz worth quoting since it accords with the 
view advanced here despite the very different methods used to arrive 
at itq 
10 ...... it cannot be assumed that since a stimulus 
set is varying only in come quantitative dimension, rcc-, jonscs 
will vary liketrise. There can be significant qualitative shifts 
in response strategies with quantitative shifts in stimuli'- 
(Op. cit., p. 121). 
A more stLtisfactory methodology for obtaining estimates of 
proportions from children was used by Lowe and Ranyard (1973). They 
showed ditplays containing red and green dots and then asked subjectý, ' 
to shade rectangles in response booklets with as much rod as the 
proportion of red dots on each slide. They point out that this task 
involves: 
1/, 2. 
(a) Understanding the concept of lproportion*. 
(b) Ability to estimate proportion in a dioplq Of different numbers 
of elements. 
(0) A conversion of this estim"te into a different but equiv%lcnt 
represontation or form. (Op. cit-9 P. 3). 
p It , ni, -, ht be thought that this would lead to 'genuinol --roT)ortionV-1 
responses from childreng but by carcfolly deci, -ning their materials 
Lowe and Ranyard were able to show that many obilOren still only based 
their estimates on the number of red dots in the diePlayn, even thouch 
specifically asked to judge proportions. This accords well with the 
viewpoint being advanced. 
Finally, it is necessary to review the previous studies of children's 
performances in similar experiments to the roulette experiment. These 
are very sparse. Piaget and InhalCer (1951) investigate& children's 
reactions to a biased roulette wheell but the nature of this experiment 
is so different to that of the roulette experiment that the results 
are not comparable. 
A series of experiments of a siNilar type to the roulette experiment 
is reported by Hoemann and Ross (1971). They start with the followinG 
contention, 
'Neither Piaget and Welder nor the later investigators 
have, however, been concerned with the extent to which their 
probabilistic experimental tasks are in fact solved by the use 
of probability concepts'. (Op. cit., P. 222). 
This is not quite the same as the view advanced here, that children's 
solutions to probability problems do not provide direct information about 
the child's conception of probability. 
Hoemann and Ross then try to assess the ability of children to 
make accurate proportionality judgements, ar, -uin, - that this ic an 
ability required for correct probability choices. However, their method 
for this allows a subject to succeed simply by making a mnyAMIC, juke- 
ment, and is consequently invalid. no materials they used were pairs 
of circles with different proportions of blach and white on the surfaces, 
each of which was divided into a number of equal-sized black and equal- 
sized Kite seaents. no circles were all the same size. Subjects 
were either asked to say which circle had the most of a specified colour 
on it, or spinners were placed on the circles and the subjects were 
asked which circle they would prefer to get a specified colour. 
The claim made by Hoemann and Rocs is that the original condition, 
in which subjects had to say which circle had the moot of a specified 
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colour on itp involved 'proportionality instructionot, whereas the 
second conditionp with the sninnorov involved lprob, -, bility instructions'. 
Not surnrisinClyg they found no difference between the two conditipncy 
and concluded that 
'. Empirical support for the sup: )osition that only comparisons 
between the E-designated color were parform, ýd comes from the 
close correlation in lbtperiment 1 betmcon results with 
probability as compared to nronortionality instructionc at 
each odds level'. (Hoemann and Ross, 1.071, p. 229). 
This corresponds to what has been described here as the moOel 2 
strategy together with some form of estimation. 
Hoemann and Ross then go on to discuss a curious findin- which was 
also reported by Piaget and Inholder (10,151)- When subjects are asked 
to predict which colour will come up in a problem involving one 
collection of elements of two possible coloursq their performance is 
inferior to their performance in situations where there are two collections 
and the task is to pick which collection in most likely to lead to a 
specified outcome. The same finding is reported by Yost et al (1962), 
and Goldberg (1966), but in both cases their tasks differ in so many 
other ways that more close comparisons would be of little interest. 
The explanation put forward by Eoemann and Ross to account for 
the effedt is derived from Piaget and Inhelder (10,51): 
'Briefly putp Piaget and Inhelder claim that to perform the 
single-odds task correctly the child must decompose all possible 
outcomes into a complete set of fractions representing each 
different outcome. Ratios, are then construct6d and compared 
using the favourable outcomes as the numerator and the total 
number of possible outcomes as the denominator of each odds 
ratio. Thus even where only two outcomes are possible a two- 
step process is required. 
With a double-odds task, on the other hand, no decomposition 
of possible outcomes is necessary as long as either the numerator 
or the denominator is the same in both odds ratios-t (Hoomann 
and Rossq 19711 p. 229). 
This interpretation seems to the-writer to stretch credulity. The 
ncar-impossibility of making a calculation of thin type with estimation 
as the method of quantification has already been explained, and the 
strategy itself would do credit to a mathematician. 
In support of their interpretationg Hoemann and Ross show that in ;I 
single collection-task children's performances under their 'proportion- 
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ality instructions' are superior to performances undarlprobability 
instructions'. This is taken to show that subjects in the probability 
instructions condition do not rely on magnitu6c octim,. -Aion in the same 
way as they do in the two-collections situationg but muct rn, -ýko use 
of 'probability concepts'. 
A simpler interpretation would be that subjects who ouccodd in 
the single-collection-and-probability-inctruct16no condition arc still 
using magnitude estimation, and the fall-off in perform, -. nee as, comp,.,. red 
with the two collection situation is caused either by it being Morcýý 
difficult in this situation to see that magnitude estimation may be 
used, or more difficult to compare estimates of the sizes of segments of 
different colours than estimates of scaments of one colour only. The 
second of these possibilities can be ruled out in view of the subject's 
success in the single-collection-and-proportionality-instructions condition. 
However, in this condition the subjects are instructed to compare the 
amounts of the two colours. It therefore seems that the most likely 
explanation of the effedt is that when left to formulate their oiM 
solution strategy subjects experience some kidd of difficulty in making 
the decision to compare rnagnituCe estimates of unlike colours. The 
explanation offered by Hoemann ahd Ross is a particular version of this 
more general explanation, but other versions are possible. For example, 
it may be a General strategy used by children in a variety of situations 
to quantify all the things that look alike and choose the biggest, and 
this may lead to reluctance to start comparing sets of unlike things 
by quantification. 
Another experiment carried out by lioemann and Ross falls easily 
in with this interpretation. In order to make children use probability 
concepts in the two-collection cituation they modified their task so 
that the children had to choose one circle to (; ct one colour or the 
other circle to get the other colour. This brought performance down 
to the level observed in the one-collection situation. Only probability 
instructions were used in this experiment. 
The simplest way of testing Hoomann and Ross's interpretation 
against the alternative interpretation offered here would be to 
compare performances in the type of situation used by thempwhere each 
collection is of the same total size, with performances in situations 
where the collections and their elements are all of di f4f crent sizes- 
Thiz would be what Hoemann and Ross would call a double-odds task 
in which neither the numerator nor the denominator are the same in 
both odds ratios. At present this has not been done. 
145. 
The studies of children's estimates rovipwcd here can cactly be 
inteCratcd with the theory advancedy and : 11tilou,, ýh Otudion of cl,. Alflrcnls 
performances in experiments like the roulette experiment nrc lenc 
consistent with the present Position, ex-porimontal testc between IýIhc' 
different interpretations have been CuCacoted, However, attemnto to 
pply a theory to extant rosearch do not provide a atronC tcst of tho a- 
theory and for thin reason anothcr experiment vill be dorA, -, ncd* 
16. 
CHAPTIM 
The : ý'odificd Roulette hx-)cri. mcnt. 
Aims for the modified rou1_vV,, q oxnerimont. 
The results of the rOulCttO experiment hlvc been conniacrod in 
terms of the solution straterjes -_,. i4entificd from, the rociiltn of thr., 
beads experiments and in torms of Xl, -. hr and lilnllacelc (1ý73ýj exposition 
of ouantification operators. It has been arGued tlnt thc nilbinctn' 
performances in the roulette experiment can be senn as tri-sin,,; from. 
combination of attempts to make use of the same ctr,. -. teriPn an wore obsorvad 
in the beads experiments and the imprecise nýiture of entimation. 
One possible way in which this vi-., w could be testod would be if 
some other means of quantification than cr; tim,,,. tion coulO, be 
available in the typ(% of situation used for the roulette experimont. 
The availability of and Qc inztvad of Q0 should caur-a renii1tr, to 
return to the pattern observed in the bcaes ex2criment, an subjects enn 
then gcnorate more reliable and precise quantitative symbols. 
Such a situation can be produced by drawinj, - diameters on the whnelc 
used in the experiment in such a way that althouCh there is still only 
one 'red and green se. -ment on each wheeleach of these sc, -mr! nts is sub- 
divided into a number of oclual nieces (see the exa., i-los ý: ivon in Table 6). 
.? 
lication of Qc in countinZ the numbor of ptncon, This allows the ap, 
althouC; h it will usually be invalid by adult standar0s. 
The predictions whidh can then be made -are: 
(a) That the availability of Qc will increase the number of str,, ý: c 
responses by the younger subjects, wbo are row nrovidea wit. ý a 
more precise and reliable method of quantitative coripLirison than 
(b) That the availability of Qc will incran-sc the overall nwnber of 
model 3 res-ponses for t, ý, je same rcasons. 
In both predictions the increases rcferzcd to are witý, rcc: )cct to 
the result of the original roulette experiment. Tho predictions ns, -um. 0 
that subjects will not rcalise that Q0 is invalid and conser1licntly 
not apply it. 
The modified roulette expcrime t. 
To test these predictions it is necossar., 
which will distinguish as far as possible the 
strategy in Mich counting and estimation are 
quantification, the model 3 stratey, and the 
correspondinC to the hypothesised model 4. A 
to dosien an oxneriment 
formS of the , 7ýoecl 2 
the preferred mcanc of 
true proportion stratecy 
modifiod version of the 
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roulette experiment (which will be referrreO t, ) %s tile roulotto 
experiment) waa dosiumod for this purpose. The m,, iterialo vsod in ti, ir 
experiment wore similar to those used in the roulotte ex-)e-r-I'ment, excen. t. 
that the red and green soCments vicre marked into separate riecon. lvlý' a 
meant that the shading used to show the red anO_ green conn ents haO to 
be abandoned (it would have interfered with the lines mar! -. inr, the pieces) 
and was replaced by a system of haphazardly plaoed dots with an even 
density. 
Problems used: The problems designed for the modified roulette exncriment 
were as follows: I 
Problem MRl: Large wheel: 3G3R (i. e. half Croon and half red, each 
divided into three pieces). 
Small wheel: 4G4R (i. e. half green and half red, each 
divided into four pieces). 
In this problem the red and Green segments are largest on the large 
gheelt so that the use of the model 2 strategy with cize estimation will 
lead to choice of the large wheel whether red or green is the target 
colour. The small wheel has more red and green segments tha-n the large 
wheell which means that the model 2 strategy together with counting of 
pieces will lead to choice of the small wheel in both cases. There 
are the same numbers of green and red pieces on each wheel, so that the 
model 3 strategy with counting will lead to choice of either wheel. 
There are also the same proportions of red and green on each whoollco 
that the model 4 strategy with accurate quantification will lead to 
choice of either wheel. In this as in the other problems the model 2 
strategy with recognition of fractions will always lead to 'correct' 
answers if the fractions are recognised and ordered correctly) but 
will lead to idiosyncratic answers if they arc not recognised correctly. 
Problem MR2: Large wheel: 02R. 
Small wheel: 6G3R. 
In this problem, the red and green segments are again larger on the 
large wheel, whilst there are more red and Croon pieces on the einall 
wheel. Hence th. e model 2 strategy will lead to choice of the large 
wheel when size estimation is the means of quantification and the small 
wheel when counting of pieces is used. The difference between the 
numbers of green and red pieces on each wheel is greatest for the 
small whcelý so that when the model 3 strategy is used with counting 
the small wheel will be chosen if green is the target colour, and ! -he 
large wheel if red is the-'L-, targot colour. Both wheals have the same 
proportions of red and green. 
(q- ý; A 
I- PKOG LEMS tJS, E-D IN FI ED P\O(J UI TC- CX 
PC R ItIC N 
-7 ý- I P\ L +q-l9s. iý. 
TuP'>' PZO13LMS 
KRi.. 'S(ý-7>RL V '+C4RS e. 
MR-L., I+q-2-RL Cý-IRS. 
v qcý2-Rc) 
Sq--SRL v qc. -l .. - --- - -, - -- ;. -.. ,. I 
.Iý. -I J--. - --. 
"I : I_, . 4f 
RI mEtsI-c COW Si ST 5 OF TTIE -OLLOI-VE IH C- Ex PC- rD 
13Y MRIpMR 21 M C\'ý, M Rq, IN R (A NDoM i SE-0 ORDC-R. 
RL VýRU-L VtDA -rwýcze 4zeo arqD -n4f? c-( 
ScqMENTs RC-eN 
I A) 
t. ) " 
Problem MR3-. Large wheel: 4G3R. 
Small vthe(, l: 4G2R. 
The red and green zogmento are larger on tho large wheel, ao thVA 
the model 2 strategy with size estimation will always lead to choice 
of thin wheel. There are the came number of Croon pieces on each whealq 
but more red pieces on the large wheel. Thic means that if the model 2 
strategy is used with counting of pinceso the model 2(a) or 4'2(b) types 
of response may be observed when Crean is the target coloury and when 
red is the target colour the large wheel will be chonen. The difference 
between the numbers of green and red piccer; on each wheel is greater for 
the small whool, so that when green is the target colour use of the moJel 
strategy with counting will lead to choice of the small wheel, %nd when 
red is the target colour choice of the large wheel. The most favourable 
proportion of green to red is on the small whool. 
In this problem the use of recoCnition of fractions an the method 
of quantification is likely to lead to idiosyncratic responses as the 
fractions four-sevenths -and throe-coventhe are not easily recoCnisable. 
Problem MR4: Large wheel: 5G3R. 
Small wheel: 4G2R. 
The red and green segments are larger on the large wheel. There are 
alco more red and Croon piecesoon the larea whool, so that the model 2 
strategy with size estimation or countinf; of pieces will ladd-`, to choice 
of the large wheel whether red or Green is the target colour. The differ- 
ence between the numbers of green and red pieces on each wheel ic the came 
for each whcely so that the model 3 strategy with countine of pieces will 
lead to the assertion that either whool may be chosen in both cases. 
The most favourable proportion of green to red is on the small wheel.. 
In this problem the u-Wo of recoe; nition of fractions as the means 
of quantification is again likely to load to idiocypcratic responcen 
as the fractions throe-oightho and five-eightho are not easily 
recognisable. 
There i-s also a pretestq problem 1=9 
to get to know the experimental situation 
had 7 green and 2 red pieces on the large 
pieces on the small wheel. A list of the 
with illustrations to assist the reader$ 
which was used to allow cubiocto 
and requirements. Thia problem 
wheel, and 4 green and 2 red 
experimental problems, together 
is given in Table 6. 
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Procedure: The presentation and methods usod in the roulette and 
modified roulette experiments differed in 6ply one roe-pect, namely that 
the order of target coloursq which had bacn alternated in the roulette 
experiment, was more varied in the modified roulette experiment. This 
was done to avoid the possible criticisms of this which were encountered 
in the analysis of the results of the roulette experiment. It was 
achieved by making the order of target colourn on successive problems 
red-green, green-re69 red-greeng and so on. The combination of this 
with the haphazard order of presentation of the problems eliminates 
any significant artifact at the level of analysis to be employed. 
As the other methods and instructions were the same as those used in 
the roulette experiment they will not be repeated. 
Sample: The subjects used were sixty children aged six t(, ten years, 
(twelve of each age) drawn from the same primary school as the children 
of these ages in the other main experiments. Some of the children had 
taken part in previous experimentsg but th6-most recent of these hhd 
been carried out four months before. Table 6(a) lists the subjects 
in question. The table shows that the possibility of a practice 
effect must be admitted in principle. However, such an effect would 
militate against the direction of the observed outcome of the experiment 
(which is reported below), and consequently is of less importance than 
might have been the case. 
Results of the modified roulette experiment 
The way of treating results develQped in the previous analyses will 
be used again for the results of the modified roulette experiment. 
This involves an initial analysis based on an interpretation of the 
strategies the subjects' responses correspond to, followed by a comparison 
of the result of this interpretative analysis with the analyses of the 
previous results, and finally an independent analysis using the Brimer 
technique. 
The first s-tep- in the analysis thus involves specification of the 
criteria. on which the initial interDretation of the results will be 
based. Ettuentially the same scheme as that devised for the interpret- 
ation of the results of the roulette experiment was used. This scheme 
will be repeated here in order to give coherence to the samples of 
answers of each type drawn from the experimental results, which can 
be compared with the samples drawn from the results of the beads 
and roulette experiments. 
The scheme is as follows: 
150. 
Troe 1: Any answer corresponding to the first stage of development 
found in the results of the beads and roulotto experiments. Such answers 
seem to the experimenter to involve spurious factors, or guesses. Choices 
made are erratic, and their justifications often seem post hoc. The 
following illustrations of this type of answer are taken from the revults 
of tho experiment: 
SMR1 (modified roulette experimentg subject number 1)y probl'em 
VIR2 green (problem number 11R. 2. target colour green). 
Chooses 4G2RL (the large wheelg which has four green pieces 
and two red pieces marked on,., -it). 
II dunnol. 
SIM, problem 14R29 green. 
Chooses 6G3RS. 'I think I'll win'. 
S1,1R39 problem KR2, green. 
Chooses 4G2RL. 'We had that one there before'. 
ST-11152 problem MR41 red. 
Chooses 5G3RL. 'It's a big-er circle'. 
SMR9 I problem DIR1 green. 
Chooses 4G4RS. 'It just stopped on it'. 
Type 2: Answers correspondinG to the model 2 strategy. Such answers 
involve a comparison of the amount of each wheel covered by the target 
segmenty and a choice of the wheel with the larger amount covered. The 
actual method used for the quantification is disregarded as long as the 
subject indicates that he compared the amount of each wheel covered by 
the target segrent and chose the one with more. Answers involving 
comparisons of the amount of each wheel covered by the non-tare-et segment 
followed by choice of the one with less are also scored as type 2, although 
these are rare. 
Ibcamplos of type 2 answers: 
SMR10y problem K*Rl red. 
Chooses 4G4R3- 'It's Cot more than that. Got four, that's 
Got three'. 
SNR101 problem MR2 red. 
Chooses 6G3RS. 'Got more than that one. 14ore red bits'. 
SMR459 problem 101 Green. 
Chooses 3G3RL. 'There's more --reen 'coo it's a bijeer 
circle'. 
SMR461 problem KR3 Green. 
Chooses 4G2RS. 111ore Green on. There's a quarter red there 
and a bit on this'. 
SMR47t problem MR3 red. 
Chooses 4G3RL. 'More red. The arnount of lines tells you'. 
151. 
SHR479 problem MR4 green. 
Chooses QW. 'Hardly any reds 'coo it's a little circle. 
That other red goes round further'. 
SYR-47 9 problem lolRl -reen. 
Chooses 3G3RL. 'It's a biUCer green bit. ', lore dots on it'. 
SM'R53P problem 1,11R4 green. 
Chooses HAL. 'There's just one more of them lines than 
that one'. (This seems to be a reference to the lines 
separating the green pieces. ) 
Sf4R53i problem MR2 green. 
Chooses MRS. 'The span outwards is a bit more bigCerl. 
(Sho-vx with his hands and- tries to measure). 
SPIR53, problem MR3 green. 
Chooucs MRS. 'It's much bigger. It's more round. Looks 
more like a half over there, only a quarter red Wre. 1 
S1, M541 problem il-IR4 green. 
Chooses 5G3RL. 'There's five quarters. That's more. They're 
bigger. One more quarter than the other one'. 
SDIR55 9 problem IU'22 red. 
Chooses 4G2RL. 'There's two here and three there, but they're 
smaller'. 
3DIR569 problem 1-1111 red. 
Chooses 3G3RL. 'It's bigger. The circle is. They're the 
same really 1cos they're both half red. ' 
In problem MR31 when Veen is the target colourg there are four 
Veen pieces on each wheel. This means that subjects using the mole! 2 v 
strategy with co=ts of pieces will find initially that either wheel 
may be chosen, and the distinction between those subjects who stick 
to this opinion (model 2(a))and the subjects Ko then make use of 
information concerning the red pieces (model 2(b))can be introduced. 
The following are examples of Mat can harpen in this situation: 
S!, 'R361 problem IIR3grecn. 
Chooses 02M. 'Both got the same. I'll have the small one'. 
STIR101 problem ýIR3 green. 
Chooses 4G3RL- 'It's got more green than the other one. 
Maybe it's the same. I think it's wore*o 
SI-IR487 problem MR3 green. 
Chooses 4G3RL. 'Got more green. Four on each but iýore space 
here'. 
S1,7R57 ý problem MR3 Creen. 
Chooses 4G2RS. 'It's got leso red colours thýan th, -, t one. Same 
Creen colours on each'. 
15, '. 
SUR609 problem T. TR3 green. 
Chooses MRS. 'Other has three reds, this only h.?. s two. 
Both got four g-rcen'. 
The first of these examples corresponds to model 2(a)2 but was the 
only case of this to be found in the whole experiment. The 1ý,, st two 
examples correspond to mod-el 2(b) with quantification by counting 
pieces, which was not uncommon. The other two examples show a different 
way of resolving the problem; which was to reapply the model ? strntey 
using size estimation instead of counting. The dignificance of this 
will become clear later. 
YZP2 3: knswers indicatinC use of the model 3 straterZr. This involves 
comparison of tho differences between the amounts of each wheel covered 
by the target and non-tareet segments, and choice of the most favourable 
case (i. e. the Keel with the largest 'surplus' or the sr: iallest 'deficit'). 
As with the type 2 mower category the method of quantification is dis- 
regarded. 
Examples of type 3 -answers: 
31, IR59, problem T. 11Rl Croon. 
Chooses SOL. 'Both the same. Both got half Creen and half 
red. Just for luck'. 
S11R601 problem MR1 red. 
Chooses DWI after a long pause. 'Doesn't matter which 
one. Bol have got half red and half ycon'. 
S11R489 problem DIR1 red. 
Chooses MAL. 'Both the same. Three of each. It mijt 
stop on red. Could be either really. ' 
S 
IVIR48, problem NRl green. 
Chooses 040. 'Four of each. So Jill try it. Any will do'* 
TYPO 4: Mowers which seem to involve some understanding of proportional 
relationships. For example: 
ST. M319 problem NRI green. 
Chooses 04M. 'They're both halves. It always went on 
aeon. One's just big, r than the other one, they're the 
same really. t 
A number of responses from the results could not be fitted into 
this categorisation scheme very easily. These t=nea out to le generally 
of two typest 
(a) Answers which are similar to the type 2 answers, but involve choice 
of the wheel with less of the target colour inotead of the Wo-1 with 
more of the target colour. 
For example: 
STJR101 
problem MR1 -reen. 
Chooses 3G3RL. 'It's got ics-1 titan that or. c. Only thrccl. 
SPIR101 problem MR4 red. 
Chooses 402RS, 'It's cot ler's red. Thý: %tls thrceý this 
is two I. 
(b) Answers which are sitailar to the type 3 answers, but only refer to 
the amount of target and. non-target colour on the wheel chosen, 
without any indication of comparison between circles. Thc choices 
made may be consistent or inconsistent with the rno(l. el 3 strategy. 
Examples of responses of this type: 
SDIR21, problem MR4 green. 
Chooses 4G2RS. 'It's got more green than the red'. 
31-: 1R219 problem MR3 green. 
Chooses 4G3RL. ! It's got more than the red onc. It's got 
four, red only has three'. 
SUR51i 1problem MR2 red. 
Chooses 6G3RS. 'It's got three reds. Greens have got more'. 
31-IR37Y problem MR2 green. 
Chooses 6G3RS. 'It's smaller. The green's big. -er. Red 
is only three quartersp green is six quarters'. 
Both of these types of response are unclassifiable in, terms of the 
scheme set out so far. In the previous experiments they were rare and 
were usually left as unclassifiable (in the roulette experiment7 an 
. 
swers 
of type (b) were included in type 3 if consistent with the strategy)q 
but they are more common in the modified roulette experiment. The 
first type, (a), seems to be a mis-construction of the model 2 strategy, 
or an early form of this strategyq and was accordingly brought into the 
type 1 category. The second typeg (b), looks like it is either a 
primitive 'form of the model 3 strategy, or a post hoc justification of 
a choice made on other grounds. Subjects giving some resý,, onses of 
type (b) seem to make predominantly type 1 responses to the other 
problems, so this type was also brought into type 1. Had most of the 
answers of this type been consistent with siodel 3 choices (as was 
found in the roulette results) they could possibly have been considered 
as type 39 but this didn't happen. 
This modification to the classification scheme leaves only three 
unclassifiable responses. These are as follows: 
SMR219 problem MR1 green. 
Chooses 4G4RS. 'The green bit's big, -er than the red bit. 
I can tell by all the dots'. 
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SMR349 problem MR4 red. 
Chooses 4G2RS. 'There's quite a lot in each red one'. 
SMR419 problem MR1 green. 
Chooses 3G3RL. 'It looks bigger. The green bits look 
bigger than the red bits'. 
The result of applying this classification scheme to the data collected 
in the modified roulette experiment can be found in Appendix G. 
In order to facilitate comparison of the results of -the modified 
roulette experiment with previous results, a graphical illustration can 
be made. This involves no particular difficulty as there are eight 
results for each subject and twelve subjects in each age groupq and the 
previous graphs are also of this type. It might be though that such a 
comparison is unfair, as the design of the modified roulette experiment 
necessitated the use of two problems in which the proportions of red 
and green on each wheel are the same. Such problems undoubtedly skew 
the results of the experiment in terms of pass and fail choicesy but 
it was shown in the analysis of the results of the roulette experiment 
that they do not alter the strateCies the subjects use to an important 
degree (except in the special case where the proportions are half and 
half, which was used in all the experiments), so that no attei-ilpts at 
compensation need be made. 
The graph of the result of the modified roulette experimenty in 
terms of the number of responses of each type for each age group, together 
with equivalent Graphs of the results of the first beads and roulette 
experimentst is given in figure 13. 
Inspection of this figure shows that the result of the modified 
roulette experiment differs from the result of the beads experiment in 
much the same way as the roulette experiment. That icy there is an 
overall retardation of the development of the different types of responsO2 
with the third type never becoming dominant. A chi-square test carried 
out in the same way as the comparison for the roulette and first beads 
experiments. shows that the proportions of subjects aged six to ten years 
falling into stages 1,21 and 3 in the first beads and modified roulette 
experiments is significantly different at the . 001 level 
(See Appendix J). 
The difference between the results of the modified roulette and 
roulette experiments is less pronounced. The slopes of the curves 
representing tjýe type 1 responses are almost identical in each casey and 
the point where the type 2 response takes over from type 1 as the dominant 
response is also similar. Howevery the curve representing the type 2 
response climbs more steeply initially in the modified roulette results, 
so that more responses of type 2 are obtained from the younCor subjects 
in the modified roulette experiment. There is no statistically 
significant difference between the median numbers of type 2 answers 
produced by the combined six to ten year age groups in the roulette 
and modified roulette ex, perimentoy but the median scores of the six 
and seven years olds are significantly higher in -the modil'ind roulette 
experiment (see Appendix J). The type 3 response hardly figures at 
all in the results of the modified roulette expcrimentp and type 4 
is effectively absent. The median of the numbers of type 3 answers 
produced by the combined six to ten year old subjects in the roulette 
and modified roulette experiments is significantly hirhcr -for the 
roulette experiment (see Appendix J). 
Before the modified roulette experiment was carried outp two 
predictions had been made. These were that the introduction of the 
possibility of coimting into the roulette situation would lead to 
a result like that of the first boac1c, experiment, with a 1, -. r-cr nunbcr 
of type 2 responses- &t the younger ages (first prediction) and an 
overall increase in the number of type _3ý responses 
(second prediction). 
The second of these predictions is clearly not supported by the result 
of the experiment. If anythingg the reverse see,, --, z to be the cLse, anC_ 
the type 3 responses are almost eliminated. The first prediction is alco 
only confirmed in a weak manner, and the large increase in the number 
of type 2 responses anticipated has not occurred. 
The reason why the predictions" were no-,, supported was not initially 
understood. It was noted when the predictions were m%ae that they 
depend upon the children's treatin, - the countina of pieces as an tj L. 1 
appropriate means of quantification in this kind of situation. It 
waýo thou&VG.: Uk. P_17 ithat thýs would. hap_,, cnp because of the greater precision 
and reliability of counting than estimation. However, if for some 
reason counting was overruled by the childreng then the overall similarity 
of the result to the result of the roulette experiment would be explainod 
although the drop in the number of type 3 responses would not. This 
explanation would not be very appealing because of its post hoc nature 
and the ease with which it might be applied retrospectively to the 
result of -almost any experiment of this type. .. A 
first stop in antcr- 
taining such an explanation is to consider the methods of quantification 
used by the children and their relative importances. 
In the discussion of the results of tile roulette experiment much 
was made of the interaction of ways of quantifying information vnd 
ways of organising quantified information to make choices. 'Much the 
iý6. 
sainc ways of quantifyin,, - informatinn can be sc(! n .n 
Vie rc-, iilts or tjn 
modified roulette experimontp i.,, ith the . C. Cition of bacc,. O. on tl,, c 
numbers of pieces in the segments. J.; Lei, dfi mcthoOx, Voiind. to 
be: 
(i) Countinf- the number of piccos in a 
(ii) Counting the number of radii ccr. -. r,,., tJn, -, the pieces 4-n Oegrient. 
plicit referencc to numbcrs of -icces b, USin,, -, 
the v. rord im- 
$more', e. g. 'There's more red bits- here than therel. 
(iv) Estim, -AinC the area occupied (size) by a T),,. rticular se: Tment. 
(V) Estimating the area occupied by a -o-.. rticulL-Lr piece. 
(vi) '", 'stimatinG the width of a segmrcnt. 
(vii) Estimating the width of a piece. 
(viii) Bstimatinýý the amount of dots on a ocCmentq withou-111- actually 
Giving a number. 
(ix) Estimating the size of the an-le a sc--ý-, icnt subter. Cr; at tile cei-Ire 13 V 
of the circle. 
(X) Recognizing a certain sha e of sciTnent (or ran-c of 
as, corresponding to a particular fr--ction. 
T11is list is by'no means exhaustive. The various forms of cotimationg 
for example2 were also applied to whole wheels as vell -is sc, -, ý. r.,. cnts of 
the 
wheels. 11ore importantly, a quite common method seeis, to indicate which 
segment of a wheel occupies more than the other segment, but nothing 
else. In the discussion of the pilot for the roulette experiment it 
was argued that this is probably a srecial forin of size estimationy ; -ýnd 
it seems to be this which causes some of th. e answers which look like 
type 3 at first sight, but do not lead to systematic choices and only 
refer to one wheel. Statements of the form ', more X1c and Ylslh; ý-ve 
not been considered as being the result of a separate method, 
but 
rather as the result of a calculation performed on -qiiant-itative-' 
symbol. s... (The fact that no evidence is produced 
to support such an assumption does not matter a-, it is -the attention 
paid to number which is important. This will become clear later). 
In terms of the quantification operators proposed by Klahr and 
Wallace (1973), methods (i) and (ii) may be the result of counting 
(Q 
c) 
or subitizinC (Q S 
), depending on the particular circumstances. 
All the remaining methods (including (iii)) can be seen as forms of 
estimation At presentt howeverg the central consideration is not 
so much the way the quantification is carried out as what it is applied 
to. For this purpose it is most important that method (iii) is not 
lumped in with estimation. 
: 1. . r-ru: rrr- .-i 
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To make this point clearorxconsidor what altornativcs a c1iild usin, -, 
estimation has available to him. If he wichea to quantify -, Lhe cizec of 
segments he can only use the various different cues.. Tf, howevert 
he estimates that one segment has more pieces th, -. tn anotherg thin is 
something he could have confirmed independently by countinr L .' 
(w- t1l 
the numbers of pieces used in the modified roulette experiment). 
None of the other ways of estimating offer such a poCsibility. (Although 
it is true that in the modified roulette experiment sufficient information 
is available, in the form of numbers of equal cizcd pieces, to enable 
children to calculate as well'as recognise fractionog no children were 
seen todo this. It can thus be assumed that within the age ran,, ýc used 
this kind of check is not possible). 
Vfhat is needed then is to consider the results of the modified 
roulette experiment in terms of the difference between quantifications 
which involve numbers or could be brought to a numorical form, and 
quantifications whidh are not numerical in any way (includingg for 
present purposest recognition of fractions). This lead-a to the con- 
struction of table 7.,, - 
In table 7 the way'in which all the typo 2 responses found in the 
modified roulette experiment seem to have been quantified in Got out. 
In this table the ways previously referred to as (i) and (ii) are 
called C2 methods (iv) to (x) are referred to as E, and method (iii) 
in called 1V1 to -..,,, how its special status as a form of estimation which 
alludes to counting. Where more than one form of quantification seems 
to have been involved this is also i#dicated according to the followine 
conventions: 
A/B. * A quantification is carried out by a method of typeAq but is 
overruled by a conflicting rebult arrived at by a method of 
type B. (The quantifications are not necessarily reported as 
being carried out in the order A11). . 
A+B: Twcr quantifications are reported in the order given, but they 
both lead to the same choice and so do not conflict. 
(A and B are used to refer to any of the types of quantification 
method). 
By counting every instance of C, M, and Et for each age group a 
table of the frequency of quantifications by numerical mothods (C and M) 
and non-numerical methods (2) at different ages for subjects using the 
model 2 strategy can be constructed. This is table 8. 
The actual figures quoted in table 8 cannotq of course2 be taken 
very seriously as they are only derived. from small sani-ples. However, 
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they do indicate that both numerical and non-numerical methods of 
quantification are important in tho production of type 2 recnonces 
at all of the ages involved. This allows a rejection of the view that 
the result of the modified roulette experiment is caused by the subjects 
considering counting pieces to be inappropriate. 
Inspection of table 7 reveals a most interesting phenomenon. 
Many of the subjects using the model 2 strategy (i. e. giving type 2 
responses) seem to arrive at their answers by carrying out the strate. gy 
with both numerical and non-numerical quantifications. Furthermore, 
most of the subjects who don't report using both typos at onceq do not 
stick consistently to one type or the other in their answers, This 
gives the impression thrat what they are doing is applying the model 2 
strategy with both numerical and non-numerical quantifications. If 
these quantifications agree there is no problem, but otherwise one 
method must be preferred to the other. Possibly this will be the method 
leading to the larger discrepancy between wheels, possibly the lzist 
method carried out. The followinZ illustrations of this have been drawn 
from the experimental results: 
C+E: SrMi54ý problem MR4 green. 
Chooses 5G3RL. 'There's five quarters. That's more. 
They're bigCor. One more quarter than the other one'. 
E+C: SHR449 problem W red. 
Chooses 4G3RL. 'It's a bigger red than that one. Only 
three lines there, four here'. 
M+E: SlIR589 problem MR4 red. 
Chooses 5G3RL. 'Got more on than that one and theytre 
bigger'. 
B+M: SDIR34t problem MR4 green. 
Chooses 5G3RL. 'There's more green. It's a big. -er circle 
and there's more triangles'. 
C/E: STJR559 problem 14R2 red. 
Chooses 4G2RL. 'There's two here and three theref but 
they're smaller'. 
IVE: STE157ý problem 1JR2 green. 
Chooses 4G2RL. 'That's got : -, ore green coloursq but this 
one's wider'. 
. E/! 4: S1,., M349 problem MR2 green. 
Chooses 6G3RS. 'There's more green space on it. i'llore of 
the trian-lesq although they're smaller'. 
Table 7 also shows that cases where numerical methods are overruled. 
by non-numerical methods are more conmon that cases where non-numerical 
- ___________________________________________________________ 
(I" 
methods are overruled by numerical methods. In addition to this the 
non-numerical methoJs involved in the cases where two quantifications 
are performed me invariably size or width estimation, not recognition 
of fractions, Mich only appears in cases where a sin, 71e quantification 
is made. 
In the beads experiment the majority of subjects relied on numerical 
quantifications and in the roulette experiment the majority of subjects 
relied on non-numericAl quantifications. The predictions made for the 
results of the modified roulette experiment were based on the assumption 
that when aivcn the possibility of using either numerical or non-numorical 
Quantifications children would choose the former. The present jiscusuion 
shows that this assumption was unwarrantedg und that the result of tho 
experiment can be seen as resulting from indecision by the children as 
to which method to employ. On this view the increase in the number of 
type 2 responses Given by the younGer subjects is seen as resultin, ý; 
from the availability of countinC, milst the fact that this increase 
does not reach the level found in the bca0s cxrorimcnt is caused by the 
difficulty of reconciling counting of pieces with size estimation. 
The drop in the number of type -0, responses aTDears 
to be likewisc caused 
by the problem of deciding whether to use numerical. or non-numerical 
methods of q 
., 
uantification. If one method is decided on the type 3 
stratea can be executed, but carrying it out with both methoas and 
comparing the results would be a tedious and formidable task. Of the 
six type 3 responses found in the results two are based on counting and 
four on accurate rccoo , mition of 
fractions. 
Such an interpretation must naturally be treated with caution 
until it has been subjected to further tests. Before ways in which this 
might be done are outlined, however, the rest of the analysis of the 
results of the modified roulette experiment will be described. 
The overall result of the experiment seems to show a development 
from a first stage corresponding to the type 1 responses, to a second 
stage corresponding to the type 2 responses. This development does 
not involve so much stage mixture as was found in the result of the 
roulette experimentt chiefly because the second stage seems to be quite 
stable and there is only slight indication of possible development to 
a later third stage. This means that the result is like the beads 
experiment result in that the stages found seem to be stable, but the 
development is of the more gradual type seen in the result of the 
roulette experiment. However, if the interpretation of the result in 
terms of the discrepancy between numerical and non-numerical methoJs of 
quantification is correct, then the apparent stability of the second stage 
is deceptive. 
t 16o. 
Cluster analysis of results of the modified roulette experiment. 
As in the analysis of the first beads and roulette experiments the 
Brimer cluster analysis was -applied to the results in order to gain 
an independent and hopefully more objective appraisal of their signi- 
ficance. In this case only one cluster analysis was carried out, 
involving all the responses to the main experimental problems. 
The rationale behind the cluster analysi should now be familiar, 
so the description of the initial categories needed to classify the 
results will be begun immediately. This is most easily done by 
considering the problems used in the order MR3, MR49 IMP MR2. 
In problem 1,1113 the large wheel is divided into four green and three 
red pieces of equal size, and the small wheel is divided into four 
green and two red nieces. This means that when green is the target 
colour a pass choice is defined as choice of the small wheelq and a 
fail choice is either choice of the large wheel or an assertion that 
it doesn't matter which wheel is chosen. The following categories of 
responses can be distinguished on this item: 
FU: A fail choice without any reason givený or an unqualified 
assertion as to the correctness of the choiceg or repetition 
of the exDerimenter's instruction. 
e. g. SMR2: chooses 4G3RL. 'I'll win'. 
PU. - A pass choice accompanied by a reason like the reasons 
specified for FU. 
e. g. SI-IR15: chooses 4G2RS. 'It might land on a green one'. 
FSR: A fail choice accompanied 'by a #spurious' reason, such as the 
size of the wheel chosen, the sneed at which the pointer can 
rotate, or the segment the pointer starts on. 
e. g. S1-M3: chooses 4G3RL. 'It's a bigger circle'. 
PSR: A pass choice accompanied by a reason like FSR. 
e. g. SMR5: chooses 4G2RS. 'It's littler'. 
SPIR28: chooses 4G2RS. 'The point's on green'. 
FPR: A fail choice with a reason based on previous choices or 
previous outcomes, e. g. left-right alternationg large-small 
alternationý win-stay lose-shift strategy. 
e. g. S! JR9: chooses 4G3RL- tI just stopped before on it'. 
PPR: A pass choice with a reason like FPR. 
e. g. SMR1: chooses 4G2RS. 'I got red on the other one'. 
pap: A fail choice accompanied by reference to come relevant 
factor, without any clear reason for introducing it. 
e. g. S11R6: chooses 4G3RL. 'The green's on that side and the red's 
on that side'. 
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FQACT: A fail choice accompanied by a statement of the number of 
pieces of the target colour on the wheel chosen. 
O*go SI-IR52: chooses 4G3RL. 'It's got four'. 
FQAC: A fail choice accompanied by a statement of the number of 
pieces of both colours on the wheel chosen. 
cage SMR21: chooses MRL. 'It's got more than the red one. 
It's got fourg red only has throe'. 
PQAT4: A Pass choice accompanied by an assertion that there are 
more target than non-target pieces on the wheel chosen. 
No reference is made to the other wheel and no numbers 
are given. 
e. g. SVT41: chooses 4G2RS. 'Got more greens than reds. I 
think it'll stop on Croon. Never stops on red'. 
This answer combines reasons of the PQAl;, ' and PPR categories, but as 
it is the only example of PQAT4 on this item it can be left as PQAM. 
PQAC. - A pass choice accompanied by a statement of the number of 
pieces of both colours on the wheel chosen. 
e0go SMR51: chooses 4G2RS. 'ThatIls got two, thb other's got 
four'. 
PQAE: A pass choice accompanied by an assertion th, "t the target 
segment is larger than the non-target segment on the wheel 
chosen. No reference is made to the other wheel. 
O. Ce ST-IR39: chooses 4G2RS. 'There's more Creen and lesc red 
on it'. 
FQ2E: A fail choice with a reason based on a comparison of the 
-he target segments on each wheel. sizes of 1. 
e. g. SMR20: chooses 4G3RL. 'The easiest Ices it's Cot the 
most green on'. 
FQTDE: A fail choice with a reason indicating comparison of the 
two Heels by estimating the amount of dots of the tarC; et 
colour on each wheel. 
e*C* SMR44: chooses 4G3RL. 'Bigger green bit. Got more dots 
than that green one' 9 
I"WE: A fail choice with a reason idicating comparison of the 
sizes of the target nieces on each wheel. 
e. g. SUR31: chooses 4G3RL. 'These green bits are bir,., 7er, 
those are s. m, -Lller. It might land on them'. 
FQTI: A fail choice with a reason based on a comý)ariaon of the 
widths of the target segments on cach wheel. 
, reen 
bits are bi-gerg tho2c e. g. SMR35: chooses 4G3RL. 'These p 
are Smaller. It might land on them. 
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FQTECX: A fail choice with a reason in which a compýRrison of' tho 
numbers of target pieces on each wheel is overruled by 
a comparison of the sizes of the tarCct negments on each 
wheel. 
e 31, '. R24-: chooses 4G3RL. 'It's got more 7, reen. Aur on 
each but it's much larger'. 
FQTEPW: A fail choice with a reason baseO. on comparison of both 
the sizes the target aagpents on each wheel and the sizco 
of the pieces in the target segments on c, -. ch wheel. 
e. e. SMR56: chooses 4G3RL. 'Large has the bent chance 1cor, 
it's bigger and with wider triangles'. 
PQTI,, I: A pass choice with a reason based on comna-rison of the 
numbers oftarget pieces on each i., ýheel. The exact number 
is not specified, but an assertion is made that either 
wheel may be chosen (there are the snne number of target 
pieces on each wheel)9 and the choice in the result of 
a guess. 
e. g. STNU136: chooses AG2RS. 'Both got the same. I'll have 
the small one'. 
PQTF: A pass choice W4 th a reason based on comparison of the .L 
fraction of each wheel cover, -, d by the target segiment. 
The fractions will not necessarily be r!.. cogniced accurately. 
csg. SKR53: chooses 4G2RS. 'It's much bigger. It's more 
round. Looks more like a half over there and only a 
quarter red here'. 
PCjITL: A pass choice with an assertion that there are less, of 
the non-target pieces on the wheel chosen. No numbers 
are given. 
C. g. SMR45: chooses 4G2RS. 'There's less of reds'. 
PQNTC: A pass choice with a reason basce, on comparison of the 
numbers of ncnn-target picces, on each wheb12 and choice 
of the wheel with less. 
e. C. SDIR50,: chooses 02113. 'Only the two parts rc, 10 the 
other has thrue parts'. 
MITE: A pz. ý. ss choice with a reason based on cor.,, -)ariron of 
the 
sizes of the non-target segments on each wheelý and. 0110icc 
of the wheel with the sinallcr non-tarCct seCmont. 
C*G@ W247: chooses 4G2RS. 111ot so much red as therel, 
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p ZIT"? A pass choice with a re-ýson based on comparison of -1viie 
fraction of each wheel covercd by the non-targot OeCment .4 
and choice of the wheel with the SM-211er fraction. The 
fractions need not necessarily be recognised accurately. 
Cog* S.,,: R46: chooses 4G2RS. 111ore green on. There's a quarter 
red there and a bit on this'. 
PQTIITTC: A pass choice with a rea 
, 
son indicating both size estimation 
and COIL'Itine the number of non-target nieces. 
e. g. SMP, 22: chooses 4G2RS. 'It's Smaller and there's only 
two red ones'. 
In the part of problem MR3 involving rod as the tarCet colour a 
paps choice is choice of 4G3RL and a fail choice is choice of 4G2RS. 
The following categories must be added to the list: 
PQAPE: A paps choice with an assertion that the pieces of the 
target segment are larger than the piecea of the non-tar-et 
segment on the wheel chosen. 
COCO SKR29: chooses 4G3RL. 'The red bits look bigger than the 
green bits'. 
FQTL: A fail-choice with an assertion that there are less pieces 
of the target colour on the wheel chosen. No numbers are 
given. 
e. c. SIUI10:. chooses 4G2RS. 'It's Got less red ones'. 
PQTC: A pass choice based pn a comparison of the numbers of 
pieces of the target colour on eC-, ch wheel. 
e. g. SHR52: chooses 4G3RL. 'It's Cot three, the other only 
has two'. 
PQTS: A pass choice based on a comparison of the numbers of 
pieces of the target colour on each wheelf with a statement 
of how many more are on the wheel chosen. 
e. g. SMR35: chooses 4G3RL. 'It's got one part more than that 
one 1, 
PQTI,;: A pass choice based on a comparison of the sizes of the 
target segments on each wheel. 
e. G. STJR41: chooses 4G3RL. 'Looks like a bigger red. bit 
than the little one'* 
PQTMR: A pass choice based on an assertion that there are more 
radii on the target segment chosen. No numbers are given. 
e. g. SNR47: chooses 4G3RL. 'More red. The amount of lines 
tells you'. 
PQTSE: A pass choice based on an attempt to compare the angles 
subtended by each of the target segments at the centrec of 
the wheels. 
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e. g. SI-IR53: chooses 4G3RL. 'Bigger span than that one'. 
PQTEPH: A pass choice with a reason based on comparisons of both 
the sizes of the target segments on each wheel and the 
sizes of the pieces in the target segments on each wheel. 
e. g. SVIR56: chooses 4G3RL. 'There's more-_ýred. The circle'r, 
bigger and the bits are bigger'. 
PQTCE: A pass choice with a reason based on comparisons of both 
the numbers of target pieces on each iý, rheel and the sizes 
of the target seGments on each wheel. 
e. g* SMR34: chooses 4G3RL. 'Only two ones there and three 
here. Bigger space as well'. 
PQTEC: A -pýiss choice with a reason based on comparisons of both 
the sizes of the target segments on each wheel and the 
numbers of target pieces on each wheel. 
e. g. SMR36: chooses 4G3RL- 'It's the bigi3est red. That's 
got twoq this has three'. 
This completes the list of categories needed for problem 1423. 
In problem 1, M49 the large kheel is divided into five Green and three 
red piecosy and the small wheel has four green and two red pieces. 
This means that when green is the target colour a pass choice is 
choice of the small wheel, and a fail choice is choice of the large 
wheel. The following now categories are introduced: 
FRF: A -nanss choice accompanied by reference to some relevant factorg 
without any clear reason for introducing it. 
e. g! SjjRll: chooses 4G2RS. 'Got two lott--of reds on'. 
FQ&I"FL: A fail choice accompanied by an assertion that there are 
more target than non-target pieces on the wheel chosen. 
No reference is made to the other wheel and no numbers 
are Given. 
e. g. SDIR51: chooses 5G3RL7 'It's got more green sides than the 
rcd ones'. 
PQTA: A pass choice followinE an assertion that either Heel may 
be chosen as there are more green pieces than red pieces 
on each wheel. 
e. c. SMR41: chooses MRS. 'My one. BothIve Cot more greens 
on each side. Try the little one'. 
PQAMS: A puss choice accompanied by an assertion that there are 
more target than non-target pieces on the wheel chosen. 
No reference is made to the other wheel, but the number 
of extra target pieces is given. 
e. g. SMIR42: chooses MRS. 'More green than the red parts. 
Four more'. 
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NPI'l: rQTC: PQTS. * FQ2MR: Fail choices with reasons like 
Pq? M: FQTC: PqrS: Pqrluz. 
FQTSR: A fail choice with a reason based on comparison of tho 
numbers of radii on the target scgr_nents of each wheel. 
'Phe number of extra radii on the wheel chosen is given. 
C*C* S!,! R53: choose-00 5G3RL. 'There'. -, just one more of them 
lines than on that one'. 
FQTMW: A Fail choice with an apsortion that the wheel chosen has 
more pieces of the tareet colour and a wider target segment. 
C. C. SMR57: chooses 5G_')RL. 'Got :, iorc -, reens and vrifIorl. 
F(rill, J: A fail choice with an assertion that -',, he whocl chosen hzýs 
a lar er tar-et segment and more piece-, of the t--rCct colour. 9U 
C*gO SMR34: chooses 5G3RL. 'There's more Croen. It's a bi-, zar 
circle and there's more triangle--'. 
FQTDME: A fail choice with a staterient that -the other -,, i'. lccl would 
be best because it has more niece-, of the target colour -, nd 
a larger target segment. 
e. g. STýR59: chooses 5G3RL. 'Hasn't got morc )o. rtsj I ju, -t want 
it. Bigger is the best one really'. 
parent misquantification of tho PQTXCX11: A fail choice based on -an Lip, 
number of target pieces on each wheelt follo,,,, cd by size 
estimation. 
e. g. SMR36: chooDes 5G3RL. 'It's the biggest. Both've got the 
same greens. This is the biggest green bit'. 
PZTTPE: A pýiss choice based on comparison of the sizes of the non- 
target pieces on each iý.,, heel and choice of the whocl with 
smaller pieces. 
SIM12 2: ther br- bi-. -, cr red C. C. 1 4- chooses 4G2RS. 'The o U_ 
Mien md is the target colour in problcr. 17, RZj a pass choice is choice 
of t1he large wheel (5G3RL) and a fail choice is choice of the small 
v,, heel (4G2RS). This leaC. -_ to -the introduction of further categories: 
PQAFL: A pass choice with L assertion that the vhocl chosen -Ln- 
doesn't have as many target as non-target pieces. No 
reference is made to the other wheel and no numbers are 
given. 
e qOP 0 S102, P: chooses 5G3RL. 'Hasn't got as many red trian, -les as 
green triangles. 
FQTCL: A fail choice resuitin, - from -a comparison of the numbers 
of target pieces on each wheel and choice of the wheel with 
less. 
166. 
C. C. STIR12: ohooces 4-G211S. 'It's -ot two rods. I don't wcant 
so much on the naporl. 
PQTSR: A n,, ns choice with a reason base6 on comparicon of the 
ni=borc of r, -ýdii on the target se,, mcnts of each circle. 
The number of extra radii on the wheel choesen is given. 
0 5G'RL. 'Theroln more red on it. There's C. G. SMR44: choo- - 
morc lines. One morc line'. 
P IQT NPEA choice b,,.,. --(, d on comparison of both the numbers of 
.? 
icces on e,, cl-i wlicul ,. nO the size of Vic tc. rf, -ct target - 13 
nicces on cac'l,, whoel. 
e. g. S T',, R58: choo--C-, 5,3RL. 'Got more on than that one and 
thcl, rl--c bi-r-ort. 
Problenic TIR1 In(! MR2 are different t,,, 7roblelo YR3 ýýnd 111RI": in that 
they have cqual proportions of red -'rO . 7reen on e, -. c}l I.: 11C t21- PL Pass 
res c; Q"a , nonse then involves an assertion thý,. t cither wi n, y 
be ch, , -on 
and preference for either Vhcel becomcs a The cate, ýorication 
scheme can be modified to cover thi- -ituation by addin. - the s,, iffixe'-I 
By for choice of the ln. rgc whecl, and S09 for choice of the mnall whce! 7 
to the fail categories. When this has been done the following cate. -, ories 
must also be v-dded, to the li,,, t for iuroblom M1111 when the target colour is 
green. 
(In problem MR1 the 1c. rge wheni is diviCcd into three u-rocn an(ý three 
red piccez, wh. i1c the s: nall wheel is divided. into four ,, -reen and 
four 
red nieces). 
FQAES A fail choice of the small whee! a claim that the tarcct Lj 
segment is larger than the non-target segment. 
cogs SMR21: chooseý- 404RS. 'The green bit's biT-er than the rcC 
bit. I can tell by all the dots'. 
F QAWB: A fail choice of the large wheel with a claim that the tar, -ct 
pieces are laracr than the non-tar, ýct pieccs. 
COG* ST-IR41: chooses 3G3RL. 'It lool<s bio, -cr. The green bits 
look bi, -, aer than the red bits'. 
FQAFB: A fail choice of the larL-, -c wheel accompeanied by specification 
of the fraction of the whocl covered by the green --nd red 
e. ce Sl'! R37: 'chooses 3G3RL- 'Thereto half -, nO. half. It -houlO, 
stop easier'. 
FZPCL: A fail choice of the vhcel on t-hc -, rnuncls -lv-hat it h, -x 
less DiOcen of -I, he tarCet c, -)lo,,, ir than the sr,, all wheel . 
e. g. ' SMR10 : chooses 3G3. RL. ITtIO i7ot less than that one. Only 
throe'. 
7-67- 
FQTP', I-* A fail c)'Oice or the largo whool on tl, o Crounft th, -, t it L, 
has wider pioccri of tli(, t, -, r-o t colour thrm the v! 
L. > 
SYR 350. chow-, vs 3GýRT,.. 'The. ý7reun bits -ro wiO. nrl. 
A fail. choice of the l, -rZ7c , jhcol- bcc--,, u; c it le. 's rle. ý7., ionto 
of the turCet colour anj n lure-er tar-ot meement-.. Id L. ) 
e. -* 3TTR55-O choores 3G3RL.. 'Got less and it's bio-or red'. 6W i_p 
FQT'PDS: A fail choice with reco,, , nition of 
the fr: lction of the vhcel 
chosen covcre(ý by the t, -Lrgct colour2 follmied by an assertion 
thcat there are raorc dots on the target sc,, naent of the whael. 
choseno 
e. g. 'o SI-TR29: choose-- 4U4RS- 'It'-- ý-, t half. 
Looks like it's got 
more green r;,, )otcl. 
PQTW: -or vihich whccl is chosen, An assertion that it doesn't mat-,. 
with a choice based on comparison of the widths of the 
tarL-et segments on each i; heel. 
e. U STJR58: choouses 3G3RL. 'Got vider ones, than, that. Both dead 
heat ones really'. 
PQ, RC: A passs resnonse based on the fact that there are the szamc 
number of tar-ot and non-tarect pieces on each of the wheels. 
e. g. STTR48: chooses 3G3RL. 'Both the same. Throe of each. It 
might stop on red. Could be either really. ' 
POP: A pass response based on the fact that there is the same 
fraction of target and non-target colour on the surfacc of 
of each wheel. 
e. g. SITR59: chooses 3G3RL. 'Both the came. Both got half green 
and half red. Just for luck'. 
For the part of problem, MIR1 in which red is tha target colour only 
one more category is needed: 
FQ21. "IX: A fail choice based on overruling of the wheel with more 
pieces of the target colour in favour of the wheel, with 
the larger target segment. 
e. g. ST-TR24: chooses 303RL. 'Other has moreq but this is bigger'. 
In problem, MR2 the large wheel is divided into four green and two 
red piocesy and the small wheel is divided intoEix green and three red 
pieces. Wh ether green or red is tha target colour a pans response is 
defined as an assertion that choice of tither wheel is equally likely 
to lead to ctccess9 and preference for one wheel over the other is 
regarded as a fail. 
When gr een is the target colour the following new categories mu, A 
be introduc ed: 
10. 
N&P-It'': A fail choice based on comparison of the sizes of the pieces 
on each whoeI2 and choice of the wheel with tho l, _-Lrgcr pieces. 
C#ge SKR22: chooses 4G2RL. 'It's got bigt-er squares. It's more 
easier'. 
FQJTTC: A fail choice based on comparison of the number of non-target 
pieces on each wheel and choice of the wheel with less. 
C. C. SMR60: chooses 4G2RL. 'Only got two redo, three redo on 
the other'. 
FQTSE: A fail choice based on an attempt to compare the angles 
subtended by each of the target segments at the centres of 
the Keels. 
e. g. SMR53: chooses MRS. 'The span outwards is a bit more 
bigger'. (Shows with his hands and tries to measure). 
FQTI, =: A fail choice based on implicit compRrison of the numbers 
of target pieces on each wheel and overruling their size 
difference's. I-To numbers are given. 
C. C. SMR34: chooses WAS. Mere's more green srace on 
A. 
More of the trianCles, although they're smaller'. 
FW, ýPllx: A fail choice based on comparison of the widths of the target 
segments on each Keel and overruling a claim that the wheel 
not chosen has more pieces of the target colour. No numbers 
are given. 
e. g. SMR57: chooses 4G2RL. 'That's got more green coloura2 but 
this one's wider'. 
Finallyp when red is the target colour in problem I-IR27 one more 
category is needed: 
PQ, T'NCX: A fail choice based on comparison of the widths of the 
target segments on each Keel and overruling a comparison of 
the numbers of target pieces on each wheel. The numbers of 
non-target pieces on each wheelzro quoted in au! )port of the 
choice made. 
b. g. SlIR58: chooses 4G2RL. 'There's two wide ones instead of 
three little ones. Only four greens, six on the other one'. 
This complet0s the list of categories needed. to classify the results 
of the modified roulette experiment. Once again the point must be made 
that the cateCory labels are intended as aids to the reader, and the 
categories themselves are formed by grouping tof; ether indistinguishable 
responses to the same experimental item. The complete categorisation 
of the recults7 together with data in the form uced for the analysis, can 
be found in Appendix H. 
lu, 
The increase in the number of categories which muot be introduced for 
the results of the modified roulette experiment is striking. The 
experiment involves 60 subjects each givino 8 reopon: cs and requires 
177 categories. Me comparable analyses from the bea0c and roulette 
experiments involved 8 responses from 72 subjects in each caric, with 
141 categories and 116 categories respectively. Of the categories 
from the modified roulette experiment results 86 arc uniouc in the 
sense that they only have one membew This illustrates the cat 
variability of responses in this experiment. 
A description of the first-order groups of subjects generated 
by the cluster analysis program, in terms of the factors which seem 
to underly the Groupingsy will now be given. The read. er can check 
the interpretations by consulting Appendix H. 
Group 1: A oup of subjects Me choose erratically an(I give reasons 
for their choices which are spurious or irrelevant by adult 
standards. This Group has 15 members. 
Group 2: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by comparing 
the numbers of picqcs of the tarjet colour on each wheel. 
The categories of type PWC and FQTC correspond to thic method. 
The group h:, s 8 memberc. 
Group A youp of subjects who often make fail choices based on a 
comparison of the sizes of the target scacnts on each whoel. 
The Group has 10 members. 
Group 4: A soup of subjects who choose erratically and don't give any 
reasons other than renctitions of the experimental instructions 
or unqualified assertions as to the correctncss of the choices 
made. The group has 8 members. 
Group 5: A Group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by compnrinZ 
the sizes of the target pieces on the two wheels. The categories 
PQTE m6 FQTM correspond to this mothodl and, the gToun has 
similarities to Coup 3. 
Group 3(10 members) and. arour 5 (8 members) hcve 6 nembers 
in common. 
Group 6: A similar son to soup 1. 
Group 1 (12 members) and group 6 (11 members) have 10 members 
in common. 
Group 7: A similar group 1 and gro= 6. 
Group 1 (12 members) and soup 7 (10 members) have 9 members 
in common. 
Group 6 (11 members) and group 7 have 7 members in common. 
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Group 8: A similnx -, rour to g-rou7) AI. 
Group ý, (8 members) and ,, rov-p 8(8 -, Y. icmbcrs) hr. ve 7 membei-s 
in com: ý,, on. 
Grou, p 9: A 7-, rou? of subjeo-Wo who solve problem, I-11111 by comprir-ln, ý7 -the 
fractions of o.. -,. cl-, wheel covere(I. by the t,, r, -Ot anC, non-tarret 
seC,, m c., n- 'Lls . The Croup lil-. s 3 members. 
Group 10: A -roup of subjects who -! ve answers of the PQTTC -. nd 11'1', VPIý 
categories- to problem MIR3. The har, 4 mc;, ibors. 
Group 11: A grou-) with pointo of simiil-,, rity to ý; roupco lp 69 and 7, but 
coverinC a wiClcr of annswers. Some of the members of ', Ilic 
-) -ivc r-iorc uncl, -x-cifiable than Ispur-lous' relaconc. 7"he , -rou- .L 
. -roup h,,. o 
3 membcro. 
Group 12: A group like C; rc'-'P 5 (with a lot of ex-c.,,, -ýlos of the c,,, tcC(-)r4_(, z 
PQTh' ind, FqPE), come similarity to , Trou-, 2, (wiicli lr-x, a 
core of FQT. Iý res-onses). 
Groun 3(10 members) anO, -rour 12(7 5 -, i--;:, bcrr, 
in common. 
Grou-) 5 (8 members) anO. C; rou-, 12 hc,, vo 6 membc: -s in p 
Gr 0 up 13 A -roun like -, roun 5 and , -roun 122 with come si-ilarity to 
-r o u-P 3- 
Group 3 (10 members) cand crou-_) 13(7 , Ter., -, bcro) have Ii members 
in common. 
Group 5(8 members) 'and Croup 1-1, have 5 members in common. 
Grour 12 (7 members) and grour 1-', liixe 6 me-, bers in common. 
Group 14: A similar -rou-p to -roup 1, group 62 ane. grrouP 7- 
Group 1 (12 members) and group 1A, (11 mombors) have 9 members 
in common. 
Group 6 (11 members) ý-nd. L-, roun 14 have 
8 members in common. 
Group 7 (10 members) and L-, roup 14 have 
8 members in com,,, ron. 
, ive -,,. n2wcrs Groun 15: A jroun of subjects who make errntic choices 
which are sDuriouz or irrelevant by adult ctandccrdcq czI. )Cci, -, ', ly 
problems MIRI MR2. The u-roLip has so-ne similarity to on 
Croup 1ý group 6,0 oup 7, ,, r and -roup 14- 
Group 1 (12 members) cnO. croup 15 members) li: ý. -, rc 7 members 
in co-m-non - 
Group 6 (11 members) and group - -., on. . t, 
15 have 5 members in com! 
Grour 7 (10 members) and ýSroup 15 havc 7 members in com-ion. 
Group 14 (11 members) and 7-oup 15 have 6 members in common. 
Group 16: A similar . -roup to group 1, Croun 
61 -roun 79 and grou'O 11, - 
Group 1 (12 members) and grour 16 (10 members) hwe 8 mciriber-c 
in common. 
. L. I ... 
Group 6 (11 members) and i7, rour 16 h;, VO ý -io; nborc in com, ,, n. 
., o 
7 (10 members) anO, . 7roup. Grou: 16 hv,, ve 7 membe-1; in coP,,:;,, nn. 
Group 14 (11 members) and , 7, roup 16 h.,,,. ve in common. 
Group 17: A Croup of subjects i,, *ho make erratic choices c,. aO. Cive i: ýnnwcrs 
which are spurious or irrelcw%n-I,, bLr --0 - ult oto e-- -ý)ccicll y 
in reoronoc to : )rob1cms KRJ rrO. MR4. The harý Z(-)-, lc Si 
to -roup 19 C; roun 61 -, noan- 79 croup 149 :; roun 16- 
Group 1 (12 mcmbers) 'nd r-, rour 17 (12 members) h, -. vo QS ic-iberc 
in common. 
Group 6 (11 member--) anC. grou-) 17 h-Live 7 nombcr-, in com: -, -)n. 
Group 7 (10 -. ieinbcrs) and L-roun 17 -h, --. -ve 
7 members in comnion. 
Group 14 (11 mc: -, bcrs) rrou: p 17 hz-,. vo 10 members i n common. 
Group 16 (10 members) ana jý7roxý 17 lhavc 8 mcnibcro in com;,, ýon. 
Grou--p 18: A similar group to -rcu7 1, group 6, or 0, -, P 7t ýrour) 11, sroun 1,1 - 
16, 
and to some el-Itent -roup 17- 
Group 1 (12 members) and , - 16 (10 11-ve members 7 
in com, ý: on. 
Group 6 (11 mciibers) -. n. C croul) 18) h, ý-ve 3 mo. nbcrs in corn;, ion. 
Groulo 7 (1-0 members) aný, group 13 hý-, vc 8 members in corni.,, on. 
Group 1ý (11 members) , nd gro-L,, T) 18 have 8 members in com. -, on. 
Group 16 (10 members) and group 18 have 9 members in com., -. on. 
Group 17 (12 members) ý: -nC group 18 have 
7 members in common. 
Gr o up 11 A cimil--r group to O-rouP 4 arid Croup 
8. 
Groun 4 (8 members) ana crroup 15 (6 members) have 5 members 
in common. 
Group 8 (8 members) and grour 19 have 4 mcnbcro in c omr-,, or.. 
Group 20: A hateroZencous group of five subjects who don't see m to bclon u- 
together. The wciC]htinC; z of the mc,, -, ibcvs to thit Croup are not 
very high. 
Group 21: A simil:: ýr group to Croup 1, Croup 6, group 7, gr-cun 14, 
16, 
group 17 1 , ýn(l group 18. 
Group 1 (12 members) and group g2l (8 mcmbeiýc) h, -, ve 7 ncmbers 
in common. 
Group 6 (11 membccs) L-. n--' grou7 21 have 6 rn. ci-,, berz in comi. -, on- 
Group 7 (10 members) 
, 
and grolip 21 have . 
11, rmcmberc in common. 
Group 14 (11 me-mbers) and -, rou. n 21 h,,, ve 6 members in common. 
Group 16 (10 members) 1*ý. nd group 21. lirwo 5 members, in common - 
Group 17 (12 membe--s) and group 21 hzve 5 members in common. 
Group 13 (10 members) and . -rour 
21 have 4 members in com. "'On. 
Group 221: A Croun like group 3 (which has -L lot of of 'U'l-le 
,p categories). The group h. -s come si, nilarity to grou, 51 -r,,, c,:, L., 12, 
17"-'* 
and Group 13. 
Group (10 members) anC 2, '-1 (7 huxfn 6 iýemb(, '; 's 
in common. 
GrouP 5 (8 members) anC, Group 2-21 havc 3 member-o in c-)-1,.,. on. 
Group 12 (7 members) anC -rouT) h, -, ývc 
4 membcro in comm, ior. 
Group 13 (7 members) and groculp 22 h%vc 3 mombers" in co!,, i; -; on. 
Group 23: A Lroup of subjects Giving snurious or irrelev- t arswers, to t) an. 
problems MR1 and MR29 like Group 15- 
Group 15 (8 members) and Group 23 (8 members) have 6 members 
in common., 
Group 24: A group of subjects C; iving little or no justification for their 
choices, like Group 41 Group 89 and L, -ro-ap 1ý- However, Croup, '24 
takes in a wider range of different rcsponses than these Croul)s- 
Group 4(8 members) and Croup 24 (3 memberc) have 5 mcmbers 
in common. 
Group 8 (8 members) and Group 224 h,, ý, ve 6 members in co-l: -, I. on. 
Group 19 (6 members) -, nd groun 24 have 4 members in common. 
Group 25: A Croup Giving some answers bascO, on spurious or irrelevant 
factors, and some answers citing relevant factors without any 
clear indication as to why they were introduced. The groUP 
has 8 members. 
Group 26: A similar Croup to Croup 24. 
Group 24 (8 members) and group 26 (7 mcml5ers) have 6 members 
in common. 
Group 27: A similLar group to Croup 2. 
Group 2 (8 members) and group 27 (8 members) have 6 members 
in common. 
Group 28: A Group of subjects who make fail choices and give little or 
no justifications in response to problem VIR4. The group h, --3 
some similarity to Group 41 group 82 and Croup 19. 
Group 4 (8 Oembera) and group 28 (6 members) have 5 members 
in common. 
Group 8 (8 members) and group 28 have 4 members in common. 
Group 19 (6 members) and Croup 28 have 4 members in common. 
Group 29: A group of subjects who give same spurious or irrelevant 
reasonsq but a variety of other reasons as well. The Croup 
has 8 members. 
Group 30: A group of subjects who seem to solve the problems by 
comparing the sizes of the target segments on each whecl- 
The group has some similarity to group 32 group 5t Croup 12, 
group 13p group 22. 
17. 
Groun 3 (10 members) and I ý0 (7 members) have 4 members in 
common. 
GrouD 5 (8 members) and Croup -1PO 
have 4 members in common. 
Group 12 (7 members) and Croup 30 have 4 members in connon. 
Group 1' ) (7 members) and group 30 h,,., Lve 3 mc, -, ibers in common. 
Group 22 (7 members) and Croup 30 have 4t members in common. 
Group 31: A similar Croup to Croup 49 Croup 8, and group 1, '* 
Group 4 (8 members) and Croup 31 (6 members) have 5 members 
in common. 
Group 8 (8 members) and group 31 have 4 members in common. 
Group 19 (6 members) and group 31 have 4 members in common. 
Group 32: A group of subjects who p , 
ive anwers of the PQTM category in 
response to problem MR3 when red is the target colour. The 
group is similar to group 10. 
Group 10 (4 members) and Croup 32 (4 members) have 3 members 
in common. 
Group 33: A heterogahteous Croup of subjects who all give at least one 
response with a reason based on a previous outcome or previous 
choice. The group has 4 members. 
Group 34: A group of subjects who give a number of reasons referring to 
previous outcomes or previous choices. The group is similar 
to group 33. 
Group 33 (4 members) and group 34 (2 members) have 2 members 
in common. 
Group 35: Two cubýects who give responses of category PQTDE to problem V 
MR1 when green is the target colour, and category PQTMR to 
problem MR4 when red is the target colour. 
One of the most noticeable things about these groups is the L-IrCe 
amount of overlapping between them. This is due to the large number 
of small categories inýthe original results. Most of the groups -seem 
to correspond to the strategies associated with the stages tentatively 
outlined. In addition, the different response styles ascociuted with 
the first stages which were found in the beads and roulette blucter 
analyses seem to chow up again. The stage 2 strategy anpears in different 
groups in the form using counting of pieces as the means of quantification 
and in the form*using size estimation. Recognition of fractions does not 
show up as a means Of O-uantification pormeatinC a whole group. exce-nt in 
the special case of Croup 9, where it is associated with the model 3 
strategy. The use of the word 'moral instead of numbers, which probably 
indicates the use of estimation to avoid the extra effort involved in 
17.,,. 
counting, is found in groups 10 and 2ý2- 
The second stage of the cluotc, .L r analysis involves 
the formatlon of 
clusters of the oriGin, -. l grounin-s. Followino the interpretation of 
the original -roups advanced, the followinE; clusters would be expected.: 
Cluster A: A cluster of Croupc of subjects who clioo,; e crrttically and 
offer no justification of their choices, or a justification b, -. z; ed on 
repetition of the experimental instructionot or an unqualified assertion 
that the choice is correct. This cluster will consist of -roup 49 groun 8y 
Group 10, Group 24y Group 26, -roun 20, and groun 31- 
Cluster B: A clustcr of groups of subjects who erratic choices 
an6. give reasons which are spurious or irrelevant by adult stand, %rdo. 
This cluster will, =nsist of group 1ý Group 6f group 7s jrouT) 11, 
groitp 23, Group 14, Group 159 group 169 -roun 179 L, ýrou-p groun 21, 
group 25, and group 29. 
Cluster C: A cluster of Grouns of subjects who prefer to mL-ýI: e their 
choices by comparing the numbers of -, )ieces of the tavrr-, -et colour on eacl, 
wheel and choosing the wheel which has more. This cluster will consist 
of group 21 and group 27, 
a4 Cluster D: A cluster of groups of subjects who prefer to make th ir 
choices by comparing the sizes of the target segments on ernch wheel 
- segment. This cluster and choosing the wheel with the larger target 
will consist of group 32 Group 51 Group 12-, group 13, group 22, and 
group 30. 
However, there are other possible clusters as vlellq particularly 
in the form of combinations of these 6lusters. Clusters A and B may 
well form a single cluster of Type 1 rcsponscsý and clusters C anc, D 
overlap considerably too because of the tendency of subjects to si"'itch 
from one type of quantification at the other throughout the experiment. 
There may also be a transition cluster drawinC to., "Wher grouns from 
clusters A. or B with Groups fror,. clusters C or D, sinco cluoters of 
this type were found in the beads and roulette ý, ý, nalysco. 
In addition, a number of the first-order grc,,.,. ns do not s-ec: -, to -'L'i-t 
neatly into this pattern. Thcae, -are L-, roup I; ), Group 
10, - , rour 
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Group 32, Group 331 and grour 34. ý_Iwo pairs of these Groups sac: -. I to 
from the following small clusters: 
Group 10 and-grou-D 32: Two grou-ps of subjects who solve some of tAO 
problems by choosinC, the wheal i-,, itlla rr. ore pieces of the target colour 
without sceming to count. These grours may belon, - with nreeictcd U 
Cluster C. 
Group 33 and grouý) 34:. Two groups of subjects who sometimes give 
reason-- referring to previous choices or previous outcomcs. These L> 
La . -'roups may 
belonG I-; itlh -predicteo. cluý, tcr_?. 
175. 
The rcmainin- -rou-r)-, arc: 
Group The Croup of sub-ects who -ivo ty:, c 3 ,. r: -. wcrn to nroblem 1, 
This will 7)rob, -,. bly fit in with cluotcr D, ac tl, )o o'thur -,, r., -wort3 , 7iv(, n 'b,,, 
these cubjects '-. re of ty, ýQ 2 with cotimLtion Irs the m(A-1106 of 
nuantification. 
2EaL, Lp 20 This i-I , very hetcro onco-, -, - and it .: i-*, ýht rro anywhore. 
2E2L2 in t* 
--15: 
There are only two -subject-- . 
ic r-ro,,, -r)p viho Ci%, c rnc., -nl., r 
ty-, ý, o 2 reasons with estimation. as the mothoO of nuantification (a,, -L. rt 
from the rather unusual rcs: ýonce-- which h, -, vc cuu--c6 them, to be ý-rc, )'anod, 
tr--ethcr). They will probably be associateO- 1.14 -LIL 1. )-e dicted cluoter D. 
In fact the cluster analysis nrograrn generates a s,.,. r-prisinCly larý-e 
number of clusters (seventeen 94o be nrocioc). These will be nrcsontod 
in the order -cneratcd, 2 anC. O. iscussed in tcrr., -, of -1.1icir cunst-4tuent -roup-- 
and thezubjects listed as belonC; inG to them. ý, Ihc lists of Grou: -, and sub- 
d-acts- belonging to each cluster ciýn be foUrd 4nA. )pendix 119 i., Ihiclh allo'., 10 
14 the roadcr to for-, 's own opinion of ti-to a0-vz,. ncc0,. 
Cluster 1: The ý; roups making un, the clu-ter consist of all the --rours 
in the predictcO. cluster D, together witl- :; rouT) 35- In other ".. Torcl., 2 this 
in 
eý! clust er of subjecto wlio 01"tCY1 201VC the problems, by coi,,,, ). --rin,, the V L, 
sizes of the target segnonts on oac! -ý i,,, he(, ll ý-nd the ilhýccl -vrf k1h 
the larger target scC;, nent. This is confir-nea 'by J=7, nection of the 
subjects listed as belor. CinZ to tlo clustor, -is thi-, list coný! i-ts o. L all 
the subjects who give more than one ros--)onse of tii-- ',, y: )c except S1,. 55- 
Cluster 2: The grounc in this cluster arc the Crou-ý? c in the :, )redicted. 
clusters A and B2 toE; ether groun 2(0. This cluster, ther, br4n-s U 
together Lall the grours renresentin,:; the typo 1 solutiono. The subjccts 
listed for the cluster are all subjects who ma"--. c orratic choices --nd cive 
a mixture of irrelevant justifications and no justificationz. 
Cluster 3: This cluster co,. Issists of -ILIic Gro-, rýs in predicted cluý; tcr Cy 
groups 9 and 10, and ý-; rouns from predicted cluster B (, Troup 11 ý; roup 11, 0- 
, grour, 14, groun 179 -, rou-, ) 21). All the subjects linted for the cluL; ter 
give answers arrived at by countinZ the numbers of tarý; ct nieces on cach 
whecI2 and choosing the whccl .., Iith ,, -iorc targot : )ieccs. 
ClUS-L Cluster 4: This cluster consists of the -roitns in predicted ucr C, 
to-ethor with Crou-no 92 102 an(ý 3", ane. groups from prcCl. icted cluster B 
(groups 1,149 179 21). The cluster is very simil-ý1. r in its constituent 
grours to cluster 3. Only one subject is listed for the clustorl vho 
also listed for cluster 3. 
Cluster 5:, TITO groups from nredicted cluster A (grouns 28,31), al 
group from predicted cluster B (ýgroup 2-, )p and grounz 3,2-ý ancl 34- 
176 . 
The subjects 1J-ted for the cluoter P. M. ý,, ivc sonc! P, n. -, wcrs baor! O- an 
previous outcomes or previous choices. 
Cluster 6: The groups making u-) -predUcted. cluotor A, (; roupt, from 7redicted. 
cluster B (grouns 197Y15ý16118121p2392ý, )p and ý: rou-pr; 20 -. r. O. T14ith the 
exception of group 339 these groups form a selection of the grnupo listed. 
for cluster 2. The subjects listed for cluster 6 also form a selection 
of those listed for cluster 29 and. give the same mixture of -, '. nswcrs 
with irrelevant justifications and answers with no justifications. 
Cluster 7: Four groups from preclicted cluster D (grouro 5vl2Y1300), 
and group 32. The subjects listed for the cluster all give answers 
arrived at by comnaring the sizes of the target segments on each whoel 
and choosirig the wheel with the largest target scament. 
Cluster 8: Groups from predicted cluster B (groups ltl4tl59l7q2lq23)q 
predicted cluster A. (groups 28,31), and group 32. A heterogeneous 
coliection of subjects is listed as belonging to this cluster. Some 
seem to give mainly type 1 responsesq and some give a mixture of type 1 
and type 2. 
Cluster 9: This consists of groups from predicted cluster A (groups 4, 
8,19,24,26,28,31), predicted cluster B (groups 18223920)ý -and groups 
202 33, and 34. As only one subject is listed for all the cluster it 
is difficult to see what the cluster might represent. However, it 
obviously has some similarity to cluster 2 and cluster 69 and the 
subject listed is also listed for these clusters. 
Cluster 10: Predicted cluster C, a group from predicted cluster D 
(group 30), a group from predicted cluster B (group 177), and groups 
91 109 and 32. As only one subject is listed as belonging to ýhis 
cluster it is difficult to see what it represents. It looks like it 
may be a cluster of subjects in the transition period between the stage 
where mainly, type 1 repsonses are given and the stage where mainly 
type 2 responses are given with counting of pieces as the method of 
quantification. 
Cluster 11: This cluster consists of all the groups in predicted 
cluster B except for group 18, and group 2 from predicted cluster C. 
The thirteen subjects listed as belonging to the cluster all give 
some answers based on irrelevant factors. Some of these subjects give 
more type 2 answers than answers of the irrelevant type (which is a 
version of type 1)p but most of the subjects give a variety of type 1 
answerst including the irrelevant type. 
Cluster 12: A group from predicted cluster B (group 29), a group from 
predicted cluster D (group 12), and groups 34. and 35- Only two subjects 
are listed for this cluster, both of whom show a mixture of type 1 
177. 
responses and type 2 responses with size cotimr-tion as the method of 
quantification. In other words, this looks like a clustor reprercntiný, - 
the transition between stage I (typo 1 responucn) and the version of 
stage 2 (typo 2 responses) in which size estim. -tion is the preferred 
method of quantification. 
Cluster 13: Predicted cluster Cý g-roups from predicted cluster D 
(groups 
5ý 13y 30), and Croup 32. This looks like a cluster of stage 2 subjects. 
The two subjects listed as belonging to the cluster give answers of 
type 21 with counting as the preferred riothod of quantification. 
Cluster 
-14: 
This cluster consists of moot of the Croups from predicted 
cluster B (groups 196,11,14,15916,17,21,25,29), a Croup from predicted 
cluster C (group 2)9 and group 9. From thio-list of groupcý and the 
sul)Jects listed as belonging to the cluster, it socias that cluster 14 
brings together subjects in a transition period betvocn a -stage where 
they [; ive irrelevant reasons and a stage where they give type 2 rcasonuý 
with counting as -the preferred method of quantification. 
Cluster : Two groups from predicted cluster D (Groups . 5,12)9 
Croup from predicted cluster B (Croup 23), and group 33, ilhe four 
subjects listed for this group all give answers based on comparisons 
of the sizes oftthe target segments on each wheel. The cluster's 
subjects form a subgroup of the subjects listed for cluster 71 and 
three of them are also listed for cluster 1. 
Clunter 16: Two groups from predicted cluster C (, -, roups 29 27)t crouPc 
from predicted cluster B (groups 1,11,14,16,17,21,25)9 and group 
The cluster seems to represent a transition between a stage where 
irrelevant reasons are given and a stage where type 2 reasons are 7iven, 
with counting- of pieces an the method of quantification. As 
such it is similar to cluster 14, and three of the four subjects lirtcO, 
for cluster 16 are also listed for cluster 14. 
Cluster 17_: Groups from predicted cluster D (Croups 3P5tl2y. )O)1 anc! 
a group from predicted cluster B (Croup 23). This list of -ro-anzj 
and the list of subjects belonging to the clusterg indicates that the 
cluster corresponds to the model 2 strategy for cclvinG the -ýroblom 
(the type 2 answers) with size estimation as. the preferred method of 
quantification. The list of subjects belonCin,:; to the clucter forms 
an expanded version of the list of subjects bolongin,: ý to cluý; tcr 15ý 
which is similar to cluster 17- 
It must be admittecl that this result is disappointing by comnarison 
with the clusters produced in the analy-sic of tvh(ý bc,, Ld, -- ro-,. A. (, 'ýtr% 
experiments. The 1aree amount of rcd., undancy which alwayc occurr, in thc 
1ý 7 f'ý . 
6; rcupings, to be -)-,, Psort jyj tl,,,? c). uoter,; ar well. in I L) 
thi" c"), se. In c-6.0itiong the epni-n of thc roiilot'o PYT) r, r It ý-. v r. t 
d. ocs not allow the analysis to be ronnated on a sli, -Ittly 6ý_,, 'feront r, (', t 
-hat independent confirm-t4on of tvic lroall-y' important of datl-, so tI 
clusters could be inad. e. Of course t, iis ,. -, iý-ht bc acJi. -*_ev(, 0. by roneitiw- 
the whole experiment, but this woul(I h-r61y be worthvPl, ilc in view of tl, (- 
effort necessary and the fact that more interostinG qnestý_nns Can be 
formulated from the results as iu-hey vtand. 
The rosult of the cluster analysis io, not 4_ncon-, i! -tent witl'. tile 
ex-occted result. Clusters corres, -)ondina closely to the T)-re(I-icted clusters 
B9 C, -,, nd Dq can be found. 9 although predicted cluster A O., oes not anpear 
on its own. Furthermore , Cl, tLst6rs corrcs7-, ondinLr-, to combinationf, of 
r-. eJictcd clusters A -and 'P39 and Dredicted clusters C Lýnd D, zýrc aloo 
present. As irell as this there are cIustarnro1. )rcscntJ_nE transi-itior L, ýrncu--. ps 
bcti,, ýeen what loo2,, r, liho a firct staCe (predicted cl-U2ý1, cr J1 'P, or 
stage (predicted clur. tor C v. nC D or ty- type 1 responses) and a secon, )c 2 
ý1, 
I.., Cre 4t not ortcC responses). However, this argument woul6. be . yet- 
by the fact that the two -previous ex-perimcnts show tile s. -. Me trend tcjýethcr 
with a development to a Doosible third sta, -a. Thi. -J thirO, starrc 0,. c)(, S 
not a-p-pear in any important way in the resullus of the roulette 
experiment, but the interaction between solution strateCics and the 
methods of cuantification subjects emý)loy cc: acs out most Clearly. 
In the beaCs and roulette experiments the type 
I ro-., 
_-, 
onses (or 
first stage of devol6pment) were divisible into the senu. rate 1rcs]L)on,,.,, a 
styles' of s. 7, urious justifications or no justifications. There tIM 
different versions of eta, -, a 1 aid not ceon to interact 1-jitii each other, 
but 6-eveloped independ-ently into the second cta,:; c. In the resLilt of 
the modified roulette exp S it Uý,,. t 4 
. Leriment 
the ion is very Jifferent. 
The 
end. to be hiu-. ", ly ti-, ro resnonse styles still s-low up2 but t 
.o the extent that only the irrelevant justifications as a cla. --, 
' r 0 
in their ovm right. There are now two main versions of staCc 2', C0=C". 3J>ond- 
, ing,,: to preferences for counting or size catimati6n an the method of 
q_uantificationq and both types of st,, ýac 1 response seer'. to be 
link. cd 
developmentally to both types of stage 2 response. 
This can perhaps be clariffed with the aid of a diagram. ConsiO. erino 
the clusters found in terms of the predictod clusters acna their inter- 
relationships reveals the following situation: 
Clusters corresponding to predicted cluster A (stage 1 answers of the 
'no justification' variety): None. 
Clusters corresnond-inu- to predictee- c*Justcr B (stage 1 answers of the 
'irrelevant justification' variety): Cluster 11. 
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Clusters correopon6ina to combinations of prNictV clunters A nnO P 
(stage 1 answers of both varieties): Cluster 1-19 cluctor 69 cluntnr 
Clunters correspondinC to predicted cluoter Cý rtnsý, rnrc with 
quantification of numbers of pieces): Cluster 30 cluster 4. 
Clusters correspondina to predicted cluster D (stage P answers with 
estimation as the method of quantification): Cluster 11 cluster 7ý 
cluster 15, cluster 17- 
Clusters corresponding to combinations of predicted Vustern C and D 
(stage 2 answers): Cluster 13. 
Clusters corresponding to combinations of predicted clusters B and C 
(transition from stage 1 with irrelevant reasons to, -ýstaCe 2 with countinC; 
of pieces): Cluster 14, cluster 16. 
Clusters correspondinC to combinations of predicted clusters A, B, and C 
(transition from stage 1 to stage 2 with counting of pieces): Cluster 10- 
Clusters corresponding to combinations of predicted clusters A939 and Dv 
(transition from mtage 1 to stage 2 with estimation): Cluster 12. 
This is represented in figure 14. Clusters 5 and 8 have been 
omitted from this figure as they do not seemed to be linked Oirectly to 
the other clusters. Cluster 5 seems to be a cluster of subjects jiving 
answers based on previous outcomes (probably a further fom of stage 1)ý 
and cluster 8 could not be interpreted. 
Summary of the result of the modified roulette experiment. 
For the convenience of the roadcr, the conclusions which can be draw 
from the analysis of the results of the modified roulette experiment will 
be summarised. The aim of the experiment was to tent the view that the 
difference between the results of the beads and roulette experiments 
could be accounted. for by the later development and general imprecision 
of estimation as compared with cou; nting. To make this test an experiment 
was devised which, whilst remaining similar to the roulette experimentg 
allowed the possibility of counting as well as estimation as a method of 
quantification. It was predicted that this availability of countint; 
would cause the result of the experiment to be like the result of the 
beads experiment rather than the result of the roulette experiment. 
This prediction was not confirmed. 
The result of the modified roulette experiment showed a two-staCe 
development of a gradual type, not unlike the two-ataGe development 
found in the roulette experiment. Howevorg there was little Hy of 
further development to a third stage. Instead, two versions of the 
second stage were identified, corresponding to preference for countin4, - 
or size estimation as the method of quantification. There was, bowcvcrg 
considerable intermixing of those two poscibilitiout and this led to a 
possible explanation of the rccult. 
it is proposed that the result Of the modified roulette experiment 
can be understood in terms of indecision on the part of the subjects as 
to which cuop numbers of pieces or sizes of target cononts, is the one 
which should be quantified. This leads to much switching of cues and oven 
soma cases of comparisons of the results of quantifying both cues, This 
draws attention to the crucial role of the children's views as to what 
methods arc appropriate in a given cituationgwhich has hitherto boon 
neglected. 
The lack of any development to a third stage in the ago range used 
for the modified roulette experiment may be explained as the result of 
this increased attention to different cues for quantification, inotoaa 
of the persistence with one cue found in the beads and roulette experiments. 
The fact that recognition of fractions is not such a common form of esti- 
mation as it was in the roulette experiment is also interesting. Possible 
reasons for this are a reluctance by subjects to tront ocaento which 
are divided into pieces as W ts to be represented by a single fractiong 
or the fact that many of the problems used in the modified roulette 
experiment imolve similar fractions of red and green on each wheel 
(this would mean that recognition of fractions would not indicate any 
difference between the Keels in a lot of cases, leaving the sublJoct 
with the choice of asserting that either Keel may be chosen or choosing 
on some other basis). 
Finally, the distinction between the two varieties of the stage 1 
responses (those with reasons without justification and those with reasons 
quoting irrelevant justifications) is found in the modified roulette 
experiment, but the form it tAcs is different to that of the bcaas 
and roulette results. In these results the two types of stage 1 response 
were quite separate, and seemed to develop independently into stage 27 
whereas in the modified roulette experiment they arc overlapping and 
the development is complex. The reason for tkis is not clear, but it 
has boon argued that the distincti6n is probably only one of Irosponne 
style', and me be due to the impoverished nature of the verbalisationC 
of stage 1 children. 
Some mu -estions for testin,! -, tI L '01C 'aaý, ic 
inter-oretation of the ,rS- 
-L. 1 0 
modified roulette ex-ncrimcnt2--, -3, rcj some relevant rosearch. 
No gencral critio. ue of the moEified roulette exneriment will be 
r-_r o-fercd herc2 as thek:: inds of criticism antici-)c. tcd have rýlreacy been 
covered in dis , cuts -j ions of the -oreviourr ex-2cr-. ment--. Inrtcz,. Ol 
1"'. 1. 
will be C,, iven to come way-o in which tho uonfulnocr, of the internrol-, ation 
of the result o-17fored miCht be accossed. 
The first -Ito-, ) in such an asocsomcnt must be to m, --kn allre that there 
is. no feature of the desiGn of the modified roulottn eý-n, criment %11)ich 
might itsdlf be responsible for the dif, 'Coroncc betwoon the modified 
roulette and roulette experiment results. This in particularly important 
.L 
C-. tn because the modified roulette experiment wac, not designed to investi ' 
the effect which was actually found. It was dcoiý; nca on the cs, _umvption 
that counting would be used by most of -the subjucts, so that the mrz:!. toriý, 10 
wore arranGed to disambiguate answers arrived --, t by countinc au fz,. r 
possible. In fact, counting was reported by many of the subjects 
the experiment would not have Got pact the nilot stago) , but many uolec, 
size estimation as well* 
This meant that the laclk of attention paid to the nozcibility of 
estimation in the design ctarýos of the ox, )criment : )rovod problc:, -, -Lt`ic- 
In the roulette cy, 2eaciraent only cim-: )le pro-portiono of rod. 
uSed, -vhoreao in the modi-. 4iod roulatIte experiment quite co-,,, inlex prunortions 
size proved necessary. At first this was consi(lered unim-ortant bvc, -ýusc - 
estimation does not do-end upon proportion, -, Lnd recognition of fr. -Lctions is 
imprecise enoug-h to lea(! to a 'difficult' fract4_on boin- recognisod an tl-ý, P, U 
pronortionf- nearest 'easy' one llmoi. m, Howover, the. way in which the c'm-nlc 
were combined in the problems of the roulette experiment may ma1ce for 
'easier' problems than thoac of the raoClified roulette expcrimcnt. Two 
of the roulette problems involved a whcol which was half red -ind h, -lf 
green and another whecl which was not halll* red and h.,,. 
l-' grec. n. In such 
cases it may be particularly teasyl to see that there is -'the same a. 30, ant 
of red and Green on one whoe12 and more of one than the other on the 
other i,., hool. Thiz miGht possibly account for the drop in the number 
of type 3 responses in the modified roulette experiment, instead of the 
account advanced here in terno of excessive attontion to the conflict 
between counting ana size estimation. 
A worthwhile contro. 1 to toot this possibility might be made, but 
the main claim, that the stage 2 stratoGy is used with countinG or 
estimation and in come cases both, is not susceptible to ouch criticisms. 
The general lack of attention to fractiono in the moaified rouletto 
experiment also could not 'be explained on the grounds that the fractionr, 
used were not simple, for the reasons already mentioned.: This is particularly 
tr-de in the modified roulette situation, where sufficient' information to 
enable calculation of the fractions is actually provided. 
A more general approach would 'be to investigate the criteAa*t on 
which the use of numbers of pieces or sizes of segailents as cues -to be 
18". 
utilised in this type of problem in baned. For tho fact 
that the niccon on the two ilhcM in the Wif YO roulette onrcriment Rrn 
of different radii my favour size comparisons rather than counts. in 
other wordsq children my hesitate about uciný-, countinC when the iteris 
to be compared are physically different and will then roly on entimation. 
Purthermoret there my be certain types of physical differendo which are 
more important than others in this respectq such as a sonent's radius 
rather than its analar width. The way the target pieces in the roiilctto 
experiment arc kept toythor me also increase proferonce for estimation 
to counting, and wheels in which the target and non-target pieces are 
interspersed might be tried. Attention c6uld also be drawn to the numerical 
aspects of the situation by allowing the subjects to tconntruct' the 
wheels used out of red and green 'choose pieces'. This possibility in 
particularly interesting as it takes up a point raised earlier about the 
difference between the amount of manipulation of the exrerimental materials 
by the subjects in the beads and roulette exroriments. 
If the criteria children use in docidinC to count pieces or estimate 
sizes could be identified in this way, and a position could be arrived at 
from which the relative uses of counting or estimation by subjects (in 
experiments of this type) was predictable, an impressive confirmation of 
the interpretation advanced so far would have been achieved. 
How does the interpretation of the modified roulette experiment in 
terms of the subjectO difficulty in deciding whether to count pieces or 
estimate sizes fit in with the other research literature? Wite Oimplyq 
there appear to be no similar experiments (to the writer's knowledgeg at 
any rate). It is possible, however, to find accounts of experiments where 
a similar conflict between cues leading to different types of quantity 
judgements has been set up. 
The most striking of such experiments involve the invcctigation of 
Mat Piaget (1952) CAlls conservation of discontinuous quantity. These 
experiments involve judgements by children as to whether the relative 
amount of elements in two rows remains the same after transformation of 
one of the rows. The experiment is typically be M with both rows in 
one-one correspondence (same length and spacinC of elc-,: ients for each row), 
followed by a transformation in the form of On'lioning or shortening 
of one of the rows. A non-conserving response would be to claim that 
initially the amount of beads in the two rows is equal and after the 
transformation one row has more than the other. 
The explanation offered by Piaget to account for this offodt amounts 
to a claim that the non-conserving child lacks the ability to mentally 
'cancel out? the transformationo However, Bryant (10,71b) =Ves that 
I 
"1 () 
what actually happens depends on the fact that -01cre 11-e tl, 10 cuor, 
which caild-ron may use to make quantity judComents in such cascof 
one-one correspondence and len, -, th. Initially there ours are in 
th indicate that each rour I'-1 the agreement (in the sense that they boli s 
on saric quantity), but after the transformation the one-ore co. ý, rc, _-on(l cc 
is destroyed and the lcnCth cue ind-Icatec that -the lon-er line hz,. o 
more. Piaget (10,52) states th--t the younC child does not Graup that 
number is invariantv but Bryant (1971b) has shoim that without the 
introduction of conflicting cues invariance is assumerýj ard that in the 
clasf--ical conservation experiment it is overruled by the conflict vrifli 
t-heýlcngth cue. What the chila must learn, thenv it-, not that number is 
invariantt nor how to reverse transformations, but which quantity cues 
are appropriate in which situations. 
The interesting thing about this, for pronent pur-)oscoq is the 
comparison between Bryant's interpretation in terms of cues fo-, jud, "n i7, 
quantity -and the analysis of the role of cues in the c-. r., 7nrImcnts rcTortej 
- thcA he here. Closer inspection of Bryant's own mýttcriv. ls reveal ;I 
arran, -es his situations carefully in order to climinnte other cue--'I 
such. as counting (by using large numbers of beaEs). This is quite 
legitimate as an initial step, but it limits the scone of his theory, 
ased view of the role of different tyres of and a more broadly bL 
quantitative judgements in conservation is given by K! Lihr and -1, allace 
(1973). 
A study reported bZ, Inhelder -and Sinclair 
(1ý, 6ý) also invc--. tir,, 'It'e, _- 
7lict between different cuc, for what children do when there in a con. IL a 
assessinc quantity. This study is narticularly interestino for two 
, 
ht into conflict are '. lumber Zý. -O lcný, tllj rcasons. Firstly, the cucsl; rou., - 
which involve Qc and Q0 in terms of Klahr anc, , Iall, --ccls 
(1973) r"Odely 
an(! so are comparable to the : )o--oible cues in the moaif4,06 r')IITOt'-c 
e. x-periment. Secondly, the interpretation of the results , -ivc: i by 
Inhelder (1972) is very cloze tb the ajýproach adoptc& here. 
Inhelder and Sinclairto aim was -to train subjccts to con--crvc! 
l0r-th 
by demonstrating that both number of constituent narts ana ., 
oi-rit-to- 
noint distance 'as the crow flies, are onl-, r indicatorr3 of L 
line's length in certain special CýLGCS. Their nroblems involv0d rMtCIh 
sticks of two different lcngthsq ana took three forms: 
1. The experimenter constructs a zi[; -naC 1--nc M, d(' with one lon,, -, th of 
match, and the subjoctfs tasi: is to con-truct a straight linc Of 
the same length directly bcneathý usin- the other lonGth of irrAch. U 
2. The subject again has to construct a straiý; Iit line of the sL. rýc lCn! 7tI 
as the experimenter's zia-zag line usinC ý, 04--flerent lcr., 7, th of 
9 
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but the subject's line is no lon-er (lit-octly unCorn(, %th 
exporimenter's. 
The o: cperimonter conotructs c. ztraiý; ht lino uoinjý-, one _Ici,, iý; Lh off, 
match, ana, the subjoctlr, tash is to conotruct a strý,, i-ht linc 
the same length (Ii cctly it wi, th natche- f he 
o ther length. 
, he tiý: o lenCths of tziatcheo were arr, -nL, -oC, co tli"t 
One third ty, -)c of 
2m-)le nronortional rclatioroh4n cý-_istcd a problem was solublo c. a o- 
between the two lengths). ? ""Laurc 15, VM-cli is to. '-. en fron Inlicl. Ccr (1ý72)v 
ec -he tar, ': 0 c7cla .L- ýrcr. probably maL st 
linc`-idr iýrcre c, -.. pable of All-the subjects uscCL by Inholder -,, nC " 
conservin, - Jiscontinuous nu- tity, but the efficacy of thc In ,.. I an 1, 
training conservcAion o-l-' lenjth var4od from inCliviftal to iný17. iviOual. 
Four main steps in the construction procecs leadin,,, to , Atuainmont of the 
conservation were observeO. Initially .. -. any subjectn 
baood_ ti: cir juCZ; er,. 1cnts 
on either of -the ! -iain rossible criteria, point-to-point lon, -, -th or numbor 
in the accordino to the 1, Iuc-Ition The seconý! Fýt of matches, L Uc- 
, 2rocc-. s seems to involve aw-. raness of Vlh. e a-)plicability of both 
but inability to resolve their contrr%O. iction. IThis, lcr, ý6. -s 
to a frustrltiný; 
alternation between 
t annoar, but Inholdcr (1ý72) con The third. stop did no u aiý s 
it the most significant. It'consi-sts of va-riou. - inacnious but inadequate 
L ipts to integrate the two criteria, for exam-le by brealrino -, i, ---, tches iLt t C: -, 
to get the same nirnber and same noint-to-point longth, or by 
matchco vertically ins-tc-ad of horizontally. 'Phis methoC, in inaJoquate 
because it can only be usod in two of the three situations. This is 
mado clear in figure 169 'khich also comrs from InholOor (1972). 
The explanation of the fourth ster is best left to Inhcldcx*: 
'From here, the fourth step in the construction -process follows- 
for many sub 
4 00-LU 0 
%J 
Instoaa of one scheme oncratini, a -; -)ost-hoc LJ 
correction on the other, we now see a recinrocal aCjustment whereby 
the criterion of coincidence (sufficient provided the two paths 
are parallel) and that of numerical equality 
(sufficient provi0ed all 
matches are of equal length) are successfully integrated into a 
coherent system which allows the child to solve -)roblems of len, -th 
4n all generality, and no lonC; cr in sl. )cci-ýl cases. Now the (1-ifferent LA 
schemes can be integrated, which gives a now imnetun to the search 
for necessary and- sufficient conditions for equality of length. This 
results in a complate understandinC of the compensation irvolvcd- 
The children explain "You need more matches when they are smaller" 
1 
and "the pAh ý,, oes less far but it h, -,. r, ziý7-zaus"-' 
(Inhcl(lor, 
1. / C_ Un0erlined passar 072t ', )P- 110-111- , es 
italicised in oriCinal). 
It is most interestin- to compare the result of havin, ", Q ,. nd Q UCC 
available in this situation with the result of the moe. ified. roulette 
experiment. In both cases the child is faced with the difficult task 
of reconciling conflicting ways of makin- quantity judgementc. Of coursoy 
et L in the modified roul ,a experiment size estimation ana numbers of niccon 
': in- are not always conflictingý cuest and the children have no way of maj 
t Novertholess9 some Uhe ingenious compromises described by Inhelder. 
subjects are clearly disturbed by the instances where utilioing the stage 
2 strategy with numbers of pieces or sizes of scomento as the feature 
to be quantified leads to opposite choices, and the amount of switching 
between the two cues donfirms that moct subjects do not continually 
favour one or the other. 
The ages of the subjects involved in the experiments reported by 
Inhelder are presumably below those of the subjects alternating between 
number and size cues in the modified roulette experiment (the mean ace 
quoted by Inhelder and Sinclair, 1969, is six years), and those in the 
experiments of Piaget (1952) -. nd Bryant (1971b) are younaer still 
(roughly 5-6 for Piagot, and 3ý44 for Bryant). Howevert this does not 
seriously detract from their interest in relation to the modified roulette 
results, as the situation used in the modified roulette experiment is 
oe 
more complex, so that -an effect of the type Piau-ct calls a 'clucalagol 
(see Plavclly 1963) would be expected. 
Some final theoretical considerations and speculations. 
The conclusion Inholder (1972) draws from, the results of the Genevan 
training studies is as follol,,, s: 
'Instead of a more or loss straightforward type of dcVolopmCnt9 
with differentiations becominG more and more refined (in the form 
of a treelike diagram)9 the interactions between different sub- 
systems appear of the greatest importance. As the first example 
has shoim2 interactions between numerical and ordinal ways of 
dealing with problems of judging or constructing lengths lead to 
a conflict. It is this conflict thich will trir- er the process 
leading to the final rcsolutiong through reciprocal- apsimilation 
of the two different subsystems that do not ace-casarily belong 
to the same dovelopmental level'. (Op. cit-9 p. 113). 
The similarity of this theoretical view to the position developed 
here can be clearly seen, despite the differences in terminology- 
Inhelder then shows how she thinks her 'process model' relates to the 
'classical Piagetian structural model'. 'Phis is not an impossible t, -ýsh 
V', 6. 
for, as 'Newell (1972) ; aakes clcarý the tormr, Structu"O and '? rocou, -, 
can only be used in relation to an implied perspective* In other 
words, what is structure-like and whot is procecr-like OcT)cnds on 
the viewpoint of the person makinG the distinction. 
Before considering Inhclderls views on this rtw-ittcr, to V, 0 '1- t 
will be made to surmount some of the limit-c-Ltions of her positidn. 
These arise from the fact that the cases she hc. o conriCorcd art, ir. 
many ways rather spccialp and only shcd lirrht on a a-, all nnrt of 
cognitive development. Of courscq this is not a criticiomt but 
- on. natural consequence of any carefully arraný-ed and controllra invert 
Hence some profit may be derived from fittirC har. -detailed studies into a 
more general framework. 
In order to broaden our undarstandinC of children's performance in 
experiments it is ncoessary to consider not just the stratec_; ics they 
use but the range of possible ctrate-ics from which these are oelectec.. U 
Such an approach is outlined by Goodnow (1972)2 who otres, 7cs two themes 
in rarticular; performance ass --cl-ccV. on from a ran-o of 
behaviours, --nC. learninC as the aevelopment of knuuledea about possiblet- 
usual, and mo,., t anpropriate selections for --i Civen (Goo8_no,.:, 
1972, : ). 96). 
0-r One of the main aims of the traditionral oý-_pc2_-imcntal mothoO. is, . 
course, to eliminate t1iis selective natiire ol' -ýcrformý-nce by controllinz 
conditions to the point where -vic r,,,. n hopefully dis-Cover tlc nrc, -, cnc; c 
or absence of a sin, ý; lc item in -the chile-'z rc, *ncrtoi,, c,. Althou, -h this 
will probably never be achieVed in rractice, it re-maim,, for mary 
researchers as an idoai. to be wor! ýod. towarCs. Others see it as narrowly 
restricting and uroc the analysis of data from non-cx-crimentcý, l Irpalistic' 
sottin-s (e. g. Hutt and Hutt, 1070), but thio merely le-aCs to different 
shortcomin. -s. The intereuting th4nfr, : ýýbout Goodnow's (1ý72) nosition is 
that it forms a kind of link between the two apnroachcsý becl-u-e the 
obvious thing to do if one acce7ts it is to stuC. y both the particul,,. r 
pcrtoi. ýc from Cb t1l ar stracteCies children use and the totn-1 rc- ; LL Coe "0 
drai-, rn 
Such an a,, )proach leado to many question-, for future wor. - 
from the present reseatch. A pý. rt_; cularly intcrostinC oxai: iple cý, nccrns 
the availability to the child of aiffercnt otrateCics in a 0cvc`0, -, -Qnta? - 
V I se(juenceo It has been shom thrat the ch-111d can us() 0-iff('ron' 
%-jQ0 Ln strategies in different situatidns, -an,! even dllý'fc Mt vr, ý., C U 1-i 
situations of differing level-- 01.7 co,, i7,1CY. ity- It 1-: 0ul" be L> 
intercstin- to hnoir, to what extent the chilC-ron =c t1-, c: i-clVc--r 00111sciouc U 
of this, to what C4-, tcr. t it is only typical of it 4-0n ncrio"-, f:: ýr 
.7 
they canIrct-, ress, orladvancol in ap-, )ropriate ccnditionoy ro on. 
Above ail, -4t i, - to oiscover IIou, m, -,, ny wayr, of -. -ýproachir, ý; a 
problem children see as viablOl 
lunother important tcxlk n., to, x-Ana from Ithe i0ca of -Orfnrmance LO 
Iýhc, criteria on wLich "clection frona a ro, -. ertoire is to invest JI -, at o 
such a sclection -is based. A ai:,. all projec'. of tM-, ty, ý-ý'o 
1-_1 Cy 
beer o-, ltlinod. for of the renertoirc soon in the results of the 
mo(. 7-ifi(ý, d. roulet I. c CXT', CriT-, cntI lrO this ýii., -, ht serve nac the foundrntion 
for n broad-or treatment of the prob. Le: a. Other ic', eas- conecrnin,. - thr, 
social constraints of the cxpcrimentall situntion havo also been put 
forw-ord, CnCL his interrretation of such oonutraints obviouzly plays 
an important role in the subject's choice of behaviour. Goodnoij ý: al. o- 
this point with examples borrowed from Arnhaim (196ý), 
'When a teacher or experimenter s., _ys 11this 
is a test", or, 
even more arabi, -uously, "I h_-%ve Some glames for you to play"ý the 
expectation is that the subject will reZI)ond by putting out a fair 
a:.,, ount of effort. The subject should also I: nolvi that the expected 
answers are Pscientific" ones ........ "scientific" an-Ii-icrs arc 
e. -Pected when someone asks) as pzýrt of -the Wechsler scale, "Novi 
are wood and alcohol alike? " The answer, "They 
bolish knocl. -, you 
ou-1-11 may be regarded as witty in come oettinas, Arnheim noints U 
_ou-bý 
but it will rate you zero points in a testinC situation. 
L "Good" "scientific" answers, of course - e. g., "They are bo-th 
hydrocarbons" - will rate you zero pointo in come other conversotions'. 
(Goodnowý 1972$ p. 98. ) 
An important theoretical question concerns the ori. -in and atatun of 
the repertoire of stratogics from which performance is drawn. Goodnow 
seems to take the view that the strateCies are hold in a 'made-up' formy 
ready to be applied whenever conditions are appropriate. This means 
that development is seen as the addition of strategies to the repertoire 
and the elaboration of the criteria for applying strategies. A similar 
position is adopted by !. 1iller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960), 
'Where do Plans come from? Probably the major source of 
new Plans is old Plans. We chzýýngc them around a little bit 
each time we use them, but they arc basically the came old 
Plans with minor variations. Sometimes we may borrow a new 
plan from someone else. But we do not often create a completely 
new Plan'. (Op-cit-s P-177). 
Later on, however, they modify this vievy somewhat and argue that only 
a ImetaplanI2 from which a large number of different Plans can be Cenerated 
as they are needed must be stored in a -person's memory. 
.L,, 
eý 
). 
This seems a more realistic statemontg and fits c()mc of the ide:,. s 
developed here. One of the main thomes of this thcoic has been that 
although the ways in which children organiso quantified information to 
solve problems may be equivalent over a variety of situationsy their 
choices of cues to be quantified and quantification operator are more 
directly linked to particular requirements. 
It is also noccible, however, th,. t strategies arc not stored even 
in the form of, mctanlanc$ but that they are assembled. specifically for 
the task in hand, as Klahr --nd dallace (1970--) seem to imply. The 
truth is probably that both views have some validity. In the present 
case, for example, it seems quite plausible that the stage 2 strategy 
of comparing the amounts of whatever you want in c, -. ch collection may 
be a general way of dealing with many problems. On the other hand, the 
stage 3 strategy of co%roarina the difference botwoen the ai,, ount of what 
you want and the amount of whatever you don't ýwant in each collectiony 
may well be an approach that is only figured out when conditions are 
favourable. The results of -the exneriments can certainly be in*',, (Ir, )rctcd 
in this way, although it is very speculative. 
All these dif. 1'erent ways of viewing children's performance and, 
abilities contain implicit reference-, to ideas as to how these abilities 
develop. They seem, for the most partý to regard development as increasing 
both the size of the child's repertoire of possible strategies and the 
Comnlexity of the rules hc uses in selecting from this repertoire for 
a particular situation. In addition2 some developnents can be seen as 
resulting from modifications to existing strategies. 
In this thesis special attention has been paid. to the L. ct possibility 
by formulating models in such a way thzt they can form a sequence of 
increasingly elaborate yet related possibilities. This if, in accordance 
with the ftiterion of developmental tractability suggested by Klahr and 
Wallace (1970b). Evidence i-nato then adduced that some of the modelc at 
least could be considered as equivalent to developmental staccs in certain 
situationst but nothin, ý has as yet been said tLbout what might account for 
such a development. 
- It is widely believed that development in lai-rfull and that one of 
the major tasks of developmental psychology is to discover the rules 
underlying it. The status of ouch 'transition rules' varies from theory 
to theory. Werner (1957), for example, provides an abstract ecocrintion 
of certain organisational features of a system and argues that in 
organismic development these features will tend- tow, -. rd betf, cr a0, -,. -. tn. tion 
to the environment. Perhaps this can be m, -,. Je clearer by considcrin, ý t1i, _ 
follov. in. L-, statrient, 
180. s, 
'it is -,. n orthorone-tic )r1nc-*,, T)ln %, hich 11 01 Triierevor 
t, Lt est, t 1" 
development occurs it procceClo from a stýLtc of ,: 1. obality 
and lacl-, of differentiation to a state of increr. s in! ý 0jff crentil-t i on 
'ion'. (': erncr, articulation, and hicrcLrchic intoUr,,,, - P-579 
6) 
This vi,. -ýw of development is stateLl a', a level of abs, -Lraction 
m LOý: cc it al-moot unfalsifiable. It is aloo not linkc(l to rny rvpoci 17icat -ion , 
I-X tc why d. cvelo, )mC-nt ,, irocecC. 
ri in this waywoxc, ý. t for to further 
abstrr. ct ia(m, sq such la(ýantat ion. I Ar, an overall to bc 
however, bp of Valup.. linked ý, jith other -ioi-c icleas it mny 
-et kl! '54) iz; si-iilar to ', rlorrerlo vio,: r The cc,, nii1ibrat1on of Pic, ) 
1, in,, rct t1lat the adaptation of nAn orjanis-, i to itc n mzrny .,, -, yc. j 
environment can be ,, mdcrstoo0. ir, tnrniss of twD nrocem-, oc, 7LnC. 
accomodation. These are difficult, te :, --,,. c; flr cnncise1..,,, q L113; ro*,,, -'hl, r 
s--orýking assimilat-ion is usod to describe týiv wrýL, in wl, ich t7,, c 
, lust fit environmn-n-tal events into its nw-, 
1-, nowleýf7c sl, ructiiro, -,, vI no 
and im-noveri-oh tbe-%, ncco-oO_, at4. on ý. escrilez; V, r 
in internal . -trrctv. re , -T'M. ch are 
from t1mc lon t;, Pc, in oT,, 'e. L* t(; furt, 'her 
aO. aptation, (thi-- is s1ij-,, 1A1y ovcrs-_mj)l1_fi(, (1j since 0. nreC. orlinantlir 
-(It's , --Lc Como eat ive ch-ngeq sLich -ýo an, i,, Atat.,, ()ný is no-IL. -ý0, anti,, re 
in ! PiULj 
sonse). When a C. ovelopricntal occurs, ascii, dlation ane, accorlodation 
will bc in eouilibriu; m. 
This model draws attention to certain important aspectc of develop- 
mental chanaes, and provides a frarac of reference for studyin. L; dove lopmcntw 
but hardly =plains it. Asnimilation sco,:,, s to be a nroperty of -ny 
infor-aLn. tion-h,,. iadli-. -.,,, r systo%-. 1 c, ýnd the :,,,, cin cx-PlanzatorY 
'110r%' is done by 
the concelA of --ccomodation. The dra-, r,,,, b, -. c.: is thiý, 
t the tý-: p(-, -- of -acconc(I. -ALOn 
which are -nosrAble or not possible, or si, n-, ly lil--clyg cannot be dcrivccl 
directly from the ioýcl. Fu. -ther-iorc, -Vic cý, -Iin thrýt assimilat6ry ýnC_ 
accomodatory- activity nu: A be in erj-, Hlibrium whenovor n 7r,, v(,.,! o-:, ncnt 
cannot bc substl-lntiat ýd 1,: 4-thou-1; sc-lc- 11-_iný of 7norýý7-, ire of lul, one nj-rC 
ho,., cvorj be conccý. cO. '. h-. t tlc-, r eo tý., '-c nl,,. Co w'icn- 
ever a develormcnt occ-ars -.. )r the re-L-on thnt c-s: _iiiilation w,. 
11 
always be -oiný; on and the r!. cconoý., -Ltion is tl, (, ýýcvelo-icnt- 
Many -: )sycholo, -i&, tS -100"Ti to -rr, --F'cr to -. n, )ro%ch the nroblem of 
develor. )- 
mcnit, from lorss abst=. ct lcvcls. Bryant 
(1, ý71-, 7b) rtre-eO. 
the r,, -, 
Ic 
of such factors [ý. o cncad; _nC 
1, nO 10,. -. ory ca-)ancity rather thc. n the 
lenevan 
-h lo. oical onerations, ana rn-, c-,. al-Lconc (! ('7) h--. -, a0vancoC, an concern vit 
-P o tý--s ty: )c su7-. -Ortee. b.,; ovi"elicc tile ch-il-O'CO : ý: C;;,! O Zr c: _-rlanation .I 
ca,, )r. city increases vi-ith i_ncrc-, siný; 
(in ter:. iz 01' -'. he n,, L. -ibcr of 
nOt Just -norc ef 'licicnt I chunl-in, -' Thr, ýlc -ýic iri: ýort: ý, nt 
influences on children's -, -)crfarT,. cr. cc-_j anJ rccO tý, bc irt, ýý ýýny 
I 
c0n , atinfactory account of Oovolop,: icnt but, ar, 1`1,;, voll (1-171) in ut 
it Scerns =liho3y thtt they can car, ý,,,, Ville f-, ill burCen of 
(Icvolo, nmcnt. 
Ano1.1i(,, r wi_Coly fzývouroc! notion ooc; -= to be tllu., t of co, -nitive cnnflicL. 
Br-Lmcr (! ()66), for c,: aý,,, plc9 ., iuch of the conflict betvicen mo(ICS of 
renrosontation =n source of'im,, -, ýulcion to cro,.,!, I although he admits 
that not all cor. ficts do to -, rowth. 1, ý, jny oxa., -, rloc of more or irsn 
successful tr"-inino Stuclies atto,. -, ptin,:; to accelerate dove 1 o-:,, )mCnt by 
JnculcatinC; co,,, ritivc conflict have been rc-ortce by Smod. clund (o&Co 
Smedslund, 1964o 1,068). 
Lj apor io that Ono of the important thin about Inholiers 
W72) 
she tries to link Viis lKind of approach to the Genevan 'structural' 
perspective. As has beer, mentionce-9 she rejects the idea that all 
development concists simply in increasin, -, differentio. tion of structures, 
and stresses instead the interactions between Oiffercnt sub.. yote; -lis. 
Those subsystems can, hcwcvcr2 be re-arded us intcrn1cli-ed nchemes, so 
that their appearance ana their possibiliti(ýs of bein,:; in-LoCrated ., ith 
other schemes may be dcterm.. ho -encral structure of the corrospon Jnod by td 
in, S level of development. 
This a-pproach raises many interesting ý,. uestions of c. type Which the 
older version of the qquilibration model ignores concornina the ways in 
which different subsystems can bebrought into line with each, other und 
integrated into a core coherent system. 
The two systemic principles on which Klahr and Wallace 
(10,73) build 
up their developmental theory can help in this respect. These -principles 
state that if the child is conceptua-liced as a developing information 
procecsin, U system: 
(a) The developmental system constantly searches for consistent 
sequences which will enable it to eliminate redundant processinC. 
(A consistent sequence is an internal representation of environ- 
mental inputs ana system procesces that always yield the sDme 
result). 
(b) If, in a particular context, the system is unable to detect con- 
nictcnt sequences, it widens the basic of its search. 
Tentative sugg-estions as to how come of the other questiono thtt 
Inholder's approach raises might be answered are given by Collorior 
(1,072), in a paper in which lie discusoes how the central concepts of 
Piaget's theory might be refined to a point where they would be 
Tprogrammable. Some of his ideas are worth quotin- in full: U 
'The main idea seems to be that the new rules , -. nd concc,, )ts 
arise from recombination of the ones that are nrecent. This 
1 
recombination relies heavily on the oxictenec of a gener: Ll 
purpose representation system thcat can code both nýctlonr, amo, 
-ern recog-nit, cituationsp an(! of .1 patt J-on device thut acts on 
-Llic-se ro-ýrcscntat, Jons to nroduce ruler, and concepts, - th, -A is, 
hi[; Iicr orC. or entities cuch as prcscriý)tions and descriptions. 
This means the representation systvcm mu---Ik-, hý,. --ve Come Capacity 
to accomodate new types, of input; it must itself be ad. aptivo. 
-on -here must exi_, t a OecompositAon and rccombinatý Finally, 4. 
device that acts on thesc descriptions ane. prescriptions to 
Generate new onc., z. The ý,. ctual clinice of w1li-Ich combinations 
-ruc on should be generated- hL!. ve '. o be basc6 on the const t4 
ol a ouccecs-ion of partial rcorCanizea representations 
(structured 
models) of tho rc lat ions)- i-p between 7recriptions ancl descrirtionog 
and. of techniques fcr transscribinL-, one inIvo the otherg thereby linl, _iný; Lj 0 
the structural and process (I escrint ions. 111hc selection of the 
adapted combinations would C. encnO. on an evaluation of Vleir effec-It'o 
on the (external) problem environment, this evaluat4-cn beinc used 
to update the internal mo6c! an, C_ start a new recombinction scoue. -r-ccl. 
(Op. cit. 9 pp. 120-121). 
Such a view both reinforces and extenC. s come of the conclusiono which 
have been derived here. The idea that performance ctratc, ýýios are no', 
stored in a ready-made formg but are asSembled- in various ways to fit 
situational requirements, is conveyed most forcefully, and the view 
that one of the keys to the pu, -,, zlcs of how this is achieved, and how 
development takes place, lies in the re-prescntations -16he c. iild usesy 
is put forward. The empirical eviConco -, reduced here certainly cannot, 
compel anyone to accept this interpretation, but it is consistent with 
it. The most important thirtthovicverý iss that the formulation is Suffic- 
iently detailed for the path to further tests to be cloar, and th-40 
remains a task for the future. 
192. 
SMIMARY. 
I the arGumant preocnted in t'ýi-. 1-1-, esi, - wi-11. nov be A summary of 
given. ThiS surn,, trý, 
is intended to sho,.; tl,, ic any ir wllý: Lch the thcm, -ýs 
Care developcd2 and ao is less forma3-isad ano loss factual then the 
thesis abstract. 
The study invoctigated the way children rcason whon f,,, c(, d with 
typo of 1. )robleri concer. -iin,: viliat adults 1-ioula call Ichaficol or lprobrýbil; -141. 
The problems used involved two collections of clements of two coloura. 
ChilO-rcn were asked which collection they would prefer in order to L; a:, ibIc 
for a specified outcome. Some of the research literature on t1tis tonic 
wass reviewed, and four n. ossible ways of solvint-, such rroblcms were 
succested: 
-elevant mothocs. Method 1: Guessin. -, ltcrnatinC choices, oLher ir-. 
Method 2: ComparinC the amounts of the target cicmcntsý in each colloction, 
and choosing the collection i-, rith the i. fTe-Lter 
Method 3: Comparing the differcn=; beiween the amount of tar.,, cl; --ýnd 
non-tar, -et clements in e,. ý. cl., 0011CC'. *Lon, ancl cloooi-_- the 
- J. ý collection with the most f--vour:,. blr, J,. fforence. 
Method 4: Cori-),, ý, rinL,,; the -. )ronortuiono of target --ný ron-týir, ýet elcmcnts 
in each collection, anC, clioos-*In, -, the collection with the 
moot favourable -proportion. 
Ways in which these -possibilities invccti-atod ý-Prv Oi--- 
cussed, and it v, Las, cleciC. ed to use an cxperimental dooiCn i,,, hich woulet 
allo,.,; the choices mrý(Ie to be used in infcrrin, ýý -, trategies, and to supplement 
this with an analysis of the rcr,. conz given by ciiildren to rLccount for 
thcir choices. An c-xperiment was then carriod out uzin- collcc`W*onz- of 
red aný, Ly, -reen beads in boxes %s matcrials. The subjcctc %-., ere 72 childrcn 
c. gcd 5- 10 years and. 48 c. ýiiildrcn -, 7, cd 11 - 14 years. The data obtc-incO 
(choices maae and reasons given for each choice) was analy-ced by inter- 
Dretation accordin, 3 to --pecified criteriag and indenenaently by the 
Brimcr cluster analysis. This showed that, 
(a) The way the children's Golultiono, to 1.1ic -ýroblcr-, s dcvcI-o-, ) c--n 
ct'iod. s be representod by three stages, corrcononding to m- 
(b) Method Z, did not appoar as a foart'h stl-. Lýc the -rolrý)O of 
children studied. 
A control experiment i,., -az performed to show th-,,., t ViJis rcoult- 
not due to an --rtifdct arisinL-, from the derian of the e:, -, perimentlal 
materials. 
Consideration was then -ivc,, to -'-ho rolc of co,,, u-itiný; as a conveniort 
anj rciiý: Ablc MCt1_, _oC of -u'- antifirat-_nn in -pro(aic`. nýý All 
experiment i-ný: ý in 'iný' ),, -t tho 
11CL110. Olho-v; U--- in Oitu-ati on s where onl-,, r cstim,, A ý, )r, 0r 
ff o this c: --crimcnt two ýi r (, r t. c0cIrcIerco,,, c'i i:,,, 
-cd Lind rc. ýcn ! 7ic! -ýýcnt. There -a -ointor or. erclh, circic -1-; _c'A, -.. Iler 
p I-) un 1 
10. -- to-noIntj. r-tothc rc 0or-e cr - (,, - rnt9 .- !"LC :7-" 1) ý"L Cý -1 1- Li U.. .1 0'. V -1 - 
iyas to choo-co one of the circl. -_ ir or, rr tý-, 1,, ý-ot 
od 6- 11 YO,! X. 'ý t! CtCO ýV-, O-Ull colcu.. - 72 ciiiloýrcr, ýý11 %) 
-as 7ý-ain ariclyocOl bot% by intor-i-etzction accor, 02n t( 
1-nd the Brimer cluctor Thio t-_*MC tl, p r4-01-Zr wer(- t1l'-, tt I. _- . 1. 
-c dcve"oprient (froi, i ! -1rt', (, O 1. to 'wo-stc-Li "11) Tllc-ýe wns OnI. J" La tW 
'-he age ran-c tertee., by S'J-, lr in -U L. 1 -_ ince inctlinC, 2 
of the subjects it never became the Jo-, ý. iincn-lt oltr ý! 'Q 
-lie ý%ý; e rý. -r. L; n (b) Mothod 4 did not ap-:, ýcar -. o -, % sta-c in 11 
(c) The main methoCs of quantification refcrroý -Lo by -Lhc c'iilc'rcn 
were size estimation and recocnition of fract ons. 
, otarded by cjm, t Vh S1 04' thc (a) The rcoult anpcars -h te rc,, , It 
periment involvin,, r bea6s. ex- 
This result 11L'S cy-nlained by a O. iocussior of the slo-., cr developmcnt 
. and 
by reference t icion of of estimation than countin 9L k1o the i:,, i-; -)rcc- 
cztimation. The 'fact that L -rrics the szanc information 0. a fraction cl 
inC. ex, and its nos-Sible influence on properly calculated probability . 
-the results, was also considercCl. 
In order to test this ex-olanation an experiment wcas devisod in which 
both estimation and counting woulO, be availrablc. This was achieved by U ý1 
dividin,, - -the segments on the circles useC in the second main experiment 
into pieces, so that subjects could cst-m-tc t1ac sizes of the cOL, -Ments 
or count the numbers of pieces in the seu. -mcnts- It 'vis ýreliictcc! that 
countino would be preferred because of its greater -ý)recision, and thýlt 
a result like that of the first main experiment (usin,, ý beacls) voilld 
be obtained. 60 children aged 6- 10 years were used, and the analysis, 
was carried out in the -same way as -'Lhe arnaly,,, es of the other experiments. 
The result showed, 
(a) A two stage development (from method 1 to mcthoC, 2) in the ago 
range tested. 
(b) The second stage of this development was in certain rcs-ýccts Cluite 
stable at age 10, and there was I. i-'L-, tlc sign of further development 
to a third stage corresponding to method 3 or method 4. 
(c) Wide individual differencer, --in the methods of quantification us-(ýd 
by the children in rroducin, ý solutions to the different problems of 
-the experiment. 
lN, - 
(01) The mtc ,. t which thc stlaL; c development toolý ilacc nimilar 
to thnt found. in the occond m,, -Lin cxr)crl-mcntq 1',. Ot tllc f l"rt I 
cxper 4 1,, Cnt,, 
These results cliJ not su, -port the -)redi. ctiono Tt v*, x 
that the explanation of the result lay in a failure by ', I. qc c: iilC-ren to 
consiotertly rrefer countin, - or ontimr-tion -as a , ictlhod of r,. uz,. otific,,, 'tion. 
In order to test this view the criteria on wlu-ch the C11-loice countin- 
or estimation at dif-ýcrcn`v agem -'s 
baoseO x,., oiild hL,. ve to be ctudi-al , LnC, 
su. -gc--tions were made -as to how this might be done. Piný. llyq an atteript 
vjzLs made to fit the research findiri-o into a wider context of other U 
researches and theories. 
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A TECHNIqUE FOR CLASSIFYING QUALITATIVE DATA 
25 
This technique was developed to serve a need for an inductive procedure 
that would enable'classes of qualitative categories to be formed and 
identified and which would permit such classes to make no greater assumptions 
abou't the nature of. the data than that they were binary events whose 
freq uency of occurrence 'and co-occurrence were subject to the laws oIf proba-- 
I) iI ity. While relative propinquity of categories in such classes might be 
-,, iy of conceiving their multiple dependencies, there would be no 
n, c, ý e, to Invoke spatial models to express strength of coherence-or tile 
degree to which any category was bonded to the most strongly coherint; 
category. lt should be emphasised that the a-A*. m was to create a classi- 
ficatory tool and to test the plausibility of the classes so formed. 
The resulting classes, while aiming to represent a parsimonious sorting 
of data would display alternative classes and would permit rational 
hypotheses to be fitted for subsequent experimental verification. 
The development of this technique is discusseds beginning with the 
problem of determining the'conditions for positing multiple contingencies 
I,, The two category and three category problem- 
'Given three categories a, b and c where na; nb; nc; are 
the respective frequencies of these categories in a set of 
N el*ements 
a) The expected frequencies of two category possession areV- 
nnn na -nn n1c -n nc ab abcaCbb 
NNN 
2, GivEn that nn and n are known, the probability'of ab' ac bc 
choosing from those elements that are b an element which is 
also. 4 -is 
n ab and the probability of choosing from those 
n bn 
elements that are b one that is also c is bc , and the 
nb 
probability of. choosing an element that is a and c from those 
that are b is n ab xn bc the expected value, of nabe b6ing 
2 
nb 
n a) X TI be. 
nb 
__ __- 
nv. n ab xn bc .............................. abc nh 
Similarlyý expected values of n abc can 
be derived from 
0 
n ab xn ac and 
n ad xn bc 
n nc 
1-1 anc n bc "ncnc 
N 
nanb xnbnc 
then from (1) N N n' abc 
nanbn c 
n 2 
4. It. follows that if nab >nanb and nbc >nb nc 
N N 
then n ab xn bc ý,,, n anb, nC 
. 01, -- nbN2 
and it has been shown that if amongst three given categories 
the obtained frequency of joint belonging to any twopnirs 
is greater than expected by random assignmentr the frequency 
of joint belonging to all three categories will be estimated 
to exceed the frequency expected from random assignment to all 
three categories independently. 
it follows that if all three pairs of frequencies of joint 
belonging exceed expected values, the hypothesis that 
nnnn abc> abc is strengthened. 
N2 
0 
II. Lliýher mul-riple category Eroblems'. - 
Any number of categories greater than three can be dealt with by 
extrapolation of this argument since they can be regarded ar. 
reducible to all possible paired relatiinships between cntegorics. 
. It W3.11 AUMCe to 
demonstrate this in a four category problem. 
2. a, b, c. d are four categories for which it has been found 
that 
n ab 
- 
"', 
nanb; n ac 
> nan c; n ad 
>nand; n bc> 
nbnc 
NNN 
000000o. to all possible pairs. 
If they were merely equal then the probability of an element 
which is b being av c and d is 
n ab xn bc xn bd and , 
the expected frequency in n b* bbb 
elements would'be n Ab xn bc xn bd , which after substitution 
2 
nb 
becomes nanbncnd 
N3 
This is the frequency 
random assignment to 
but since n ab 
> nanb 
N 
that would be expected from independent 
a, b, c and d, 
n bc 
>nb nc n bd 
> nb nd then 
11 N 
nxnxnnnnn ab bc bd> abcd. 
n2N2 b 
When this is demonstrable for all possible triadic relationships 
between categories, then the hypothesis that 
nnnn upported. n>abcd Is s abcd 
N2 
III. Theproblem of identifying those categories amongst which mutual 
belonging o elements exceeds that expected by random assiýýment 
to categoilei. 
A first stop in tackling this problem would be to determine for 
which categories obtained frequencies of belonging to each pair of 
every possfi3le pair exceeded expectation. - if our concern is to 
make the most economical description of co-varintion between 
categories or to assert that the number of categories in a grotip 
has bcen increased to the limit required by f0>fe then A procedura 
must be devised for identiiying that maximal set of categories in 
which the observed frequency of joint belonging to pairs of 
categories is greater than the expected frequency for all 
possible pairs. 
An iterative procedure suggests itself even though it may not be 
the most economical strategy. If we begin by selecting that pair of 
categories for which f0-fe is greatest-we increase the likelihood 
that another category can be found for which joint belonging to each 
member of the pair is also in each case greater than expected. The 
choice of this third category would on the same principle be made by 
selecting that for which the sum of f. - fe for joint belonging to 
each member of the first pair is greatest. This process can be 
carried on until a point is reached where no further category can be 
added which satisfies the f. > fe criterion. The order in which 
categories are added to a group, being determined by the order of the 
sums of differences, contributes to a maximising of the size of the 
group formed. Further groups can be formed in the same way until 
every category has been considered for its contribution to a group and 
has been assigned to a group or identified as having no co-variation 
with any other category which is greater than chance. 
IV. -The problem of standardising frequencies and differences between 
obtained and expected freguencies,, 
1. Such a process as that described in III could lead to bias in 
the groups formed as a result of the variation in the number of 
elements in each category. It is desirable, therefore, to find 
some way in which the raw frequencies can be standardised. In a 
syrunetrical matrix of categories in which the elements of the mAtrix 
are frequencies of joint belonging to categories i and j the freqtjcnc'y 
may be written n It will be assumed for the present case that 
the categories are not mutually exclusive and that a total of 
2. I 
N elements are assigned independently to categories i and 
The raw frequency nij may be expressed as the proportion, 
2-- 
n. . pij ;. ýj N 
and the proportion. itself standardised by expressing it as a ratio 
of the standard deviation of the proportion *, 
pi. 
where n, and n3 are respectively the frequencies of belonging of 
elements to i and j the obtained standardised relative frequency then 
becomes 
pi. n.. 
a Pi nn 
2. The problem of standardising differences between obtained and 
expected frequencies can be regarded in the following way, where 
n 13 = 
the observed raw frequency 
n 3. n3 the expected raw frequency, 
N 
The-ratio of obtained to expected frequency is 
n.. n.. ij xNNx 
n. n. 1jn. Inn1n 
If the obtained and expected frequencies were equal, then 
N n.. n.. 
. 
Vnin, 
-x -J 1 and -LJ- 
ninn3. nninN 
whence 
n.. n. n. 
__23 - _. 
U - 0. 
iTi- _n 
N 
j 
See Burt, C. , 
"Sta tistical Problems in the Evaluation of Army Tests", 
Psychometrica, IX, 
. 
1944, p. 225. 
(o'ý. T 
0 if ied (2) Now the first term of the above equation has been ident 
as the observed, standardised relative frequency$ therefore the 
second term must represent the expected* standardised relative 
ýrequency. And the whole expression is the standardised 
.., difference between observed and expected frequencies. 
A fur, ther demonstration of this can he found by examining the 
Lelationship ef the above equation to X2 
( 
'fo - 
fe) 2 
f 
e 
which in the notation we have used becomes 
nin, 
n, n. 
N 
If we consider the square root of the term 
[n ninjl2 
ij IN, j 
n, n. 
it can býe expressed as n nin,,. ij N 
whence /N--nlj vrn-. n. and FN 
1-mi =j 
N 
and X2:. NZn li n, 
12 
nInN 
rn 
i 
-nj 
n. Fn i 
-ni 
rn -n N 
Ij 
the term inside the brackets in the equation above is identical with 
that we have described as the standardised difference between observed 
and expected frequencies. A matrix of Lhose values has been shown by 
Burt (1953) to be the residual matrix after the abstraction of the firAt 
geneý-al factor from Lhe matrix of standardised relative frequencies. 
2 I, 
V. -The problem of mutuallX exclusive catepories 
A matrix of frequencies of the type we have ddecuosed might refer 
to categories some of which art mutually exclusive and otharn not. 
The question that arises is whether or not the proposed uue of stand- 
ardised relative differences is compatible with such a matrix. Since 
amongst any set of mutually exclusive categories, observed frequencies 
are zlero and', by definition, no frequency of joint belonging to any 
pair of categories can occur, the first question is whether or not 
a notion of expected frequen6y is meaningful. 
4 
It also follows that if the value nn is subtracted from :: a 
N 
zero and a negative difference obtained, this negative value will be 
treated as having the same meaning as a negative difference arising 
from non-mutually exclusive categories. These problems may be examined 
by considering the case of zero observed frequency of joint belonging to 
a) a pair of mutually exclusive categories 
b) a pair of non-mutually exclusive categories. 
In the case of b) it is a premiss of the matrix that theft; equency may be 
non-zero although it is a necessary condition of-tho operation to be 
performed on the matrix that it admit of this premiss being false. 
In the case of a) this premiss is known to be false. Thus so long as 
the operations performed on the matrix are such that they admit and 
identify cases where the premiSS is or may be false and do not argue 
from these false premisses, both mutually exclusive and non-mutually 
exclusive categories are admissible in the same matrix. The function 
of an expected frequency in the cases we have discussed is to create a 
difference. which will lead to the identification of those cases where the 
premiss may be false. 
Another way of regarding negative differences in both mutually 
exclusive and non-mutually exclusive categories is that they express 
the degree to which the. possession of one attribute implies the 
absence of the other. 
vi The problem of 
_pa_rtial 
association with a group of cateporlan 
The method proposed in III for identifying multiPlO category groups 
is in itself stringent in that it requires that all posoible pairs of - 
categori. es satisfy the condition f0> fe, when less than this condition 
might be sufficient in any significantly related set of categories* 
The effect of the condition might be to exclude a category for which 
aspociation with the group might be statistically significant. 
This can be readily seen in the case where one of a set of mutually 
exclusive categories has been admitted to a group and by 
its nature 
no further category in that act can be admitted. Yet the relationship 
of the group with two or more categories of the act might ba dis- 
I 
junctive i. e. either tL or b. Certain other pairs of categories might 
have the same practichl status although they have not been logically 
constructed to have that status. Thus two or more non-mutually 
exclusive categories may in practice, operate to exclude one another, 
yet possess a disjunctive relationship with the group. While in the 
case of logically, mutually-exclusive categories it would be a simple 
matter to take their status into account* in the case of empirical 
mutually exclusive categories difficulties would arise. 
2. It seems preferable therefore to create another procedure whereby 
the excessive stringency of the first procedure can be corrected. 16 
the cases we have discussed, consideration of a new category for ad- 
mission to a group would reveal both positive and'negative differences 
wiih constituent*categories of the group. The rule that has been 
adopted is that if the sum ofthese differences is positive, there 
is 
a prima facie case for examining the relationship of that category with 
the group formed. The rule is somewhat arbitrary but it will be shown 
that it is in practice trustworthy. Thus, after the completion of any 
group, the sum of the differences for every category with members of the 
group is found. 
0 
Vii. -. The Rroblem of elements in the leading diatonal 
The matrix of standardised relative frequencies leads to all 
elements in the leading diagonal being 1. After subtraction of tha 
'expected frequency' it becomes less than 1. The value of this 
'expected frequency' [n i is in fact equal to the probability of 
NN 
I 
-As 
-)-G( 0.1. 
occurrence of that category. Thus the diagonal element is the 
complement of a category's probability of occurrenco. The diaConal 
element can be used in one of two ways. 
a) The subýtaniivc use in the progiamme as currently used 
When a group has been formed, the sum of the differences for 
all possible pairs of the 'a' categories forming the group Into 
which thAt category enters, is composed of a-1 differences, 
whereas all categories not admitted to the group have sums 
composed of 'a' differences. Relative magnitudes of 'in group' 
and 'out - -group' sums would thus be non conparable and some 
controlling operations, like the use of the means of differences, 
would be necessary. An alternative procedure, and the one 
adopted in the progranne, is to add the diagonal element for a 
category to its sum. The diagonal element can be considered as 
expressing the likelihood that any contingent event into which 
the category enters entails all incidences of that category. 
When a category with a diagonal element approaching 1 enters a group 
it carries with it the likelihood of high redundancy. By adding 
the diagonal element to the sura of differences for a category, the 
sum is increased by a value proportionate to the category's 
likely redundancy. 
b) The use of diagonal elements as weights for surjs of differences 
The use of the diagonal elementst as discussed in a) has the 
effect of assigning greater importance in a group to those categories 
which have lower likelihood of supporting general propositions about 
the whole sample of objects to which categories are assigned. 
The justification for this lies in the intention of the classification 
procedure to distinguish cohering groups of categories whatever their 
level of generality. If, however, the intention were to identify 
the ca"tegories contributing the most general statement about the 
sample of objects, then the complement of the diagonal elements may 
be used to weight the sums. While such a procedure does not affect 
che sorting of categories into classes, it affects the relative Magni- 
cude of 6uTs. Moreover, it requires the use of the means of weighted 
suins, 
0 
VIII. The st atus of the, ýr ouRs, _ 
so f or med 
it will be evident from the earlier discussion thnt groups 
have been formed by teference to a necessary but insufficient 
cly, the sorting operation utilizes only positive condition. Firs-, 
differences to initiate and add meirbers to groups; secondly, 
no reference is made to the standard error of the differences In 
selecting categories for admission; thirdly, the argument for 
multiple inLer-dependence of categaries is based upon conaideration 
of all possible pairs of categories only. The implications of 
these limitations are: 
a. There is no guarantee that the frequency of joint belonging 
to all categories of a group will exceed chance expectation, 
b. A group may be formed beginning with a non significant 
difference and grow by adding categories that also betray 
non signIficant differences. 
c. The order in which categories ate added and thus, the power 
given to them to exclude other cntegories is based upon a 
difference between sums which takes no account of their 
standard ettor. 
Whereas in logic we should require of a class that there be 
defining properties of the class such that inclusion and exclusion 
would be unequivocal, in psychology we frequently seek to classify in 
such a manner that persons who betray related but not identical 
properties reveal the common pattetn underlying the overt personal 
manifestations. If our observations of persons were always grouped 
by the functions which gave rise to the observations, then class 
logic might be a relevant guide. However, itisofar as the same and 
underlying function may give rise to different behavioural manifestationit 
in different pexsons, we would by the operation of class lopic be led 
to reject an hypothesis of the operation of that function, by failing 
to find significant joint belonging to all overt categories. 
roups m. %ed viiiell nre tite nutcome of Given Llie risk that p iy he fort 
sampling error the optlows, open are cither to itvititutlý StOP bY rJnP 
te- - c-f sigm'f jcýnwc (-)r tv ti)p,. y It, nýýc-, tj I test: oc sipiMcance to ,, I 
G ý3. T 
each group. The former would, at the very best, subatantially 
increase the complexity of the analysis and the latter would entail 
the risk of rejecting groups on the basis of what is considered to 
be destructive of useful hypothesis formulation. An alternative 
pr6cedure is cross validation in which the analysis in applied to 
independent samples and groups are then tested for their replication. 
This is the procedure currently adopted in the programme and involves 
running the analysis again on the groups derived from separate 
samples and admitting only those groups which are replicated. 
This has the further virtue of revealing group redundancy which is an 
inevitable feature of this classificatory process. 
It is a common experience in employing the process on real data 
that the groups formed are immediately apprehended in the conte. 'a 
of a priori hypotheses. Nevertheless, it is worth enterinr, a 
warning that the technique is not intended as a substitute for 
the prior rKtional development of hypotheses. It can act as a 
device for clarifying the operational implications of the a priori 
hypotheses and it can at times suggest counter hypotheses that have 
not been previously entertained. Sometimes the latter are salutory 
in suggesting the degree to which pro-structuring of data lnrgely 
determines the outcome, 
The technique has been fully programmed for the Bristol University 
computer and contains a number of packages. Earlier diffiCUltiCs 
in communicating the prograT=eo arising from writing it in machine 
language have been overcome by its present PORTRAN form. 
Sample_Analxsis 
For illustrative purposes the technique is shown in application 
to data gathered by Burt (1952) and has the advantage that a complete 
set of significance tests can be applied to tcst the results of the 
analysis which can also be compared with those derived from. Burt's 
factorlal approach. Table T lists the raw frequencies and 
Table TI is the matrix of standardised differences. 
- 
v 
The data refer to the classification of individuals in terms 
of Hair-colour (Fair, Red, Dark); Eye-colour (Light. Mixed, Brown); 
Width of Head (Narrow. Wide), Ileight (Tall, Short). Tho steps 
in the process of forming groups are given below. 
Identify the highest* positive value excluding diagonal 
elements, in Table 11 (T. L. . 393). 
2. Identify the categories which have positive values with 
the two categories so selected and from these select 
that which has the highest* sum of values F. . 365). 
From the remaining select those which have a positive 
value for F and repeat from 2. 
4. When the stage is reached that no further categories 
have positive values with all those included, the 
formation of the group is complete. (Neither R nor 11 
satisfy this condition and the group is composed of 
T, L and F. ) 
5. Since condition 4 is stringent, it is preferable to 
add a further stage so that all promising hypotheses 
are entertained. For all remaining categories 
determine the sum of values. Accept as associated with 
the group all categories for which the sum is positive. 
(Thus R being a mutually exclusive category with F would 
be so associated and would lead to the hypothesis that 
T. Lt F/R was a significant multiple combination, while 
N would also be tested for its association with Tj L and F. ) 
The completion of this first group suggests the following 
combinations as fully significant. 
1) T. L. F. 
2) T. L. F/R. 
3) T. L. F. N. 
t 
, IL 
It infrequently happens that two or more values are cqualq In such 
cases the practice is adopted of sclcctinr, thAt caterory whLch tins 
the highest sum of differences with all other categories. If two 
still remain, the categories aro accepted in the order in Which they- 
are listed. 
- ---------- 
170. T, 
6. The categories not so far Belected for inclusion In a 
central group are then explored to determine the 
highest positive value (BS 222). 
7. Repeat as from.. 2 
4). ' 'B. S. D. 
5) B S'. D. M. 
6)-W. M. S. 
7) W. M. S. D. 
*. d.. .. 
8) R. L. T. N. 
9) RIF. L. T. N. 
Nine combinations of 3 categories or more are thus 
identified out of the 192 that are entertained and all are 
significant when tested against the complete table of 
combinations given by Burt. No other combinations attain 
significance. 
M. A. Brimer 
March 1973. 
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